- Also check our best rated Travel Book reviews
The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (Warfare and History) Paperback – 26 Jul 2001
- Choose from over 13,000 locations across the UK
- Prime members get unlimited deliveries at no additional cost
- Find your preferred location and add it to your address book
- Dispatch to this address when you check out
Customers who viewed this item also viewed
What other items do customers buy after viewing this item?
Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
To get the free app, enter your mobile phone number.
If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support?
'This book should long be the standard work on the subject for students, specialists and general readers.' - Gerald Hawting, Times Literary Supplement
'... a lucid exploration of the role of the military in early Islamic society... This is a very important book based on a careful and original reading of the sources. It constitutes a major addition to our understanding of early Islamic society.' - John France, History, July 2003
Top Customer Reviews
Hugh Kennedy does, of course, discuss the Muslim sources and explains what makes them so original, when compared to Western sources covering the same period, difficult to deal with but also extraordinarily rich. The two main narrative sources that he uses - Al-Baladhuri writing in the ninth century and Al-Tabari writing in the tenth century - included in their narratives and therefore helped to preserve a large amount of material from previous authors which would be otherwise lost to us. In a way, these two scholars were perhaps at least as much compilers as they were "historians" telling us their own version of what had happened. This is what makes them so valuable but also so difficult to work with. Their value is that they, and the previous sources that they transmit, are very heavily "prosopographical": their focus is on specific people and groups, much more than being on institutions, events or even caliphs and chronology.Read more ›
Most Helpful Customer Reviews on Amazon.com (beta) (May include reviews from Early Reviewer Rewards Program)
Hugh Kennedy does, of course, discuss the Muslim sources and explains what makes them so original, when compared to Western sources covering the same period, difficult to deal with but also extraordinarily rich. The two main narrative sources that he uses - Al-Baladhuri writing in the ninth century and Al-Tabari writing in the tenth century - included in their narratives and therefore helped to preserve a large amount of material from previous authors which would be otherwise lost to us. In a way, these two scholars were perhaps at least as much compilers as they were "historians" telling us their own version of what had happened. This is what makes them so valuable but also so difficult to work with. Their value is that they, and the previous sources that they transmit, are very heavily "prosopographical": their focus is on specific people and groups, much more than being on institutions, events or even caliphs and chronology. The reason for this is very well explained and lies in the transition from what was essentially a tribal organization to that of a state where those that had directly participated in the victories of the Conquest (and their descendants) were entitled to what was initially a share of the spoils and what evolved into a share of the tax revenues of the province or district that they (and their ancestor for subsequent generations) had helped to conquer for Islam. So there was, in the generations of Arabs that immediately followed the Conquest, what we would nowadays call a "vested interest" in showing that a given warrior participated in such and such a campaign or battle.
The central thesis of the book is to show how the relationship between "Army", "State" and society changed over time. It is also to show why the Caliphs made changes in the social and ethnic composition of the army and how these changes had significant consequences and interactions with the State and the society. In other words, some of these changes "back-fired" and had long-term negative consequences. At the beginning, and prior to the Conquest, there seems to have been no institutionalized state. Rather, there was a growing collection of Arab tribes united by Islam under the banner of a commander-in-chief (the Prophet and his immediate successors). There was also, as Kennedy shows, little distinction between tribes, which made up the society, and armed forces (rather than the army), which were essentially made up of all adult males of each tribe.
The first distinctions began to appear just after the Conquest, as Arab warriors and their families were settled in Irak, Syria and Egypt, but separated from the populations that they had conquered. Being a Muslim and being a descendant of the initial conquerors were necessary conditions for being part of the armed forces (the junds) and being paid for it through taxes levied from the non-Muslims in the respective regions. However, the army was no longer equated with all of the society. Overtime, this distinction between military and civilians could only grow, as a growing number of non-Muslims converted. The second distinction that grew overtime was that all Muslims were no longer necessarily part of the army and the army could not be reduced to Arabs only. To some extent, Arab armies, even during the Conquest, were not exclusively Arab. They also included, for instance, and as Kennedy shows, Persian units that had changed sides and converted, or, later on, Berbers in North Africa and Spain.
Another change and growing that appeared after 656, but had probably been growing before, was the double need for the State and the Caliph to ensure that the army was loyal and that access to resources - the cash payments that soldiers received - was reserved to those that were loyal. As Kennedy also shows very well, this consideration largely explains the growing rivalry that least to civil war between the armed forces in Syria and those in Irak, and the domination of the former, once the Umayyads had won. He also shows that the next evolutions, the reliance of the Abbasides on soldiers from Khorasan up to the early ninth, and then their increasing reliance on the various types of "slave-soldiers" followed the same logic and was intended to address similar tensions. Regarding the latter, he stresses that the important point was not their legal status. Rather, it was their loyalty to the reigning sovereign because they made up both his bodyguard and his shock troops. This loyalty was secured to the extent that they owed everything to the Caliph, starting with their existence and their salaries, and that they were isolated within Muslim society: they were foreigners (mostly Turkish, from the ninth century onwards) and they were feared if not also hated by the population of Badgad .
