This is a well-written introductory book on game theory. The theory is presented in 12 chapters (about 600 pages). It's title is completely justified. The author manages to present the various aspects of game theory in a well-written, fun to read way. The author's vast teaching and research experience is reflected to the high quality of the book. It is suitable for both undergraduate students who wish to learn basic things about game theory and graduate students who use game theory in research. It is a book whose audience is not restricted to economists, but anyone may read it, since the necessary math background is also provided. The book starts from the game and its various forms definitions, then presents lotteries, utility functions and payoffs. A chapter is dedicated to bargaining. Much discussion on pure and mixed strategies, Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, Nash and subgame perfect equilibria is also provided. Then, repeated games are introduced, the critical role of presence or absence of full information and knowledge in such games is thoroughly discussed. All this theory is presented in an easy to understand way. This book's major contribution besides presenting a variety of game theory topics in a solid and theoretically justified way is that it teaches the reader how to apply the theory in practise. It also contains much discussion on common fallacies and misinterpretations on some of these issues, which is really helpful. Last but not least, it contains a vast number of exercises at the end of each chapter. I wish more emphasis and generic results on zero-sum and repeated games had been provided by the author. Nevertheless, it is a book that is worth buying and should be read from cover to cover. This is an excellent introductory book, a similar more advanced book is Fundenberg and Tirole's Game Theory.
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