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on 10 December 2013
They Were Counted (The Writing on the Wall: the Transylvanian Trilogy)

I was so excited about this book because Prof. Macmillan's general reviews have been excellent and I have just finished the Transylvanian Trilogy which she quotes (link above) so getting a better idea of the causes of WWI was of great interest.

There is no doubt that Prof. Macmillan knows her subject well but she repeats many of the circumstances that she cites as cause for war and the book seems to me a little muddled in the chronology of characters and events. It is easy reading, it is not overcomplicated, it just takes me back to school where the historical facts had to be repeated several times to ensure that us dummies did not forget them. That said, I have learned a few relevant and more irrelevant facts.

If it were not disrespectful, which is certainly not my intention, I would comment that Prof. Macmillan may have either been otherwise preoccupied during the writing of this book or her publishers may have asked her to pad it out. So many books coming on to the market at the moment do not seem to have been properly proof-read and maybe the combined pressures of Christmas and the 100th aniversary of WWI have led to the sad faults that I have found in this volume.
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TOP 500 REVIEWERon 19 October 2013
'Preventive war is like committing suicide out of fear of death' (Bismarck).

'It had to come' (US Ambassador in London, 1914).

'Torture and Cannibalism were the only two expedients that the civilised, scientific, Christian States had been able to deny themselves:and these were of doubtful utility'. (W.Churchill).

'Please restrain Conrad' (Archduke Ferdinand in 1908).

'You'll be home before the leaves fall'. (Kaiser to troops in August 1914).

'He was like a battleship with steam up and screws going but with no rudder, and he will run into something one day and cause a catastrophe'.( Sir Edward Grey describing the Kaiser).

Professor Sir Michael Howard has written that you cannot understand the causes of the Great War or indeed any war unless you also understand the political, economic, social and cultural environment in which it took place. Hence, the ramshackle nature of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the constitutional arrangements of Germany post 1870,the surging nationalism in Serbia and the fragile nature of Tsarist Russia must be understood.For this reason, historians like Professor Margaret Macmillan now concentrate more on issues and developments in all of these fields instead of researching only diplomatic exchanges.

This essential requirement reveals the paucity and trivial nature of some of the offerings in the current cascade of books on the Great War, and why this account shines like pure gold. Those accounts that 'read like novels' do so because most of them consist of fiction and myth. No war has been so subjected to mythology, or stands so much in need of the correcting force of fundamental simplicities, as the Great War. The war is also a classic example of how doctrinal theory can warp true history, particularly military history.

Given the nature of history, the mountain of variables, the dubious quality of many sources and the inability to adopt in full the scientific method that science depends on, it is no wonder that despite the over 46000 books plus articles on the Great War there is still so much disagreement about its causes and conduct.
There is, of course, no agreement among historians or political scientists about what causes war. Is it the nature of man, the type of state or states involved,or problems with the anarchical international system, such as balance of power, instability or lack of a credible international law? Opinions differ widely. Mathematical models have been built and used with poor results. Even wars that appear easy to analyse in this respect prove to be very complex, for example, the American Civil War, the Iraq-Iran war, the Korean war. Even the causes of the Second World War were hotly disputed by Alan Taylor in his highly contentious book. Only a sadistic examiner would ask students to answer the question:'Discuss the Causes of the Great War'.

Finding the causes of war is akin to finding the causes of cancer; there are so many varieties of each. The idea that wars can be caused by one specific factor, individual or systemic has long been derided. Taylor once likened the problem to finding the reason for a car accident. Was it, he asked, poor maintenance, excessive speed,drunkenness, faulty brakes, a blowout, ice on the road or was it the fault of the nut behind the wheel? There is a view that a war of such titanic proportions must have been determined by causes of a similar titanic scale. The word 'titanic' is not irrelevant. Why did the Titanic sink with a loss of 1513 lives on 15 April 1912 when all the experts said it couldn't happen? Why did so many ships navigate the same route without mishap? Was it the hull design, excessive speed, lack of lifeboats, more ice than normal, or human error?
Those, and they exist, who still look for one cause remind one of the drunk who has lost his watch. When asked why he is looking under a street lamp he replies because the light is better here.

