I read this remarkable but grim and unashamedly one-sided book during the 2014 Ukrainian affair, while no-one was sure how far Putin would go. Taking over after the chaos of the 90s, he has resorted to a Kremlin-controlled state. Proper checks and balances seem increasingly strong-armed by chekists in balaclavas, and right now they even seem to be crossing the border to do their dirty work.
The omens for countries bordering Russia do not seem good. Putin has little to lose or hold him back. On the one side, Ben Judah recalls the KGB’s own analysis that their then lieutenant-colonel possessed a stunted sense of danger. It stymied his career, and one could imagine that it may equally make him ignore the risk of ostracism and flight of precious energy customers in the future. On the other side, as president faced with growing resentment at home, Putin has spent furiously to placate the masses. Apart from increases in welfare spending and the like, the projects in Sochi and Vladivostok have been seen to be symptomatically of dubious priority and massively over-paid due to corruption. The state remains so dependent on oil for its income that, as a result of his actions, it has to sell at $110 a barrel to maintain equilibrium (up from $70 only five years before). With present oil prices slightly below, Putin must at least ensure that countries around him are entirely dependent on his exports, or else. That implies some degree of Kremlin control. Achieving this under the guise of protecting ethnic Russian communities outside Russia has provided the perfect context.
The majority of Russians may be behind him. The author talks of a fragile, fractured and frightened nation already prone to paranoia and still shell-shocked from the fall of the Soviet Union. The country watches European influence and NATO encroaching from the west, an internal unwanted invasion of Muslims from the Caucasus, and the threat of China from the east. It thinks that China might one day actively eye the three quarters of Russia’s landmass (i.e. east of the Urals) that Moscow subjugated only in the last 400 years. The last serious Sino-Soviet conflict was less than 50 years ago.
Putin has aggravated the tough (now calmed) Wild West situation he inherited from his mentor Yeltsin, but in new ways. Had he gracefully stood down in 2012 he might have been regarded as Russia’s most successful leader ever, overseeing (thanks to oil and gas) a massive rise in affluence during his reign. Instead, he will infamously go down in history as the man who propelled centralised state control over the majority of economic riches, as well as the media and the opposition. His crushing of any political interference from the oligarchs, appointing old friends and colleagues he could trust, not to mention his ‘castling’ with Medvedev, destroyed his credibility for ever. The country suffers a massive flight of capital by those that profited from the sell-offs of the 90s. Judah describes how it is now run by a network of cronies inclined towards patronage, official hooliganism, gangsterism, criminality and corruption, with the noted presence of leather-coated siloviks or apparatchiks from St Petersburg (per Putin’s own origins) in strong positions. The vertical system is inevitably creaky, as it was under communism. The critical gas and oil industry is starting to lag for lack of investment or the type of impetus once provided by Putin’s nemesis during the 90s, Khodorkovsky (once jailed, now exiled).
The book is a lesson on how not to run or develop an organisation, let alone a state. Russia claims to be a ‘managed’ democracy. In reality, according to Judah, the omnipresent United Russia party is ‘plastic’ and has no say. The country, bereft of strong institutions, is furthermore subjected to ‘manual control’ by its leader so as to avoid any chaos stemming from the process of democratisation. Merit has been replaced by loyalty in a vertical structure dictated to by a resented Kremlin. In the rest of the country, Moscow shares this resentment.
There are positive surprises, despite all this. These include the dramatic rise of the Orthodox Church, NGOs and free internet. But Judah doesn’t always have a lot to say for the opposition such as it exists. Navalny comes across as suspect although savvy (his labelling of United Russia as the party of Crooks and Thieves has stuck extremely well). Some other leaders appear deliberately and cynically tolerated in order to make United Russia appear a better option. Not that any of this matters; election rigging appears rife, and although regional governors are once again elected, the Kremlin has retained an ominous oversight. Although the author dismisses Medvedev as a lackey, he doesn’t actually criticise him to any great extent, and even attributes to him several positive points. I found the chapter on him in the middle of the book particularly interesting.
Judah doesn’t offer much hope. Unless Putin is ousted by his own circle (any scenario similar to the lead-up to Tsar Nicholas II’s demise seems unlikely), he seems destined to stay in power until 2018, if not 2024, and surely the situation he has created seems unalterable by peaceful means any time soon. It’s all very sad.
My criticisms of the book lie in its lack of balance, avoiding trying to better understand the motivation behind Putin’s moves, and lack of mention at all of Russia’s known talents in science and industry and explaining why they have not had more effect. But it is a great read and highly recommended all the same.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet or computer – no Kindle device required. Learn more
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Flip to back Flip to front
Follow the author
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.
What do customers buy after viewing this item?
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
About the author
Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.
