Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 Paperback – 30 Apr 2003

I was slightly disappointed after reading this book. The title gives an impression of military strategy on the battlefield level. This book offered very little of that. Most concepts, strategies, and thoughts were from the thirty thousand feet level. I was hoping for a book which outlined campaigns with battlefield maps, and greater descriptions of the eb and flow of the combat. Most battles were described in a paragraph or a two. That was very disappointing. The book did give good background information on why things happened, and the history of the conflict. But with a title of "Decisive Encounters" I was expecting more "decisive encounters".

Best book I've ever read on the topic. Really helped me understand where Mao came from, and more, so much more.

I purchase this book hoping to learn something new only to be disappointed. For one thing, the author did correctly note that the Chinese Communist contribution to the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 was minimal and most of their "operations" were propaganda in nature. Unlike the opinion of some other reviewer, the CPC (Communist Party of China) hardly ever engaged the Japanese in major battles but did have some nominal guerrilla skirmish against the Japanese. The CPC mostly concentrate on building their army and political network after their disastrous Long March.

As such, out of 22 major engagements (battles involving 100,000 men or more), the CPC participate in only 2 of them and only as a minor player. The Japanese view the Kuomintang as their only enemy as such most of the Japanese operations were against the Kuomintang.

What this author fails to articulate was the real reason why the KMT (Kuomintang) lost to the CPC. In my opinion the KMT lost due to three reasons. One of the reasons was the rampant corruption of the KMT. The second have to do with the stupidity of the Americans in forcing the KMT to "make peace" at the time when the KMT forces was successful in their offense against the CPC in 1946.

The third reason was the U.S coercion of the KMT to get rid of the warlords and troops who have co-operated with the Japanese during WWII. The Nationalists sacked over 1.5 million troops who have ties with the pro-Japanese government to support the Marshall Mission; this turned out to be a fatal mistake for Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. Almost none of the 1.5 million troops discharged belonged to Chiang's own forces, most of them belonging to warlords most of whom had collaborated with the Japanese during the war and later pledged their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalists. This move alienated many within the Nationalists. Nothing was done to help them integrate the sacked troops to integrate back into civilian life. Many protests and riots by the discharged soldiers broke out.

Larger number of the sacked troops either became bandits or most join the Communists. The largest Nationalist defection to the Communists occurred in Manchuria, where over half a million discharged Nationalist soldiers who have co-operated with the Japanese joined the Communist force giving the CPC a 1000% boost in men power. Another problem is that the sacked troops and generals knows the location to the huge Japanese weapons stockpiles in Manchuria, this stockpiles was turned over to the Communist and it was huge enough to sustain more than 700,000 troops for several years.

These reasons helps cemented the CPC victory in China. Apparently knowledge in history was greatly lacking in the Bush administration and the same mistake was made by the Americans during the early period of the Iraq occupation by sacking over 400,000 Iraqis who have served under Saddam as part of the "de-bathification". These 400,000 jobless and humiliated Iraqis ex-soldiers and their families may have joins the Iraqis insurgents.

Professor Westad offers here a concise and well-written overciew of the Chinese civil war and its international ramifications. While he is an excellent cold war scholar and I *do* recommend the book, I do so with certain reservations.

He begins by blaming Stalin for "inadvertantly" beginning the Chinese civil war via Soviet troop withdrawals from Manchuria. This analysis reflects the still-dominant view among Western academics to reflexively blame the USSR and Stalin for the cold war in general, although Professor Westad adds the liberal adverb caveat of "inadvertant." There is no analysis of what the Soviet alternative could have been: to remain in occupation of Manchuria? And then, of course, Stalin would now be blamed for "advertantly" causing the Chinese civil war by staying, and providing sanctuatry for the CCP to grow.

Similarly, Professor Westad is inclined to give Chiang Kai-Shek ("Jiang" - sorry, I just *can't* get used to Pin-Yin!) the benefit of the doubt. Professor Westad is of the opinion that Chiang was "deeply concerned" about the corruption of his Kuomintang regime, and "took steps" to correct it; but as Professor Westad is surely aware, these could be little more than rhetorical scoldings of middle and lower level cadres. The true source of the KMT's rot was at the top. Any serious anti-corruption drive would have threatened the corporate monoplies of the Soong family, which had been the backbone of Chiang's rise to power, and of the "Green Gang," a mafia brotherhood of which Chiang had long been a member. Ralph Thaxton's book, "Salt of the Earth," shows how peasant cottage industry was in basic opposition to the central monopolizing policies of the KMT and its confiscatory tax system for the favored few. Thus a mere "anti-corruption drive" could not have removed deep-seated peasant opposition going back some 20 years, and reinforced by the KMT's postwar carpetbaggery.

