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Enrique Alonso "WAR HEAT" (Spain)
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Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrilla Warfare
by Ernesto Che Guevara
Edition: Paperback
Price: £5.21

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars Useful Only for Historical Personal Purpose., 24 Nov. 2015
This review is from: Guerrilla Warfare (Paperback)
At the beginning of January, 1959, in a rapid consideration and synthesis of the guerrilla Cuban process, newly reached, Fidel Castro, got enthusiastic with his social military operational "discovery", was defining categorical: "Without training, without war tactics, we manage to conquer that Army ..." "No professional Army (in America) would have forces to offset the activities of revolutionary guerrillas". "In any other (geographical) stage, with the same political conditions that ours, the popular guerrillas are invincible". See Carlos Franqui. Diario de la Revolución Cubana. Ediciones R. Torres. Barcelona, 1976. Pages, 703 and 704. Simultaneously published in France and Italy.

With all this statement, he was who first established the social ideological operational theoretic basis of the Spanish-American guerrilla warfare. Afterwards Guevara developed, with more scientific than doctrinaire aspirations, its military guerrillas lived ideology. It was wrote in his "Guerrilla Warfare" book. He centered it on two postulates. That he was claiming the Cuban guerrilla warfare had absolutely (undoubtedly and without variation) demonstrated in practice. "The popular forces can win a war against the Army" Indeed, this has happened in other occasions. "Not always it is necessary to wait that all the conditions for the revolution are present. (He was thinking in Mao's theory of protracted warfare). The rebel revolutionary focus can create and develop them". His tragic end in Bolivia, where he lived as a "wandering irregular rebel", without supporting popular bases, would give the "relative, local character, questionable, particular and conditioned" real measure of his military theory "discovery".

Guevara dedicated great part of the forty thousand words of "The Guerrilla Warfare", to the study of the men who were forming the guerrillas and to giving advises on the life in the mount. But the work is slightly extensive in the study of the guerrilla tactics and strategies. As for his technical "offers" in his "Guerrilla Warfare" book, we only have to look at any photo, even of 2 or 3 decades ago, of armed irregular military rebels in some uneasy country in the World. They all generally have an assault rifle and an antitank rocket launcher. That usually are an AK-47 and a RPG-2 or RPG-7, all of Soviet design. Guevara speaks about a "grenade-launcher" designed by the Cuban guerrillas. Its propellant is a hunting cartridge, without pellets, adjusted to a wood rod. In its free end is adjusted a proper tin, full with gunpowder and grapeshot, and provided with a time fuse. It is fired off with a cut away shotgun, adequately inclined. Their guerrillas rifles were Springfield 1903 cal. .3006, with some North American M-1 cal. .30 and Dominican San Cristóbal carbines and few semiautomatic Garands. A superficial examination of the American FM Improvised Ammunition Devices, will give you better and abundant ideas to use in an undeveloped, hostile and without logistics support rebel environment.


On War
On War
by Carl von Clausewitz
Edition: Paperback
Price: £23.77

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A Global Theory of Warfare, 16 Oct. 2011
This review is from: On War (Paperback)
It is an extensive work, since it fits with the epoch, in which writing little was a sign of inconsistency, little importance and scanty reflection. The books or parts that compose it were finished in variable degree by the author, whose premature death did not allow its conclusion. I am more interested in the first chapters on "the theory and the philosophy of the war".

The other books or parts treat on the tactics of a period in which the enemy deployment was staying at the sights of the enemy command and his HHQQ and auxiliary, placed in a nearby height.

In an age of masses armies, inaugurated by Napoleon (also called "the nation at arms"), soon was clear that it was not possible to win a war between full armed nations, in an alone great battle.
It was necessary a campaign with successive victorious operations, looking for the achievement of the military goals of the campaign (theatre of operations, Europe, Pacific Ocean, Africa) or the strategy. In addition, already there did not exist a genius advanced to his epoch as Napoleon.

According to general André Beaufré, 3 fundamental principles exists for Clausewitz: the concentration of efforts, the action of the strong upon the weak and the war decision by the battle in the principal theatre of operations.
Nevertheless, the reading of the book "On War" allows to extract at least other nine conclusions, milestones or advices of his great work. And they have the character of principles of the war. These would be: Simplicity in the plans and executions. Concentration on the enemy and relative economy of forces in other sectors, to help to get it. Establishment of a principal effort and the reserves to guarantee it in the time. The surprise, as multiplier of the own military capacities. Superiority of the defense, which must be active, as a form of fight. The need of the offensive, to obtain positive and/or decisive results in the operational and strategic levels of action.

He praises Liddell Hart's opposite strategy: a decisive battle using the maximum own concentration and power on the enemy army.


On War (Classics of World Literature)
On War (Classics of World Literature)
by Carl von Clausewitz
Edition: Paperback
Price: £3.99

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A Global Theory of Warfare, 15 Aug. 2011
It is an extensive work, since it fits with the epoch, in which writing little was a sign of inconsistency, little importance and scanty reflection. The books or parts that compose it were finished in variable degree by the author, whose premature death did not allow its conclusion. I am more interested in the first chapters on "the theory and the philosophy of the war".
The other books or parts treat on the tactics of a period in which the enemy deployment was staying at the sights of the enemy command and his HHQQ and auxiliary, placed in a nearby height.
He praises Liddell Hart's opposite strategy: a decisive battle using the maximum own concentration and power on the enemy army.

In an age of masses armies, inaugurated by Napoleon (also called "the nation at arms"), soon was clear that it was not possible to win a war between full armed nations, in an alone great battle.
It was necessary a campaign with successive victorious operations, looking for the achievement of the military goals of the campaign (theatre of operations, Europe, Pacific Ocean, Africa) or the strategy. In addition, already there did not exist a genius advanced to his epoch as Napoleon.


Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics
Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics
by H. John Poole
Edition: Paperback

5.0 out of 5 stars Unconventional and Creative Military Approach to Guerrilla Warfare, 15 Aug. 2011
The author is well-known in the military and academic environments. With the last FM-100, it was supposed that everything was now mentioned. But, not. A tradition, inherited from the Civil war, exists in the USA, of saving grunts lives, avoiding the combats at close distances and using with profusion the heavy fire support to win always.
It does not serve to gain the hearts and the minds of the people, intermingled with the rebels in cities or open land, thanks to a degree of constraint that always exists from the rebels. Henry Poole offers a heap of counterinsurgency tactics. He also speaks about the own character of the possible rebels. And, especially, he creates the mixed units, at a very low level of action, of proffesional soldiers, self-defense forces and civil elements of construction, promotion and education. With them it is possible to interpose a "swarm", more active, effective and professional of loyal units, to the swarm of the guerrilla units. And to go isolating them slowly, reliably and progressively from the people, of their bases and of the rest of their operational and strategic goals.


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