Margaret MacMillan agrees that all the major Powers must
share the blame for a war that caused around 10 million deaths, 15 million wounded and destroyed four major Empires (as well as 1 million horses). However, and I share her view, she believes Austria-Hungary and Germany were the main culprits. In so doing, she disagrees with Clark (Siberia) and Mcmeeken (Russia). Instead she supports the writings of some leading German scholars and the superb accounts by Albertini, Strachan, Stevenson, and many others that the available evidence would convince any unbiased jury to convict these two countries.

Professor MacMillan is a Canadian who is Warden of St Antony's College Oxford, She is the author of several best sellers including: 'Peacemakers' that won the Wolfson prize, 'Women of the Raj', 'Nixon and Mao', 'An Uneasy Peace' and 'Canada and Nato'. As the titles suggest she is not only a leading historian but also an international relations scholar. She writes beautifully clear English making a 700 page book easy to read. She is authoritative, fair and objective. At times she can be delightfully politically incorrect. Her Great Grandfather was David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain during the war from 1916.

In her book of 20 chapters she spends 17 of them examining the period from 1900 to 1914. She discusses the many Balkan crises and the Moroccan crises, pointing out how these had all been settled diplomatically. She, like others, mentions how the war had surprised many Europeans given the economic, technological and commercial progress during the previous 30 years. Those like Ivan Bloch, the Polish entrepreneur, who gave, in five brilliant volumes, dire warnings about the nature of a war in the 20th century, were ignored by generals for the simple reason his views, if believed, would have put them out of a job, as were the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war and the American Civil War. This was not the first or last time that the past was to be ignored. The other major reason why few were willing to believe that warfare had changed was because in all previous interstate wars it had been possible to turn a flank. Come Xmas 1914 this was no longer possible. Siege warfare became the name of the game. No general had any knowledge of this nor was it taught in our Staff College. No wonder the learning curve was almost vertical.

Given the focus and structure of her book, it could have been entitled:'European History: 1900-1918'. It is NOT a military history book, there being hundreds of those available. Whereas they deal with the: How, When and Who, this book deals with the far more complex question 'WHY'.

She addresses the key question, namely, how did an incident in a far away country result in a terrible war, or why did peace fail in 1914 when it held in 1908 and 1912? It is a question that has perplexed many, many historians.
She points out that the war took place among much bellicosity and militarism, and that it was confidently believed that if war came it would be limited as had the wars of 1866 and 1870-71. Only in the Epilogue does she touch briefly on the war and its conduct. The author discusses the various plans for war. These have been misunderstood by many who know little of military matters. These 'plans' reveal that it was only the German plan which involved an attack upon another power (France). It was only that plan which involved the violation of a neutral country, and it was only in the German plan that mobilization meant not preparation but war.
Also as Lord Haldane said at the time Germany had allowed decisions about war to be made by soldiers instead of by civilians. He said (echoing Von Clausewitz) 'It is not their business to have the last word in deciding between peace and war'.

The author , unusually in books on the war, includes a chapter on the importance of the Peace Movement, that was instrumental in setting up the Hague Conferences. This important movement in fact began after the Napoleonic Wars largely due to Quakers and liberal middle class business men. It drew on the ideas of Bentham, Say, Turgot, and James Mill. Its aim was to end war. In fact although it flourished in Britain, France and The USA it met opposition from growing militarism by 1900. It became vilified at the time of the Boer War.

There is very little that is new in this book-how could there be? What makes it a gem is the way the author synthesizes the mass of evidence available in such a convincing manner. The result is a book that is by far the best so far on the war. Students will find it indispensable. It is not, to use an overused word, definitive. No historical work can ever be. When interpretation and judgement are the name of the game, there can never be a final agreed verdict.

Her view that it was the handful of decision-makers who failed to control the crisis from escalating into a crisis slide out of honour, fear, hubris and incompetence and, in part, by public xenophobia is, I believe, very sound. They had grown used to peace. It is people, not systems that cause war. They say, like Bush and Blair did:'Yes' instead of 'No'. What if Kennedy had allowed the Air force Chiefs to have their way and bomb the missile sites in Cuba? What if Obama had not listened to critics and gone ahead and bombed Syrian bases? What if Truman had agreed to 'bomb the Soviets back to the stone age'as one very senior general advocated? Wars are determined not by vast impersonal forces. They are the result of deliberate policy decisions by men (almost always men) who are at the mercy of the whole range of human frailties. Unfortunately, there are few signs that our decision-makers today are any different or better than those in 1914 despite the availability of computers and a bevy of special advisers.

