Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel succeed in challenging the familiar understanding of Munich as the product of Chamberlain's naive "appeasement" of Nazi aggression. They argue that it was the culmination of cynical collusion between the Tory government and the Nazis throughout the 1930s.
The strength of The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion is that it is based upon a careful reading of official and unofficial correspondence, conference notes, cabinet minutes, and diaries. The quotes by key actors and their associates is what knits the book together and makes fascinating reading as the political and social outlook of the British ruling class is revealed especially their benign view of fascism.
Finkel and Leibovitz document the steps taken under diplomatic cover by the West to strike a bargain with Hitler based upon shared anti-Soviet premises. They show that hostility to communism and to the USSR was the biggest driver of British and, to a lesser degree, French foreign policy and that Chamberlain struck what he believed was a deal with Hitler whereby Germany would enjoy a free hand in Eastern Europe, especially with regards to a war to destroy the USSR, as long as Hitler left Western Europe and the British Empire alone.