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on 1 December 1998
The basic problem with any materialist theory of consciousness is that there is no room for consciousness to *do* anything -- it is caused by certain material processes but does not itself cause anything. The firing of a neuron can always be explained in terms of the firing of other neurons, the impingement of a photon on a photoreceptor, or some other objectively observable cause. At no point is it necessary to say that "this neuron fired because the brain it was part of had such-and-such a subjective experience". Thus consciousness is not logically necessary in our objective description of the material world, so we can at least conceive of a world where David Chalmers' zombie twin writes papers and books about the mind-body problem without ever having any subjective experience itself. This seems absurd but the absurdity is inherent in all the various flavors of functionalism or property dualism. And "new physics" won't change the picture at all -- string theory, quantum gravity, quantum multiverses, and any as yet unconcieved of physical theory are all simply more of the same kind of "ontological stuff" that we already have -- objective procedures for predicting the behavior of objectively measurable things.
Some functionalists attempt to make the problem go away simply by declaring conscious states a matter of definition -- "pain" is some set of states of an information processing system, "pleasure" is some other, etc. Thus whether a robot that makes a convincing whine when you hit it actually experiences pain is a matter of definition. Few would deny that there is indeed a correlation between neural states and subjective experience, but anyone who has actually experienced pain knows that it is more than a matter of definition -- your pain won't go away just because everybody else on the planet has redefined your neural state as pleasure.
Finally, substance dualism, for good reasons not considered seriously by most philosophers, doesn't solve any of the problems but merely hides them behind a black screen.
Chalmers recognizes the absurdities inherent in all theories of consciousness. He refuses to sweep the problems under a rug; he argues for a form of property dualism while being honest enough to point out that it leads to the bizarre conclusion that we puzzle about the nature of consciousness for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that we actually *are* conscious. Like me you probably won't be willing to go as far as Chalmers wants to take you, but his book makes it plain that all the apparent avenues of escape lead to pitfalls at least as bad as the ones on the road he takes. If Chalmers is right, and consciousness must be added as an "extra feature" in our description of reality, it is devilishly hard to see how we will ever have a good theory of it. How will we be able to convincingly determine whether that poor robot really hurts?
The book is very clearly written; you don't need a formal education in philosophy to follow his arguments. Overall this is one of the best books on the mind-body problem I've read.
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on 20 December 2003
Along with Erwin Schrodinger's 'Mind and Matter', this ranks as one of the best writings about consciousness I have read. Chalmers does not evade the problem of subjective experience, but faces it directly and acknowledges that materialistic science cannot explain the subjective phenomenon of consciousness. It is rare to find a work that faces up to the problem so honestly, without having to resort to accounts of structure and dynamics that do not bear any meaning when explaining the nature of subjective experience. I would thoroughly recommend this book to those who are interested in consciousness, and are dissatisfied with contemporary writings on it.
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Philosopher and author David J. Chalmers makes an ambitious, daring attempt to expand the understanding of consciousness. Although he admits that his sympathies are with materialism, he concludes that materialist (physical) explanations cannot account for the existence of consciousness. His theory of consciousness is based in the natural world, but he proposes that consciousness has both physical and nonphysical properties. He suggests that a set of psychophysical laws are needed to explain the how and why of consciousness. Although parts of this book are densely technical and call for readers with a thorough background in mathematics, physics and philosophy, Chalmers has taken pains to make his material as accessible as possible to the average well-educated person. He even puts asterisks beside sections that lay readers are likely to find too daunting, and notes those sections general readers might most productively read, skim or ignore. We suggest this book to well-schooled readers who are interested in the philosophy of the mind, cognition or psychology.
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on 14 September 2011
As a philosophy student already interested in the philosophy of Mind when I began this fantastic work, I can only say that I have been bowled over by the lucid exposition of its arguments, its wide-ranging scope, and its wit.