It is for this and other reasons why I have long advocated the study of human psychology along with history. Among other things, students would learn the traps awaiting decision-makers caused by false assumptions, mirror-imaging, and self-fulfilling prophecies. They would also benefit from a study of the'law of unintended consequences'.

Some of the author's pen portraits of key personnel are quite superb. Anyone who thinks they were lesser beings than their equivalents today would be well advised to read the new book by Professors Crewe and King entitled: 'Blunders'. They reveal the appalling incompetence and errors made by politicians in Great Britain in the past 16 years, errors that have cost the country at least £50 billion!

The author does not shrink from making a number of analogies with problems in today's world, for example, terrorism. She could have made several analogies to the problems in Syria. That state has, in my opinion, the propensity, like Serbia in 1914, to draw in several major powers like the US, Russia, Israel, Turkey and Iran resulting in a Middle East powder keg.

She rightly places little importance on the assassination. It was, like W M D, a pretext for action by Austria to destroy Serbia. She could have mentioned also that assassination was all the rage after 1890. Four Presidents (2 American), two Queens, two Prime Ministers, a Shah, two Kings and a Crown Prince were murdered in this period. None it should be noted caused a war.
Even the Emperor showed little concern over the Archduke's demise. The Archduke was disliked by many, yet ironically as he was anti-war he may have been the only person who could have prevented the lemming-like process.

Finally, although she does not say so, there are glimmers of Chaos Theory in her account. Leaving aside the mathematics, this theory is all about change over time. All systems alter over time. The theory attempts to explain irregular behaviour and the difficulty of prediction. Small changes can make systems unstable; this certainly happened in the 19th century.

At the end of the war European dominance of the globe had ended. After the fighting on the Western Front, and elsewhere, Europeans could no longer speak of a civilising mission to the world. Did it end war? Unfortunately not. We are still awaiting the solution to that question. One fears it will be a very, very long wait.

A wonderful book by a superb historian (a long book though of 700 pages that perhaps could have had up to 50 pruned without affecting the quality). I would respectfully suggest that others put away their pens, close their laptops and find another subject to write about.

The Bibliography and Notes are excellent. The maps are adequate, given the focus of the book. I have tested the index, it is sound. It is very pleasing to see that Professor Macmillan thanks her team of researchers: so often these very hard working people are overlooked.

This is an enthralling, detailed book full of brilliant points. It is illuminating, written with pace, verve and demonstrates excellent judgement. I repeat,it is not definitive but, and it is an important but, this work comes as close to being definitive as is possible given the available evidence (unfortunately some priceless documents were destroyed during the bombing of Germany in 1944). This is a very major contribution to a true understanding of the Great War. The debate will continue over the attribution of responsibility for the Great War but this book will raise the level of the debate. The war was not, as the author says, inevitable. However, as MacMillam shows once it began its course depended on a range of contingent factors. Finding out why war broke out is a very important historical and political endeavour for we need to learn lessons from it even today.

A catastrophe of the scale of the war of 1914-18 can only be understood when the specific 'causes' such as: the alliance systems, the Balkans, colonial rivalry, arms races, nationalism, miltancy, and so forth are meshed with larger political, economic and societal trends that took place after, say, 1850. These trends, for example, industrialisation, mechanisation, growing Empires, an explosion of communication systems, railways and increasing populations that by 1914 allowed states to put millions of men in uniform, an act that revolutionised the problems of command and control on the battlefield, are crucial to any true analysis and understanding of the war. Margaret MacMillan has done all interested in the most terrible war since the 30 years war a massive service by reminding us of these developments.

Buy this book. it is a tour de force.
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on 26 July 2014
Like so many book of the genre it delights in the jigsaw of pieces that brought us to the time when the picture showed the first guns were fired. There it stops. Forget all the political and personal machinations, the foibals, the weakness, the pettyness of the then upper class establishment. She almost coyly asks about the Spring of 1915 when stalement had put its first roots in the soil of France and Belgium. She suggests almost in the style of our beloved "Punch" that when the war had become bogged down".. why was it not stopped ? and gives the suggested answer... how can "they " admit that.. "Whoops we may have made a bit of a mistake" . Big business had made a huge commitment to supplying ..at huge profit..the necessities of .war.