The paradox that this created is also one of the most interesting points in the book: these foreigners (quasi-mercenaries), although Muslim, depended entirely on the State for their survival. To ensure the latter and to control its dwindling resources, they increasingly tried to control the State and to replace independent minded Caliphs by their puppets. This, in turn, accelerated the crumbling of the Caliphate which was already suffering from rebellions from powerful governors at the beginning of the ninth century, until the mid-tenth century, when the Buyids stripped the Caliphs of their political powers and became military dictators in Irak. By that time, most of the other provinces had broken away and become separate states.
Finally, there are discussions of the army itself, including discussions on numbers, which is also one of the book's strongpoints because Kennedy does provide estimates, and on equipment, sieges and fortifications, on which he has less to say. This is partly because of the sources but mostly because these elements are not central to the book's purpose, that is the interactions between army, state and society, NOT an "Islamic Military History". In addition, and even if this may seem short for some, all the main points are made.
So, in my view, and even if the glossary or the maps could perhaps have been more extensive, the "product" delivered by Hugh Kennedy is simply excellent, remains unmatched, and should be compulsory reading for anyone interested in the Arab Conquests and the three first centuries of Islam, and not only for "experts and specialists."
This is because, as he shows so well, so much of what happened after was conditioned by what existed before....
Armies of the Caliphs (although quite dense) does present a comprehensive and balanced discussion of items such as weaponry, tactics, lines of command, methods of payment, and the changing social and ethnic composition of Muslim armies throughout the first three centuries of the Caliphate. The book is based heavily on narrative sources by historians of the ninth and tenth centuries such as al-Baladhuri and especially, al-Tabari. Since these works focus greatly on individuals and groups of individuals rather than institutions, they are extremely prosopographical. Directly, the sources refer only sporadically to tactics and methods of paying soldiers. Kennedy however uses this prosopography to his advantage. For example, using al-Tabari as a source, Kennedy cites an anecdote in which the Umayyads under al-Hajjaj defeated the Kharijis when they tried to attack Kufa. In doing so, he effectively demonstrates the importance of the infantry spear-wall defense. To reinforce this view, he cites another anecdote (once again using al-Tabari) about how the `Abbasid troops used the exact same technique at the Battle of Tell Kushaf to defeat Marwan II's army. Similarly, Kennedy argues convincingly that soldiers were generally paid in cash thus reflecting upon the importance of commerce and monetary exchange in the economy. This contrasts with the system in medieval Europe at the time, whereby troops were paid by grants of land or by tax farms-what started as a stipend for the Caliph's soldiers, ultimately became a true salary for work done.
Compared to his discussion on payment, Kennedy provides only a cursory glance composed of two chapters in regards to weapons, equipment, fortification, and siege warfare (a mere twenty-seven pages in a book of well over two hundred). This however is understandable because apart from the stirrup, there were no major technical advances in military equipment during the first three Islamic centuries. Regarding the stirrup, Kennedy argues that although there is no reason to suppose that the Arabs used them, the Muslims began to adopt it around the end of the seventh century. His discussion takes into account Lynn White's theory that the introduction of stirrups lead to the development of the heavily armoured horseman and ultimately to the social structures designed to support such specialized warriors. On the other hand, siege warfare played a small role in Islamic military history because there was a general dislike for static and restricted forms of warfare. Furthermore, no evidence remains for organised siegecraft. Even when cities, citadels, and individual buildings were fortified, they were more for display purposes than for defense.
Kennedy's discussion of the changing social and ethnic composition is quite comprehensive. In the years around 700 AD, largely in response to the challenge of revolts and civil wars, the Caliph Abd al-Malik began to have his army dominated by units from Syria because of their supposed superiority. With the fall of the Umayyads in 750 AD, Syrian domination gave way to men from the province of Khurasan (where the revolt which gave the Abbasids control of the Caliphate began). When the Khurasanis were no longer reliable, the Caliphs began to increasingly recruit Turks from Central Asia. Historians usually refer to these troops as slave soldiers, but Kennedy argues that we cannot be sure of their legal status. This is because in some ways it was irrelevant: the result of this new source of recruitment was the growing isolation of the Caliphs and the usurpation of real power by the soldiers, who themselves were cut off in their garrisons and in frequent conflict with the indigenous dwellers of Iraq.
Kennedy's book is part of a series, Warfare and History, intended for historians and related specialists. He wastes no time with a background for introductory purposes, and delves right into the content. It seems therefore quite lacking that the glossary does not include many of the Arabic terms for weapons, armour, and other similar words which occur frequently in the text. An appendix providing a brief introduction to some of the important Caliphs, commanders, and generals would have been helpful as well. Although there are three maps provided in the book, they are not sufficient for a book of such a large scope. More illustrations would have been helpful, of not only paintings and artefacts that provide evidence, but reconstructions of weapons and army formations, which are difficult to visualize simply from verbal descriptions. Overall, Kennedy succeeds in doing what he set out for: analyzing the relationship between army and society in the early Islamic period, thus offering an excellent reassessment of the early Islamic state.
Look for similar items by category
- Books > History > Asia
- Books > History > Middle East
- Books > History > Military History > Strategy, Tactics & Military Science
- Books > History > World History
- Books > Religion & Spirituality > Islam > History
- Books > Society, Politics & Philosophy > Warfare & Defence
- Books > Travel & Holiday > Countries & Regions > Middle East