Also, Professor Westad brushes aside the CCP claim that it "bore the brunt" of the Japanese occupation. I find this an unsupportable conclusion, based on the logic of events. Chiang did not have the resources to drive the Japanese out of China. Knowing it would be suicidal to risk his remnant regime in an all-out assault, he knew also he must accomodate their presence, however unwillingly. But there was great advantage to him in having the Japanese in China, in providing a law and order he could not and keeping the Communists in line. Proof of this was his continued reliance on the Japanese remaining after the peace, to help him consolidate "Free China." In terms of attacks on the Japanese, the CCP definitely had nothing to lose and a world to gain by pushing a confrontional anti-Japanese policy, and thus *can* be said to have born "the brunt," however limited, of anti-Japanese resistance.

But in spite of my criticisms, I do recommend the book as a concise and necessary overview of a time and place that remains shrouded in cold war night and fog.

This is a clear, well organized, and concise overview of the Chinese Civil War. This is not a detailed narrative or military history. Readers looking for that type of book can consult the excellent bibliography of this book. Westad's aims are to cover the basic narrative and provide analysis of the major features of the Civil War. Westad does this very well.

Westad presents China emerging from WWII and the prolonged struggle against the Japanese as a profoundly damaged society. This was particularly true in those parts of Northern China that were the main battlegrounds in the fight against Japan. In this context, whoever could establish even moderately effective government would be able to dominate China. The Nationalist party (Guomindang - GMD)led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)had become the most powerful force in China in the interwar period but the success of the Japanese invaders greatly damaged the GMD. Nonetheless, in 1946, the GMD seemed likely to regain dominance of China. Jiang Jieshi was acknowledged internationally, including by the Soviets, as the leading figure in China, the GMD at least nominally controlled 80% of the country, and the GMD army had been well equipped by the Americans. In the initial battles of the Civil War, the GMD forces did well against the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

A major theme of this book is the failure of the GMD to capitalize on its advantages. The initial pre-eminence of the GMD was also a source of weakness as any failures to establish effective governance undermined the legitimacy of the GMD. Westad makes clear the high level of corruption, numerous errors in governing, high level of intra-party competition, economic ingnorance, poor leadership, and general incompetence that characterized the GMD efforts to establish effective government. GMD failures led to considerable unrest in the cities and the countryside, providing opportunities for the CCP.

While the CCP started the war in an inferior position, it had certain advantages. It was a smaller and considerably cohesive movement, its leadership was clearly better, and despite problems due to inconsistencies in how vigorously to pursue radical reform in the countryside, CCP cadres generally proved more competent than their GMD counterparts. The CCP benefited also greatly from control of the most industrialized part of China, Manchuria, and significant assistance from the Soviets. Soviet support was clearly crucial, though its importance should not be overestimated as Stalin's China policy was rather cautious. Its clear from Westad's narrative, that the CCP leadership, specifically Mao were able to make the most of their advantages and exploit the huge shortcomings of the GMD. This is not the popular story of a peasant led guerilla uprising taking over China. Rather, this is the story of relatively conventional military success allowing establishment of reasonably competent government and leading to acceptance of CCP dominance of China. Military success in conventional warfare was crucial and the CCP appears to have had the outstanding commander of the war, Lin Biao.

Westad stresses the importance of the Civil War experience for subsequent events in China. Mao dominated the CCP at the outset of the Civil War, but the rapid success of the CCP (much quicker than anyone, including Mao, expected), sealed Mao's domination of the CCP. The militarization of the CCP, the emphasis of rapid mass efforts, the importance of "will," and use of Soviet models of government and political organization, were all accelerated by the Civil War. Westad is very good as well on the nature of politics and change in the countryside adn the cities. The complicated relationships between the GMD, the CCP and the various national minorities is also covered well.

While this book is very much a history of GMD failures, there is some irony when looking at the events of the Civil War and recent events. The GMD, notably Jiang, wanted a modernizing, nationalist state, in control of its own economy, restricting expression but still interacting with the greater world and markets. The state would be authoritarian but using democratic forms to boost legitimacy and a mass party to mobilize the party to support the regime. It appears that CCP domination of China was a painful way to achieve Jiang's goals.