The book would have infintely more credence had she answered the Harry patch question.. WHY WAS IT NOT STOPPED ? Many doubt that the establishment wanted it stoipped. It was stopped but only after another 3 and a half years of slaughter, not until "they" had killed 12,000,000 men and women and it was ended; and it was... in a few hours in a railway carriage by a group on minions. The final obsenity was "they" delayed the armistice for 5 hours until they had the poetry of 11th hour;the 11th day , the 11th month. And another 1500 men had to die for that.

The only question really worth researching and publishing is who failed to stop it in the early summer of 1915 and one finger points at an ancestoral relative of Mrs MacMillan.. a certain D Lloyd George.
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on 9 July 2014
I have not got far with this but I have seen one particularly bad error.

Professor MacMillan writes that Erskine Childers, the author of the Riddle of the Sands, was executed by a British firing squad.

He was executed by an Irish firing squad of the pro treaty forces during the Irish Civil War
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on 2 May 2014
Shameful, especially when compared to the far better and more comprehensive book The Sleepwalkers. This is purely painting Britain as the innocent party that was caught up in a War created by Germany. It fits into the British national view and fails to recognise the French financial support of Serbia whose initial act of assassination triggered the cascade of events that led to war. It does not make much account of Russia's backing of Serbia and its willingness to go to War over Serbia and of France seeing Russia's involvement as an opportunity to finally put Germany in its place. A highly biassed book - 1 star because the author made it so long possibly just to give it credibility.
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TOP 1000 REVIEWERon 15 January 2014
The author is erudite and lucid while her text is amply documented. I have, however, deducted one star due to her acid comments on characters of principal actors, their married life and extramarital affairs which - while not adding substance to the story even though she may feel she is adding spice to her prose - in fact decrease the density of her text and increase unnecessarily the length of the book.

World War I was not inevitable but it did not come out of a blue sky either. A series of decisions taken by European powers successively before the war narrowed choices and in the process increased the likelihood of war.

When in 1914 Europe fell into the abyss of a catastrophic conflict, the result was the killing of millions of men, the bleeding of its economies dry, the shaking of empires and societies to pieces, and a fatal undermining of Europe's dominance in the world.

Most Europeans including their leaders thought a general war impossible, improbable or bound to end quickly. There was, however, a dissenting minority in this view which included internationalists and pacifists. Prominent among them was Jean Jaures who though receiving limited coverage in the book still emerges something of a hero. He was prescient in describing to a friend in a cafe in Paris, what a future war would be like: 'the cannon fire and the bombs; entire nations decimated; millions of soldiers strewn in mud; millions of corpses...

Europe with minor exceptions had enjoyed a century of peace since the Napoleonic wars. In 1800 before the gap in power opened up, Europe had controlled approximately 35 percent of the world; by 1914 that figure was 84 per cent.

But looking up on the scene in Europe before World War I we can see the forces making the war more likely: the rivalries over colonies, economic competition, ethnic nationalisms which were tearing apart the failing empires of Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, or the growth of a nationalist public opinion which put new pressures on leaders to stand up for their nations' perceived rights and interests. Adding to those tensions was a world in flux due to industrialization, the scientific and technological revolutions, the play of new ideas and attitudes, were shaking societies across Europe and calling,long- established practices and values into question.

The book traces Europe's path to 1914 and picks out those turning points when its options narrowed.

There was initially the Anglo-German naval rivalry which ended Britain's 'splendid isolation' and led to the entente-cordiale with France. Then a series of episodes led and crystallized to opposing alliances, the Triple-Entente comprising Britain, France, and Russia and the Triple-Alliance comprising Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Italy the junior partner.

What increased tensions over a period of eight years preceding World War I were a series of crises, the first and second Moroccan crises, the crisis over Bosnia, and the two Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 which all threatened to bring about a general war but diplomacy had always averted it. During these tensions, the Concert of Europe had more or less survived.

What finally precipitated the war was the assassination in Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary and his wife Sophie. This led to declaration of war from Austria-Hungary against Serbia which led to general conflagration.

