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Customer Review
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 9 April 2020
The title sums it up: this is how the French built themselves an army doctrine, equipment and training that failed completely in 1940. That is an example of something that the French seem inclined towards: forming a core idea, building everything around that, and sticking to it, because it's /their/ idea.
In this case, the idea was that all Frenchmen would serve in an army that was an expression of the nation. That sounds good, but a lot of things that were needed to make that work were lacking.
NCOs and officers need more training and experience than privates. The French had some long-term professionals in the army, but they didn't want to have very many. So the first step in mobilisation was that all the units which were already active at mobilisation time would split themselves into three parts, be filled up with reservists and would then be operational. Of course, that didn't work. Nobody knew anybody, nor had any trust in them. If the Germans had been able to invade in late 1939, the French would have done even worse. By spring 1940, the units had at least integrated themselves and were able to follow their orders. That's the next problem.
Because of the limited training, and the shortage of professionals, as well as the experience of learning how to fight WWI at its end, their doctrine was very much built around methodical fighting. That had a front line of infantry, supported by lots of artillery. The artillery wasn't very mobile, so infantry attacks could not advance very far before the artillery had to stop firing and start moving. Artillery movement has to happen in overlapping phases, so that some of the guns are always available. It gets pretty slow, and the officers were extensively
training in managing this, but not very much in anything else.
They were sure that tanks could be important, but each branch did its own thing with vehicles. The infantry built tanks that were intended to accompany infantry attacks, essentially as mobile strong points. The cavalry were well aware that horses were obsolete on the battlefield, and recognised that vehicles could let cavalry thinking be useful again. But they didn't have much budget, and nobody else was listening to them. Armoured divisions were eventually formed, when the Germans showed in Poland that they were useful, but the French were still figuring them out when it all became a moot point.
But the biggest problem was the high command. The French government never really trusted their army - it wasn't that long since Napoleon - and created a command structure where the generals could not do very much,
because the civilian ministers chaired the committees with power. Then they appointed ministers who left everything to the military, not realising that military people like to follow rules. The outcome of this
was that existing doctrine was endlessly re-affirmed and elaborated, not challenged or reconsidered.
They succeeded in building a system where people's moral feelings and sense of duty retarded military development. It would be hard to do this so well deliberately.
In this case, the idea was that all Frenchmen would serve in an army that was an expression of the nation. That sounds good, but a lot of things that were needed to make that work were lacking.
NCOs and officers need more training and experience than privates. The French had some long-term professionals in the army, but they didn't want to have very many. So the first step in mobilisation was that all the units which were already active at mobilisation time would split themselves into three parts, be filled up with reservists and would then be operational. Of course, that didn't work. Nobody knew anybody, nor had any trust in them. If the Germans had been able to invade in late 1939, the French would have done even worse. By spring 1940, the units had at least integrated themselves and were able to follow their orders. That's the next problem.
Because of the limited training, and the shortage of professionals, as well as the experience of learning how to fight WWI at its end, their doctrine was very much built around methodical fighting. That had a front line of infantry, supported by lots of artillery. The artillery wasn't very mobile, so infantry attacks could not advance very far before the artillery had to stop firing and start moving. Artillery movement has to happen in overlapping phases, so that some of the guns are always available. It gets pretty slow, and the officers were extensively
training in managing this, but not very much in anything else.
They were sure that tanks could be important, but each branch did its own thing with vehicles. The infantry built tanks that were intended to accompany infantry attacks, essentially as mobile strong points. The cavalry were well aware that horses were obsolete on the battlefield, and recognised that vehicles could let cavalry thinking be useful again. But they didn't have much budget, and nobody else was listening to them. Armoured divisions were eventually formed, when the Germans showed in Poland that they were useful, but the French were still figuring them out when it all became a moot point.
But the biggest problem was the high command. The French government never really trusted their army - it wasn't that long since Napoleon - and created a command structure where the generals could not do very much,
because the civilian ministers chaired the committees with power. Then they appointed ministers who left everything to the military, not realising that military people like to follow rules. The outcome of this
was that existing doctrine was endlessly re-affirmed and elaborated, not challenged or reconsidered.
They succeeded in building a system where people's moral feelings and sense of duty retarded military development. It would be hard to do this so well deliberately.
