I had the pleasure of having John as one of my lecturers for War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. Aside from being a dab hand at a war game, he can write a mean book.
As others have said, this is a revisionist account, mainly concerning itself with countering the prevailing notion that British armour performed poorly in Normandy. This book is not one filled with soldiers individual accounts, it is an examination of British armour (and to some extent the Army as a whole) - why they fought the way they did, both in Normandy and throughout the war, and why some of the interpretations of the campaign about the British are incorrect, or at least misleading.
The book is very thorough, examined tactics and doctrine, morale, design, planning and production, and 'the tank gap' (comparison to opposing German tanks). There is repetition (unsurprising and unavoidable), and while noticeable, it is not irritating - and can indeed be quite beneficial if you are not reading the book in a short period.
I would thoroughly recommend this as essential literature to anyone with an interest in the Normandy Campaign or the British Army during World War II, or anyone with an interest in military doctrine and the way it shapes performance. It is well written and researched, and it was both enjoyable and useful to read.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet or computer - no Kindle device required. Learn more.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle Cloud Reader.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Flip to back Flip to front
Follow the author
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.
OK
British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 (Military History and Policy) Paperback – 6 April 2006
by
John Buckley
(Author)
| John Buckley (Author) See search results for this author |
Promotion Message
50% off gift wrap with code GIFTWRAP50.
1 promotion
-
50% off gift wrap with code GIFTWRAP50.
Get 50% off gift wrapping on eligible items with code: GIFTWRAP50. Offered by Amazon.co.uk. Here's how (terms and conditions apply)Sign in to redeem.
Note: This item is eligible for FREE Click and Collect without a minimum order subject to availability. Details
Pick up your parcel at a time and place that suits you subject to availability.
- Choose from over 13,000 locations across the UK
- Prime members get unlimited deliveries at no additional cost
- Find your preferred location and add it to your address book
- Dispatch to this address when you check out
Enhance your purchase
The popular perception of the performance of British armour in the Normandy campaign of 1944 is one of failure and frustration. Despite overwhelming superiority in numbers, Montgomery's repeated efforts to employ his armour in an offensive manner ended in a disappointing stalemate. Explanation of these and other humiliating failures has centred predominantly on the shortcomings of the tanks employed by British formations. This new study by John Buckley challenges the standard view of Normandy as a failure for British armour by analysing the reality and level of the supposed failure and the causes behind it.
- ISBN-100415407737
- ISBN-13978-0415407731
- Edition1st
- PublisherRoutledge
- Publication date6 April 2006
- LanguageEnglish
- Dimensions15.6 x 1.75 x 23.39 cm
- Print length304 pages
Frequently bought together
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
Special offers and product promotions
- Get 50% off gift wrapping on eligible items with code: GIFTWRAP50. Offered by Amazon.co.uk. Here's how (terms and conditions apply)
Product description
About the Author
John Buckley is Senior Lecturer in War Studies and History at the University of Wolverhampton. He is the author of The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945: Constant Endeavour (1995) and Air Power in the Age of Total War (1998).
Start reading British Armour in the Normandy Campaign on your Kindle in under a minute.
Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Product details
- Publisher : Routledge; 1st edition (6 April 2006)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 304 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0415407737
- ISBN-13 : 978-0415407731
- Dimensions : 15.6 x 1.75 x 23.39 cm
- Best Sellers Rank: 541,533 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- 533 in World War II D-Day Landings
- 1,064 in Historic Origins of World War II
- 16,862 in Great Britain History (Books)
- Customer reviews:
About the author
Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more
Customer reviews
4.6 out of 5 stars
4.6 out of 5
28 global ratings
How are ratings calculated?
To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyses reviews to verify trustworthiness.
Top reviews
Top reviews from United Kingdom
There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 21 July 2014
Report abuse
Verified Purchase
14 people found this helpful
Helpful
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 7 May 2018
Verified Purchase
A very detailed and well-written account that deals with a number of issues and exposes a number of myths. Avery good read for military historians and wargamers. It is extensively referenced and well set out.
One person found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 4 December 2013
Verified Purchase
No serious library of the Normandy campaign is complete without this book.
You don't have to agree with the author's conclusions but the value of his contribution to the historical understanding of the campaign is beyond doubt.
You don't have to agree with the author's conclusions but the value of his contribution to the historical understanding of the campaign is beyond doubt.