There is something useful to be found in this work for many people, from the interested general reader to the academic. The arguments are persuasive, clear, and so helpfully laid out - at no point was I lost, or seeking extra clarification. Chalmers is an extremely gifted writer, and the cohesion and exposition of his views are astounding. Here is a brief synopsis of the book:

- CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 - Chalmers introduces the mind as having, simply put, two aspects - the psychological (desires, beliefs), and the phenomenal ('feels', and the 'what it is like' element). The two categories may overlap, with the latter including some of the former. The phenomenal aspect of mind is what poses the hard questions about consciousness. Chalmers cashes out his notion of 'supervenience', which he uses to define physicalism and dualism. The reductive physicalist position is that the mental (inc. the phenomenal aspects) logically supervene on the physical.

- CHAPTERS 3, 4 AND 5 - Chalmers argues, persuasively, that the logical supervenience required for reductive physicalism fails. The arguments presented are a mix of new and previously existing ones, all presented clearly and forcefully. Chalmers proposes his view - naturalistic property dualism - using primarily the argument from the logical possibility of zombies: physically identical beings to us that nevertheless lack qualia. The possibility of such entities is hard to rule out, and that is all Chalmers needs for his argument to go through. Chalmers then considers the apparent tension between his view and our judgments of our own experience - how can we clearly consider our own consciousness with our psychological minds, when consciousness arises due to separate, phenomenal properties?

- CHAPTERS 6, 7 AND 8 - Chalmers advances arguments for non-reductive functionalism, his positive theory of the mind in the light of property dualism. Consciousness and cognition (awareness) are shown to cohere, providing a basis for consciousness research in cognitive science. Consideration of cases of fading and dancing qualia reveals that something like the 'principle of organizational invariance' holds - that all it takes for consciousness to arise is for a particular functional system to be instantiated. Finally, Chalmers proposes that phenomenal properties arise due to the world being intimately related to computational information at its base level - a bold and controversial thesis.

- CHAPTERS 9 AND 10 - Chalmers applies his theory (admitted to be only a sketch, a basis for further research) to the topics of AI and quantum mechanics. The view suggests Strong Artificial Intelligence - the possibility that a machine such as a computer is the right sort of system that could be conscious, just like a human being. The section on quantum mechanics puts forward the hypothesis that Chalmers' theory, plus a version of the Everett interpretation of QM, is the most favourable approach to one of the most difficult issues in physics - how can QM be such a powerful tool of prediction when the world it suggests seems so wildly different from how we ordinarily take the world to be? This last section functions on its own as an excellent and readable introduction to some of the issues in QM.

Overall, a stunning work of philosophy, extremely well written on a fascinating subject.
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on 15 September 1997
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophy of mind or even for anyone who has ever puzzled over the phenomenon of consciousness. Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fact over and above any physical/functional brain processes. His position has the feel of cogency. After all, prima facie it is difficult to conceive of two more different states of affairs than (say) the smelling of a rose and some neural/chemical brain activity. The problem is that when Chalmers delineates the implications of his view one can't avoid the impression that he has reduced himself to absurdity. For example, he ends up with an epiphenomealism of sorts according to which our consciousness states don't affect our behavior. On this point, I, at least, had to ask myself whether I had more faith in Chalmer's arguments or more faith in mental causality.

Nonetheless, I really liked the book. It is (with the exception of chapter 2) easy and fun to read, and Chalmers has a wealth of really cool ideas. I enjoied it more than just about anything else on the philosophy of mind that has crossed my path.
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on 28 August 2016
In this book David Chalmers presents a case against materialist reductionist accounts of consciousness, and in favour of a non-interactionist dualist account. I don’t think his case stands up.

Chalmers bases his theory very heavily on the conceivability – and therefore, in his view, the logical possibility - of zombies. Chalmers also believes in epistemic asymmetry – that one needs to have experienced consciousness to understand what it is and believe in it. These two positions are incompatible. If there can be zombies, then there can be a zombie version of Chalmers himself. Zombie Chalmers is functionally identical to conscious Chalmers. Therefore, just like conscious Chalmers, zombie Chalmers writes a book in which he expounds his belief in consciousness – the very book that I am currently reviewing. But the argument from epistemic asymmetry says that since zombie Chalmers has no experience of consciousness, he cannot have a belief in consciousness, and therefore cannot write any such book. So zombie Chalmers both does and does not write this book: a contradiction.

