Aristotle's First Principles (Clarendon Aristotle Series) Paperback – 31 May 1990
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`Undoubtedly a major work - scholarly, learned, detailed ... Irwin's book will certainly be something for Aristotelians to discuss for a long time.' Times Higher Education Supplement
`T.H. Irwin's rich book ... is vastly learned ...The argument is always based on a scholarly perusal of the texts; and it is usually presented with philosophical subtelty and precision ... He writes of Aristotle with admiration and with love; and his affection gives a charming blush to a serious book ... already a classic of its kind.' Jonathan Barnes, The Times Literary Supplement
'The book is elegantly printed, and conspicuously well proof-read.' Christopher Kirwan, Exeter College, Oxford, Journal of Hellenic Studies, Volume CX, 1990
'an emminently readable reference book to the history of the field' Pat Haggard, New Scientist, 20 April 1991
`its great strength is that, in spite of its length and scope, Irwin never loses his grip upon a central, organising thesis.' Canadian Philosophical Reviews
`This is a very good book. It has much that is original. It is comprehensive ... It is critical ... this is a really important book, and a provocative one; it must be pondered by all who deal seriously with Aristotle.' Ancient Philosophy
`remarkable ... This is a scholarly and philosophical work of the first magnitude ... one can only admire the intellectual achievement this book represents, and be grateful for how much there is to learn from it.' Philosophical Review
About the Author
Terence Irwin is at Cornell University.
Most helpful customer reviews on Amazon.com
To begin our investigation we have a statement that.
"Realists must allow the logical possibility of the truth of scepticism, since they take truth to consist in the correspondence of beliefs to some reality that is logically independent of them; this logical independence implies the logical possibility that all our beliefs are false. and therefore leaves logical room for the sceptical doubt to be correct. Any justiﬁcation appealing to coherence between beliefs seems to leave room for sceptical doubt; and it has sometimes seemed that only beliefs immune to doubt could be reasonable foundations for realist claims. The search for beliefs immune to doubt leads naturally to a foundationalist conception of justiﬁcation, according to which all inferential justiﬁcation depends on beliefs that are non-inferentially justiﬁed and self-evident."
First the author fails to make a distinction between beliefs and inferences. Second considering this statement "this logical independence implies the logical possibility that all our beliefs are false". What he should have said is "this logical independence implies the logical possibility that all our inferences are false" after all we are talking about aristotle the father of the science of logic.
Lets examine that proposition which takes the form of all S are P. Now lets assume that this proposition is true, the equivalent to this statement is all S are not non-P. If we take the negation of false (non-P) represents a true inference then our statement would read all our inferences are not true which is equivalent to all our inferences are false. Now if we take the negation of all S are not non-P we get no S are non-P or none of our inferences are true. We can see that the statement all of our inferences are false and none of our inferences are true agree with one another. Now that we have established the proposition that none of our inferences are true as a true proposition we have to ask the question are any of our inferences true, and we find that the answer is yes that the inference that none of our inferences are true is established as a true proposition (inference). Now what we have have is not one proposition but two propositions. First we have one proposition that none of our inferences are true Which takes the form No S are P. Our second proposition is that at least one of our inferences is in fact true, namely the E propisition No S are P. This second would take the form that some of our inferences (at least one) are true. Thus we have the I Proposition Some S are P.
Now If we look at the square of opposition modern or traditional we find that these two propositions contradict one another.
It seems that this author is woefully ignorant to logic formal or traditional.
I gave it two stars because to the true student of logic there will always be some valuable information to be found but to the novice this is a terrible way to start. The best books on logic are old out of print books found on google books. Recently Some of these books are being reproduced on a small scale.
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