3 people found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 27 September 2017
Verified Purchase
None
One person found this helpful
Report abuse
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 14 June 2010
Verified Purchase
In this work John Buckley assaults the issue put forth via various historians that the British armour arm failed during the 1944 Second World War Normandy campaign, while at the same time building upon Stephen Ashley Hart's and David French's work that the British Army adapted and fought the war in its own unique successful way.
The key issue Buckley highlights is that the apparent failure of the British armour is based on the erroneously perceived vision of how armoured warfare should be conducted based off the likes of the France 1940 campaign "Blitzkrieg"; an event that had been superseded by newly developed weapons and tactics. Additionally while the initial Overlord plan had called for deep penetrations into Normandy by armour; terrain, logistical issues, and German opposition made this not possible and thus the armoured divisions fought a battle that they had not trained nor prepared for - to be used in an attritional battle as battering rams. Likewise as the campaign progressed German tactics altered to combat the Anglo-Canadian attacks, leading to in-depth defences while they concentrated the majority of their armoured forces, and better quality divisions committed to Normandy, to halt the progress of the British and Canadian forces.
Buckley looks into the doctrine and the issues of how the divisions and independent brigades were suppose to fight; he highlights the lack of common doctrine and the problems this entailed but also of how this presented the various units with flexibility and actually, after some problems, allowed them to learn how to fight in an effective manner. The overarching point made is that the British armoured forces fought in a different way to the German Heer or Waffen SS Panzer arm and cannot be straight up compared to the idealised view of what armoured warfare was based off the misconception of what happened in France 1940 etc; the British approach was different, it had its problems, but in the end was successful - the British armour did not fail in Normandy.
Buckley highlights that contrary to popular perception the vast majority of armour committed to Normandy, by the German armed forces, was comparable or even outclassed by British tanks and anti-tank weaponry. While the "big cats" posed a real problem to British armour, they too were vulnerable; that at the end of the day the battle was not so one sided in the tank realm. On the other hand he does note that all allied tanks (in part due to the below issues) were vulnerable to German anti-tank weapons - including the most heavily armoured Churchill model.
Buckley also looks at the design and production of British tanks; the reliability issue facing the initial models, how this and the need to re-equip the expanding army following the Fall of France, experience in the desert, rushed production, and various legislation, not relaxed until mid-war, held up design work and influenced development. This coupled with the acceptance of the M4 Sherman and medium velocity 75mm gun, which was a compromise to have tanks equipped with a weapon that could successfully knock out soft skinned vehicles and anti-tank guns, saw that by the time Overlord was planned it was too late to stop current production/supply and introduce new tank models - these models then only becoming available later in 1944. With that said he also discusses the Firefly project, showing that while tank design had been poor during the early war period, it had improved while research, development, and innovation of new anti-tank guns and ways of using them was top class.
To sum up, in this excellent study Buckley shows the pros and cons of the British armoured force of 1944 and how they adopted what they had to fight their own unique and ultimately successful campaign.
The key issue Buckley highlights is that the apparent failure of the British armour is based on the erroneously perceived vision of how armoured warfare should be conducted based off the likes of the France 1940 campaign "Blitzkrieg"; an event that had been superseded by newly developed weapons and tactics. Additionally while the initial Overlord plan had called for deep penetrations into Normandy by armour; terrain, logistical issues, and German opposition made this not possible and thus the armoured divisions fought a battle that they had not trained nor prepared for - to be used in an attritional battle as battering rams. Likewise as the campaign progressed German tactics altered to combat the Anglo-Canadian attacks, leading to in-depth defences while they concentrated the majority of their armoured forces, and better quality divisions committed to Normandy, to halt the progress of the British and Canadian forces.
Buckley looks into the doctrine and the issues of how the divisions and independent brigades were suppose to fight; he highlights the lack of common doctrine and the problems this entailed but also of how this presented the various units with flexibility and actually, after some problems, allowed them to learn how to fight in an effective manner. The overarching point made is that the British armoured forces fought in a different way to the German Heer or Waffen SS Panzer arm and cannot be straight up compared to the idealised view of what armoured warfare was based off the misconception of what happened in France 1940 etc; the British approach was different, it had its problems, but in the end was successful - the British armour did not fail in Normandy.