Chalmers cannot have both zombies and epistemic asymmetry: one of them must go. My view is that the zombies must go. Could there be anything more absurd than the idea of a zombie philosopher writing a book about consciousness? What could possibly cause the neural activity to occur in the zombie philosopher’s brain that results in the writing of such a book? I don't see how there could be a zombie Chalmers, and if there can be no zombie Chalmers, there can be no zombie anyone else. And if the zombies must go, then so, it would appear, must Chalmers’ non-interactionist version of dualism.

Why does Chalmers think zombies are possible? Ultimately it seems to be because of his belief in the widely accepted principle of causal closure at the physical level, i.e. that where there is sufficient cause for a physical event, there is always sufficient physical cause. However, I think Chalmers may not be applying the principle correctly. (He doesn't discuss it overtly, so I am having to infer.) Suppose we have a physical event A, and that A causes an event B which, after quantum wave collapse, can occur in two ways, either as B1 or as B2. Suppose that we actually get the sequence A -> B1. Is A a sufficient cause for B1? It depends what you mean by 'sufficient'. If you mean that B1 can follow A without the need for any additional event, then (according to quantum theory) yes, it is sufficient. But if you mean that A is enough to ensure that B1 occurs, then no, A is not sufficient. The question here is whether a full explanation of human behaviour requires only the first kind of sufficiency, or, unusually for physical processes, requires the second. Chalmers seems to be assuming that it only requires the first, but this is only an assumption. The fact is that we don't know (yet); and since human behaviour is atypical in many ways for physical processes - it is purposive, for a start, which most physical processes are not - and since Chalmers' assumption leads to the apparent absurdity of zombie philosophers writing books about consciousness when they have no consciousness to write books about, I think we would be justified in at least holding off assent to this assumption until it can be shown that it is correct.

Later in the book, Chalmers considers whether an interactionist form of dualism might fare better than his version. His remarks here seem to me rather superficial and, in some cases, downright odd. He notes that:

"… some have appealed to the existence of quantum indeterminacy, and have suggested that a nonphysical consciousness might be responsible for filling the resultant causal gaps…"

which, as I've already hinted, does seem to offer a possible solution to the problem of how phenomenal consciousness might be able to act causally on behaviour. But he dismisses the suggestion for reasons which, to me at least, seem ill-founded:

"First, the theory contradicts the quantum-mechanical postulate that these microscopic “decisions” are entirely random…"

In fact it does not, because as Chalmers himself has just noted, consciousness is presumed in this scenario to be nonphysical, so it remains the case that events are random at the quantum level insofar as physical processes are concerned.

"… and in principle it implies that there should be some detectable pattern to them – a testable hypothesis."

It seems odd to describe the testability of the suggestion as a 'problem'. Surely it is an advantage?

"Second,… it needs to be the case that the behavior produced by these microscopic decisions is somehow different in kind than that produced by most other sets of decisions that might have been made by a purely random process…. This again is testable in principle… to hold that the random version would lead to unusually degraded behavior would be to make a bet at long odds."

Well, again, testability is hardly a disadvantage. And I know Chalmers is a mathematician, but he can't expect us to take the length of the odds on trust: some evidence of the calculations should be provided. And anyway, instead of discussing the theory, why not just do the tests?

Chalmers then has some remarks about the possible influence of consciousness in collapsing quantum wave functions, and says:

"…it seems that the kind of causal work consciousness performs here is quite different from the kind required to play a role in directing behavior."

Is it? It seems to me to be essentially the same work. Both involve collapsing wave functions: the difference is that in one case the collapse is being directed, and in the other it is allowed to be random; but this is a difference within consciousness, not in the causal mechanism, whatever that may be, that constitutes the interaction between consciousness and the physical world.

He then goes on:

"In any case, all versions of interactionist dualism have a conceptual problem… We can always subtract the phenomenal component from any explanatory account, yielding a purely causal account."