Sometime in the evening on the eve of the war, Monday 3 August, Grey (the British foreign secretary) made the remark which for so many Europeans came to sum up what the war meant. As he looked out the window into St James's Park where the lamplighters were lighting up the gas lamps, he said, 'The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them again in our life-time.'

By the time the war ended on 11 November 1918, sixty-five million men had fought and eight and a half million had been killed. Eight million were prisoners or simply missing. Twenty-one million were wounded.

The author in the epilogue somewhat rhetorically asks, was he (Kaiser Wilhelm II) to blame for the war? was Tirpitz (German secretary of the Navy)? Grey? Moltke (chief of the German General Staff)? Berchtold (Austria-Hungary's foreign minister)? Poincare (President of France)? or was none to blame? should we look instead at institutions and ideas? General Staffs with too much power, absolutist governments, Social Darwinism, the cult of the offensive, nationalism?

To which she wisely concludes that there was first, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war - in an earlier part of the book she had pointed Bismarck as a personality who would have resisted going to war. There are always choices.
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on 6 September 2014
As the author more or less says herself in the intro, this book was written in something of a hurry and it shows. It is shot through with minor and not so minor slips and mistakes, some of them plain silly and all of them entirely avoidable. Admittedly, the book is highly readable but so is Christopher Clark's "The Sleepwalkers", and here we are, unsurprisingly past performances considered - sorry about that one, but yes - dealing with a much better and much more professional effort. So forget about this number, go for "The Sleepwalkers"...
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on 11 May 2014
I would have preferred if MacMillan had been clear about the position she was arguing for from the start so obliging her to consider the evidence and arguments for and against it, rather than apparently going through her selection of the evidence at great and repetitive length and dismissing alternative views eg Fritz Fisher's out of hand. The significance of Germany's blank cheque is downplayed.The role of Moltke is minimised and recorded in such a way that ,even at the level of evidence let alone interpretation the overlap of agreement as to actions and statements with ,for example Fromkin' book is scant.
I originally thought the constant and irksome attempts to find parallels with recent international relations were just part of a narrative ploy to engage the general reader ,however contentious some of the parallels were. In fact these parallels turned out to be MacMillans guide to interpreting the events of 1914.The case she is making is that the politicians as a class failed to do what J.F.K. did in 1962 during Cuban missile crisis, guided by Tuchman's Guns of August and stand up to the military.This position is only stated on the last page of the main text,page 592! Hence only at the very end does one realise why some aspects were emphasised in her account compared to other authors '.
To my mind the authors political views about more recent history have been projected onto the pre 1914 era ;this process may serve rhetorical purposes but are not a substitute for making her case.
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on 1 August 2014
A few days ago, I finished reading this tome of over six hundred pages for the second time. Margaret McMillan’s book is a long read, and requires the reader to try to put him- or herself into the mindset, or rather the various national mindsets, of pre-1914 Europe.
I can certainly say that the book does not yield any easy or pat answers to the origins of the Great War. No simple (or simplistic) chains of causation are identified: rather, Margaret McMillan weaves an intricate tapestry of personalities, countries, their institutions, their alliances and the events that occur. She provides an extraordinarily detailed history starting from the late 19th century and tries to shed light on how the Great War came about, this enormously destructive global conflict that claimed the lives of over 9 million soldiers, left some 15 million wounded and resulted in widespread and often senseless devastation in – to mention a few examples - Belgium, much of northern France, Serbia and parts of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. How could this cataclysm have emerged out of the apparently civilised Europe that existed before 1914?
The book does not have an easily identifiable executive summary, but I did find the following useful précis tucked away in Chapter 19, and it certainly confirms my understanding of the broad conclusion of the book (the small amount of text in square brackets was added by me for clarification):