Buckley highlights that contrary to popular perception the vast majority of armour committed to Normandy, by the German armed forces, was comparable or even outclassed by British tanks and anti-tank weaponry. While the "big cats" posed a real problem to British armour, they too were vulnerable; that at the end of the day the battle was not so one sided in the tank realm. On the other hand he does note that all allied tanks (in part due to the below issues) were vulnerable to German anti-tank weapons - including the most heavily armoured Churchill model.
Buckley also looks at the design and production of British tanks; the reliability issue facing the initial models, how this and the need to re-equip the expanding army following the Fall of France, experience in the desert, rushed production, and various legislation, not relaxed until mid-war, held up design work and influenced development. This coupled with the acceptance of the M4 Sherman and medium velocity 75mm gun, which was a compromise to have tanks equipped with a weapon that could successfully knock out soft skinned vehicles and anti-tank guns, saw that by the time Overlord was planned it was too late to stop current production/supply and introduce new tank models - these models then only becoming available later in 1944. With that said he also discusses the Firefly project, showing that while tank design had been poor during the early war period, it had improved while research, development, and innovation of new anti-tank guns and ways of using them was top class.
To sum up, in this excellent study Buckley shows the pros and cons of the British armoured force of 1944 and how they adopted what they had to fight their own unique and ultimately successful campaign.
23 people found this helpful
Report abuse
TOP 1000 REVIEWER
5.0 out of 5 stars
Buckley's deep academic study results in a serious re-assessment of British armour in Normandy
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 26 March 2011Verified Purchase
This book is an absolutely first class detailed academic study of the performance of British and Canadian armour in the summer 1944 campaign against the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units who faced them in Normandy. Using rigorous analysis of the military, industrial, political, doctrinal and operational background which shaped the philosophy and performance of 21st Army Group, the author reveals a deep understanding of often overlooked elements of the campaign and effectively explodes the widespread myth that allied armour `failed' in Normandy. He shows us that predicated on the governing principles of low casualties, boosting morale and ultimate resource superiority, the armour of 21st Army Group proved eventually to be the equal of the Wehrmacht and SS formations in most essential areas and, despite setbacks, became progressively more effective; achieved victory by learning from early mistakes and by playing to their own strengths and to the weaknesses of their opponents in what was to prove a difficult environment for all attacking forces.
The author lays out his arguments logically chapter by chapter. He explores the political and industrial environment governing British tank design in the mid-war years: quantity over quality was paramount in 1941-42, as most of the Army's equipment had been lost in France in 1940, and it was only with the A27 Cromwell and A22 Churchill projects that tanks finally became reliable. The strengths of the German `big cats' were well known prior to `Overlord', but it was also correctly predicted that only about one third of German tanks were of this superior class and that they too were vulnerable to both the British 17-pounder anti-tank gun and the smaller HV 6-pounder with SABOT ammunition (a clever British development of an original French concept, still used in armour-piercing firepower to this day), and in the case of the Panther to the dual-purpose but otherwise inadequate allied 75mm gun from the flanks. The failure of the A27 Cromwell Tank design to accept the AP 17-pounder gun led to the Sherman Firefly project as a stop-gap, which was successful in addressing the shortfall in armour-piercing firepower in 21st AG as were a number of other innovations. That the shortcomings of allied AP firepower were only fully put right by the deployment of the Comet Tank in late 1944 and by the Centurion prototypes ready by summer 1945 proved the British tank design and production system did ultimately work well, though results were delayed; nevertheless in Normandy in 1944, the armoured contest was not in truth as one-sided as is often claimed.
Planning for the campaign had not anticipated that German formations would attempt to bottle-up the allied armies in their bridgehead and so prevent breakout into the open country to the south of Normandy much more suitable for a campaign of rapid armoured manoeuvre, as 7th AD in particular had been able to do in North Africa. This meant that the armoured formations of 21st AG had to be used as battering rams to break into the strengthened German defences in depth in close-hedged country, a role for which they were not intended and were ill-suited. However the lack of rigid doctrinal dogma in the RAC meant that commanders rapidly learned and adapted to this unforeseen combat environment, which 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division in particular did to great effect in combining close-co-operation between armour, artillery and supporting infantry. Buckley demonstrates that all armies in Normandy - whether British, Canadian, American and Polish, or Wehrmacht and Waffen SS - suffered heavily when attacking in this combat environment and that British units eventually became quite effective in this difficult and unforeseen role. He also demonstrates that the strategic decision of the German command to fight in this way inhibited effective deployment of their own forces as much as the allies and contributed significantly to the scale of the eventual German defeat.