Ah, but can we? Here is Chalmers earlier in the book, introducing the subject of zombies:

"To fix ideas, we can imagine that right now I am gazing out of the window, experiencing some nice green sensations from seeing the trees outside, having pleasant taste experiences through munching on a chocolate bar, and feeling a dull aching sensation in my right shoulder…. What is going on in my zombie twin? He is physically identical to me, and we may well suppose that he is embedded in an identical environment. He will certainly be identical to me functionally…"

Stop right there. ‘Identical to me functionally’? This would mean that if, for example, you enter the room where zombie Chalmers is sitting, he might do any or all of the following things that Chalmers himself might do (I don’t know Chalmers, and for all I know he wouldn’t do any of these things; but there will be things he might do in this situation, and anyone who knows him is free to substitute those – my argument will still go through):
- point to the tree outside and say, ‘Look – aren’t those leaves a delightful fresh green colour?’
- offer you a chocolate bar like the one he is eating and say, ‘Here – have one of these, they’re delicious’
- rub his shoulder and say, ‘I really must put something on this – that fifth game of squash wasn’t such a good idea.’

But why would zombie Chalmers do any of these things, since he can’t experience colours, tastes or dull aches? He has no motivation to do them; so he won’t do them. And yet, as a philosophical zombie, he is functionally identical to the conscious Chalmers, and if they are what the conscious Chalmers would do, then he will do them. So he will do them, and he will not do them: another contradiction. This contradiction arose because we supposed that we could ‘subtract the phenomenal component from any explanatory account’. It turns out that we can’t – not without contradicting ourselves.

The point here is that phenomenal consciousness is causally explanatory at the level of human behaviour. We therefore cannot merely subtract it and leave the causality intact. Whether this should make us interactionists is not clear to me; but I think it shows, again, that Chalmers' non-interactionist version of dualism must be wrong.

A further reason to reject Chalmers’ theory is that his account of the supposed connection between conscious experiences and their physical correlates is seriously flawed. This will take a little while to explain.

Chalmers has some remarks about the ‘psychophysical laws’ which he suggests regularise the correlation of particular conscious experiences with particular physical events in the body:

"There is a system of laws that ensures that a given physical configuration will be accompanied by a given experience, just as there are laws that dictate that a given physical object will gravitationally affect others in a certain way.

"It might be objected that this does not tell us what the connection is, or how a physical configuration gives rise to experience. But the search for a connection is misguided. Even with fundamental physical laws, we cannot find a “connection” that does the work. Things simply happen in accordance with the law; beyond a certain point, there is no asking “how”… If there are indeed such connections, they are entirely mysterious in both the physical and psychophysical cases, so the latter poses no special problem here.

"It is notable that Newton’s opponents made a similar objection to his theory of gravitation: How does one body exert a force on another far away? But the force of the question dissolved over time. We have learned to live with taking certain things as fundamental."

Well, let’s consider this by way of an example. Suppose I cut my finger. This causes a message to be sent along the nerves to my brain, where two things happen: one, I feel a pain that appears to me to be localised to the injured area; and two, messages are sent from my brain to other parts of my body to initiate appropriate physical action (such as saying ‘Ouch’ and sucking my injured finger). According to Chalmers, the pain I feel has no causal role, and I would say ‘ouch’ and suck my finger even if I were a zombie and felt no pain at all. The fact that I feel pain is the result of the coming into play of a psychophysical law that ensures that, even though the pain does nothing, this is nevertheless what happens whenever I cut my finger.

There are three things to say here. Firstly, we do actually know what happens when people cut themselves and feel no pain, because there are such people: they suffer from a condition known as ‘congenital analgesia’, and their inability to feel pain, far from making them behave exactly like those of us who do feel pain, means that when something happens to their bodies that would cause us to take some appropriate action, they do nothing, with the result that they have an increased risk of further damage, e.g. from infection. So the suggestion that a being like ourselves but without consciousness would behave as we do when experiencing pain runs counter to our actual experience.

Secondly, the parallel with the law of gravity is highly misleading. As I pointed out, when I cut my finger, on Chalmers’ theory two distinct things occur: a feeling of localised pain, and the initiation of physical action such as saying ‘ouch’ and sucking the injured finger. In the case of gravity, only one thing occurs – an attraction between two physical bodies. In the case of pain, there is a conceptual similarity between the pain and the action of sucking the injured finger: they are both localised, one subjectively and the other objectively, to the same location on the body. No such conceptual similarity obtains in the case of gravity, because there are not two things in that case but only one.