“The crisis in July 1914 was initially created by the recklessness of Serbia, the vengefulness of Austria-Hungary and the blank cheque [to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia] from Germany. Now it was increasingly the turn of the Entente powers to do what they could either to avert war or, if it came about, to bring it on favourable terms for themselves. While many of the historical debates have centred on the question of Germany's or Austria-Hungary's or even Serbia's culpability for the war, others have placed the blame on the Triple Entente, whether on France for following a policy of revenge against Germany, on Russia for the alliance with France and for backing Serbia, or on Britain for not recognising Germany's legitimate demands for a place in the sun and a greater share of the world’s colonies or for not making it clear early in the crisis that it would intervene on the side of France and Russia. While these have fascinated and will continue to fascinate historians and political scientists, we may have to accept that there can never be a definitive answer because for every argument there is a strong counter. Was France really intent on revenge on Germany? Even nationalists such as Poincaré [the French President] had resigned themselves to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and were not prepared to risk war to regain the provinces. True, France's treaty with Russia led Germany to feel encircled but from both the French and Russian points of view the treaty was a defensive one, triggered only if Germany attacked. (As so often in international relations, though, what is defensive from one perspective may appear a threat from another, and that is certainly how Germany saw the treaty.) How much responsibility should Russia bear for encouraging Serbian nationalism? Sazonov [Russian Foreign Minister] should have done more to keep his ambassador Hartwig under control but for all the Panslav rhetoric in nationalist circles not all Russia's leaders wanted to come to Serbia's defence if it meant risking another major conflict so soon after the catastrophic defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. As for Britain, while an early declaration that it would unhesitatingly fight on France's side might have acted as a deterrent on Germany, that is not at all clear. The German military regarded the British Expeditionary Force as negligible and hoped to win in France long before naval power came into play. In any case, Britain could not have made such a declaration before the Cabinet approved it - and the Cabinet was deeply divided over what to do in the last weeks before the war broke out.”
McMillan asks the question in the paragraph preceding the one quoted if war could have been avoided if certain voices of moderation had not been removed by death or loss of office. One of these would have been Archduke Franz Ferdinand, whose assassination triggered the final fatal sequence of events. Another would have been Alfred von Kiderlen, the German Foreign Minster, who died at end 1912. As McMillan writes, “If Kiderlen had been in office he might have just been strong enough to stand up to the military and persuade Bethmann (the German Chancellor) and the Kaiser to take the path of peace. His death is yet another example, like that of the Archduke’s assassination, Rasputin’s stabbing or Caillaux’s forced resignation, of the role of accident in history“. [Rasputin could have been an influence for restraint on Czar Nicholas, and Joseph Caillaux (French Prime Minister, 27 June 1911 – 11 January 1912), favoured better relations between France and Germany, believing that France and Germany had much to gain by working together.
McMillan concludes the book by saying “And if we want to point fingers from the twenty-first century we can accuse those who led Europe into war of two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices.”
There are always choices - that’s a message for the politicians of the twenty-first century!
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on 26 April 2014
A gripping read, suitable for a history novice, or an expert.
Beginning with the Paris Exhibition of 1900, Prof MacMillan charts European history to the outbreak of war, picking out, with the benefit of all we now know, how a series of events, along with a prevailing culture of militarism, and theories of how war should be conducted, and all the limitations of the period too, brought us closer to war.
As the introduction makes clear, it was not so much that the European powers intended to go to war, its that the various options were gradually narrowed down, so war became, apparently the only choice. I say apparently, for as Margaret Macmillan points out, there are always choices.
Even as we all know the outcome, the book holds the reader in suspense, as time and events march on.
Throughout the book we get a sympathetic appreciation for all the key players, with their strengths and foibles. Each chapter deals with significant events, e.g. the two Morocco crises, the Balkan wars, or aspects and movements of the time, e.g. the peace movements, military plans, militarism. We learn how all of this shapes the leaders of the day, and the various alliances that form between the powers. In the main, there's helpful analysis towards the end of each chapter, of what impact these events/factors had on the path to war. We also get an appreciation of the period, and how the key players were men (mainly men) of their time.
We are treated throughout the book to a then European perspective. How Europeans felt, how Europeans reacted, what values Europeans held dear, and so on. We get an insight into early 20th century European culture; this I found refreshing, exhilarating almost, drawing out a European identity. My one question, given Europe's diversity today, and even more so then, how deep could a European identity really run?
The final chapter - called the Epilogue - gives a brief summary of what happened after the close of war in 1919, and particularly satisfying, what happened to all the key players. (Did you know that the Kaiser lived until 1941 in The Netherlands?).
A great read - I'm encouraged to read MM's sequel (or the other book end to the Great War), "Peacemakers: Six Months That Changed The World" as well as her analysis of the "Uses and Abuses of History".
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