The author also explores issues of morale (with tables of statistics for combat fatigue and AWOL numbers by unit) and reveals that in fact morale held up well in the British armoured forces, more so with inexperienced than with veteran units. One of the governing precepts of the allied command was that, if possible, victory should be won without allied soldiers being brutalised in the process and that the NW European campaign was generally successful in this regard.
Overall this is an excellent study, extremely thoughtful and well written by an intelligent and informed academic mind which might make you think about the Normandy campaign from new perspectives. It is in no way superficial or lightweight, but might appeal to the serious-minded reader who seeks a deeper understanding of the issues behind this vitally important historic campaign.
`British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' is a print-on-demand title, well edited and produced with a good photo section, comprehensive notes and a huge bibliography. The hardcover is expensive, possibly due to its small target audience of academics and serious students of the campaign. However if you are interested in this subject it's definitely worth the asking price and you are unlikely to regret buying this excellent book.
The author lays out his arguments logically chapter by chapter. He explores the political and industrial environment governing British tank design in the mid-war years: quantity over quality was paramount in 1941-42, as most of the Army's equipment had been lost in France in 1940, and it was only with the A27 Cromwell and A22 Churchill projects that tanks finally became reliable. The strengths of the German `big cats' were well known prior to `Overlord', but it was also correctly predicted that only about one third of German tanks were of this superior class and that they too were vulnerable to both the British 17-pounder anti-tank gun and the smaller HV 6-pounder with SABOT ammunition (a clever British development of an original French concept, still used in armour-piercing firepower to this day), and in the case of the Panther to the dual-purpose but otherwise inadequate allied 75mm gun from the flanks. The failure of the A27 Cromwell Tank design to accept the AP 17-pounder gun led to the Sherman Firefly project as a stop-gap, which was successful in addressing the shortfall in armour-piercing firepower in 21st AG as were a number of other innovations. That the shortcomings of allied AP firepower were only fully put right by the deployment of the Comet Tank in late 1944 and by the Centurion prototypes ready by summer 1945 proved the British tank design and production system did ultimately work well, though results were delayed; nevertheless in Normandy in 1944, the armoured contest was not in truth as one-sided as is often claimed.
Planning for the campaign had not anticipated that German formations would attempt to bottle-up the allied armies in their bridgehead and so prevent breakout into the open country to the south of Normandy much more suitable for a campaign of rapid armoured manoeuvre, as 7th AD in particular had been able to do in North Africa. This meant that the armoured formations of 21st AG had to be used as battering rams to break into the strengthened German defences in depth in close-hedged country, a role for which they were not intended and were ill-suited. However the lack of rigid doctrinal dogma in the RAC meant that commanders rapidly learned and adapted to this unforeseen combat environment, which 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division in particular did to great effect in combining close-co-operation between armour, artillery and supporting infantry. Buckley demonstrates that all armies in Normandy - whether British, Canadian, American and Polish, or Wehrmacht and Waffen SS - suffered heavily when attacking in this combat environment and that British units eventually became quite effective in this difficult and unforeseen role. He also demonstrates that the strategic decision of the German command to fight in this way inhibited effective deployment of their own forces as much as the allies and contributed significantly to the scale of the eventual German defeat.
The author also explores issues of morale (with tables of statistics for combat fatigue and AWOL numbers by unit) and reveals that in fact morale held up well in the British armoured forces, more so with inexperienced than with veteran units. One of the governing precepts of the allied command was that, if possible, victory should be won without allied soldiers being brutalised in the process and that the NW European campaign was generally successful in this regard.
Overall this is an excellent study, extremely thoughtful and well written by an intelligent and informed academic mind which might make you think about the Normandy campaign from new perspectives. It is in no way superficial or lightweight, but might appeal to the serious-minded reader who seeks a deeper understanding of the issues behind this vitally important historic campaign.
`British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' is a print-on-demand title, well edited and produced with a good photo section, comprehensive notes and a huge bibliography. The hardcover is expensive, possibly due to its small target audience of academics and serious students of the campaign. However if you are interested in this subject it's definitely worth the asking price and you are unlikely to regret buying this excellent book.
29 people found this helpful
Report abuse