Thirdly, it seems an astonishing coincidence that, despite the fact (according to Chalmers’ theory) that subjective experience is not causal, a psychophysical law nevertheless obtains which puts in place a subjective experience that is precisely what would be required if it were causal. To see how acute this problem is, consider how unlikely it would be that, if we chose a subjective experience at random to occur when I cut my finger, it was a localised feeling of pain in just that injured finger. It could, after all, be a pain localised to some other part of my body, or the smell of strawberries, or the sound of a trumpet. Yet inexplicably - literally inexplicably, according to Chalmers - there is a fundamental law that puts in place precisely the subjective experience needed to cause me to attend to my injured finger even though it doesn’t do this at all. This is just too odd and suspicious to accept. The world does not work like this: it is not founded on astronomically unlikely coincidences for which there is no explanation. Chalmers here is asking us to believe something quite unbelievable.

To approach the same point from the opposite direction: If we suppose for a moment, contra Chalmers, that phenomenal experience is causal, then what experience would best suit the purpose of directing my attention to the injured finger so that I might take some soothing or healing or protective action? The answer seems obvious: it should be an unpleasant feeling (so that I am impelled to address whatever it is that is causing the unpleasantness, in this case the untreated injury), it should contain no extraneous subjective content that might confuse the issue and impel me to take some irrelevant action (for instance, it should not include the smell of strawberries or the sound of a trumpet, since these would be entirely unhelpful), and it should be subjectively localised to precisely the place on my body that requires attention, so as to direct my attention to the right spot. And all three of these features, amazingly – amazingly, that is, if the phenomenal pain is not causal - are possessed by what I do in fact experience when I cut my finger.

It is here, I think, that Chalmers' non-interactionist dualism runs into its worst difficulties. If the physical world is truly causally closed, as Chalmers believes, then phenomenal experience is causally irrelevant. In that case, phenomenal experience can be configured in any way we like to imagine, without having the slightest effect on human behaviour. It would then seem that there are a vast number of possible worlds, each with its own peculiar set of psychophysical laws, in which there are counterparts to ourselves who behave exactly as we do, but have very different phenomenal experiences. In one of these worlds, our counterparts hear only the sound of trumpets, irrespective of what they are doing at the time. In another, they merely get smells - of onions, say, or strawberries. In only a tiny subset of these worlds do our counterparts have phenomenal experiences which are such that they meet the three criteria I mentioned above, criteria which make it seem plausible that they could be causes of behaviour rather than merely accompanying it. And now the non-interactionist has a problem, which is to explain how it comes about that we happen to live in one of this tiny subset of worlds, rather than in one of the others. Given the prima facie plausibility of the suggestion that phenomenal experience may be causal after all, it is clearly not enough to shrug this off and say, 'Well, we just do': the odds against it are so enormous that such an attitude is obviously unreasonable. The only possible avenue that I can see for the non-interactionist is to claim that this close correlation between phenomenal experiences and physical events is a feature of all possible worlds - in other words, that it is metaphysically necessary. Yet it is hard to see how a defence of this position could be mounted. The correlation certainly does not seem to be logically necessary, and it is hard to see how to show metaphysical necessity by any other route.

If, however, conscious experience is causal, everything becomes much easier to explain. The reason why, when I cut my finger, I have a subjective experience that is so precisely what is required to direct my attention to my injured finger, is that this has survival value, whereas the smell of strawberries, or the sound of a trumpet, or a pain elsewhere in my body, would not – in fact their survival value would be negative. It seems obvious that the reason so few people suffer from congenital analgesia is that the inability to feel phenomenal pain confers a survival disadvantage, and therefore is selected against by evolution; and this can only be the case if phenomenal pain is causally efficacious. If we allow conscious experiences to be causal, then it is evolutionary advantage that has given us the particular conscious experiences we have. This seems to me a much more plausible position than one which asks us to accept that there is an unexplained and highly improbable law that creates these correlations.

The rest of the book pretty much degenerates into mere metaphysical speculation. Chalmers speculates that organizational complexity plus some unknown psychophysical laws may be enough to create consciousness, and on this basis he invites us to ask ourselves what the conscious life of a thermostat may be like, and whether if you got enough Chinese people talking to each other with radios this might generate a group phenomenal consciousness. Ironically, Chalmers, who invented the term 'hard problem', is here forgetting just why the problem is hard: it is hard precisely because, whatever happens in the physical world and however we describe it, we are unable to see why phenomenal consciousness should be the result. The suggestion that organization may be a key to the problem is really just another kind of reductionism. The fact is that we simply don't know why or how brains manage to generate consciousness, and there is really no point building castles in the air on foundations of mere metaphysical speculation.

At the end of this book I am left with the strong feeling that, while trying to solve the mind-body problem using the tools of philosophy is an entertaining parlour game, no real progress will be made until science steps in and does the job properly. Which, of course, may never happen.
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on 6 February 2014
Chalmers does not ignore sentience and subjective experience like most people who claim that subjectivity is unscientific, on the contrary, objectivity has no meaning if it has nothing to be contrasted with.

Chalmers is a genuine metaphysician desperately trying to understand consciousness. He is very patient and modest in addressing materialism and has a high respect for it as a framework, especially in physics. He clearly understands how materialism is incredibly useful at accounting for the emergence of biochemical phenomena from low-level mechanics. He is not in anyway hostile to science he does not jump to conclusions without careful consideration and analysis of arguments and he has no affiliation with being anti-materialistic insofar as the traditional biological mechanics are concerned. He has no bias nor religious agenda and does not deny the success of mainstream, reductionist science. It is very comfortable to read and has a pleasant tone, just as Chalmers does in his interviews.

However...

It is interesting to see someone finally address qualia and phenomenality as a real problem. It is probably the best explication of consciousness I've ever read insofar as it helps us define and understand the nature of what-it's-like-to-be-sentient, even though it doesn't provide an explanation for how or why phenomenality exists - still it is the best explication.

Nevertheless it is the best philosophy of mind literature I have read so far.

Great book 5/5.
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on 26 February 2002
The book starts off very well; the first section on fundamentals is very well explained and is useful to anyone studying philosophy.
However to logically supervene, as defined in this book, is impossible, nowhere in the universe is it possible to create exact replicas; the laws of physics deny this, a priori. Many of the arguments, based on Nagel and Searle, have already been demolished by Dennette and Hofstadter, including the old 'Chinese box' argument, or what it 'feels like to be a bat'. See The Mind's I and Consciousness Explained.
The book tells us about the phenomenal as opposed to the psychological, and assumes that the reader knows what is being referred to. After pulling this magic rabbit out of a hat, the author goes on to say it not logical, I agree with him.
In section two he digs up the old discredited zombie argument, and states that he thinks that they should be possible, two identical entities with different conscious experiences. This is obviously not true, if they were identical they would, by definition, have the same experiences. Our memories have a physical bases; the brain physically depends on its environment. How could two identical entities have opposite experiences for the same stimuli? The book didn't convince me, and it is certainly not the materialists' nightmare as some have implied, it just the same old dualist arguments wrapped up in a new suite.
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on 10 April 2012
This is the definite treatment of the physicalism vs dualism question, in which David Chalmers develops his famous Zombie argument against physicalism. This is also Chalmers' earliest exposition of his two-dimensional semantics, which is critical to making the case against physicalism maximally clear. This book is still the best introduction to the Zombie argument and two-dimensional semantics.
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on 26 July 1996
David Chalmers has put forth a very interesting philosophical framework
for a consistent analises of the brain-mind problem. I have read his book
a couple of times and found nothing wrong with his thesis that conciousness
is something over and above the physical. In fact, he has convinced me that
a real theory of mind needs a theoretical structure that relates conciousness
to physics, and that this structure cannot be deduced from phisics itself.
This is a most oustanding conclusion! Read the book, and see for yourself!
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