55 of 61 people found the following review helpful
A sleight of hand to kill off all sleights of hand,
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This review is from: I Am a Strange Loop (Paperback)
Philosophy, to those who are disdainful of it, is a sucker for *a priori* sleights of hand: purely logical arguments which do not rely for grip on empirical reality, but purport to explain it all the same: chestnuts like "cogito ergo sum", from which Descartes concluded a necessary distinction between a non-material soul and the rest of the world.
Douglas Hofstadter is not a philosopher (though he's friends with one), and in "I am a Strange Loop" he is mightily disdainful of the discipline and its weakness for cute logical constructions. All of metaphysics is so much bunk, says Hofstadter, and he sets out to demonstrate this using the power of mathematics and in particular the fashionable power of Gödel's incompleteness theory.
Observers may pause and reflect on an irony at once: Hofstadter's method - derived *a priori* from the pure logical structure of mathematics - looks suspiciously like those tricksy metaphysical musings on which he heaps derision. As his book proceeds this irony only sharpens.
But I'm getting ahead of myself, for I started out enjoying this book immensely. Until about halfway I thought I'd award it five stars - but then found it increasingly unconvincing and glib, notably at the point where Hofstadter leaves his (absolutely fascinating) mathematical theorising behind and begins applying it. He believes that from purely logical contortion one may derive a coherent account of consciousness (a purely physical phenomenon) robust enough to bat away any philosophical objections, dualist or otherwise.
Note, with another irony, his industry here: to express the physical parameters of a material thing - a brain - in terms of purely non-material apparatus (a conceptual language). In the early stages, Professor Hofstadter brushes aside reductionist objections to his scheme which is, by definition, an emergent property of, and therefore unobservable in, the interactions of specific nerves and neurons. Yet late in his book he is at great pains to say that that same material thing *cannot*, by dint of the laws of physics, be pushed around by a non material thing (being a soul), and that configurations of electrons correspond directly to particular conscious states in what seems a rigorously deterministic way (Hofstadter brusquely dismisses conjectures that your red might not be the same as mine). Without warning, in his closing pages, Hofstadter seems to declare himself a behaviourist. Given the excellent and enlightening work of his early chapters, this comes as a surprise and a disappointment to say the least.
Hofstadter's exposition of Gödel's theory is excellent and its application in the idea of the "Strange Loop" is fascinating. He spends much of the opening chapters grounding this odd notion, which he says is the key to understanding consciousness as a non-mystical, non-dualistic, scientifically respectable and physically explicable phenomenon. His insight is to root consciousness not in the physical manifestation of the brain, but in the patterns and symbols represented within it. This, I think, is all he needs to establish to win his primary argument, namely that Artificial Intelligence is a valid proposition. But he is obliged to go on because, like Darwin's Dangerous Idea, the Strange Loop threatens to operate like a universal acid and cut through many cherished and well-established ideas. Alas, some of these ideas seem to be ones Douglas Hofstadter is not quite ready to let go.
The implication of the Strange Loop, which I don't think Hofstadter denies, is that a string of symbols, provided it is sufficiently complex (and "loopy") can be a substrate for a consciousness. That is a Neat Idea (though I'm not persuaded it's correct: Hofstadter's support for it is only conceptual, and involves little more than hand-waving and appeals to open-mindedness.)
But all the same, some strange loops began to occur to me here. Perhaps rather than slamming the door on mysticism, Douglas Hofstadter has unwittingly blown it wide open. After all, why stop at human consciousness as a complex system? Cconceptually, perhaps, one might be able to construct a string of symbols representing God. Would it even need a substrate? Might the fact that it is conceptually possible mean that God therefore exists?
I am being mendacious, I confess. But herein lie the dangers (or irritations) of tricksy *a priori* contortions. However, Professor Hofstadter shouldn't complain: he started it.
Less provocatively, perhaps a community of interacting individuals, like a city - after all, a more complex system than a single one, QED - might also be conscious. Perhaps there are all sorts of consciousnesses which we can't see precisely because they emerge at a more abstract level than the one we occupy.
This might seem far-fetched, but the leap of faith it requires isn't materially bigger than the one Hofstadter explicitly requires us to make. He sees the power of Gödel's insight being that symbolic systems of sufficient complexity ("languages" to you and me) can operate on multiple levels, and if they can be made to reference themselves, the scope for endless fractalising feedback loops is infinite. The same door that opens the way to consciousness seems to let all sorts of less appealing apparitions into the room: God, higher levels of consciousness and sentient pieces of paper bootstrap themselves into existence also.
This seems to be a Strange Loop Too Far, and as a result we find Hofstadter ultimately embracing the reductionism of which he was initially so dismissive, veering violently towards determinism and concluding with a behavioural flourish that there is no consciousness, no free will, and no alternative way of experiencing red. Ultimately he asserts a binary option: unacceptable dualism with all the fairies, spirits, spooks and logical lacunae it implies, or a pretty brutal form of determinist materialism.
There's yet another irony in all this, for he has repeatedly scorned Bertrand Russell's failure to see the implications of his own formal language, while apparently making a comparable failure to understand the implications of his own model. Strange Loops allow - guarantee, in fact - multiple meanings via analogy and metaphors, and provide no means of adjudicating between them. They vitiate the idea of transcendental truth which Hofstadter seems suddenly so keen on. The option isn't binary at all: rather, it's a silly question.
In essence, *all* interpretations are metaphorical; even the "literal" ones. Neuroscience, with all its gluons, neurons and so on, is just one more metaphor which we might use to understand an aspect of our world. It will tell us much about the brain, but very little about consciousness, seeing as the two operate on quite different levels of abstraction.
To the extent, therefore, that Douglas Hofstadter concludes that the self is that is an illusion his is a wholly useless conclusion. As he acknowledges, "we" are doomed to "see" the world in terms of "selves"; an *a priori* sleight-of-hand, no matter how cleverly constructed, which tells us that we're wrong about that (and that we're not actually here at all!) does us no good at all.
Neurons, gluons and strange loops have their place - in many places this is a fascinating book, after all - but they won't give us any purchase on this debate.
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Showing 1-7 of 7 posts in this discussion
Initial post: 15 Jun 2011 11:42:39 BDT
What on earth does "To the extent, therefore, that Douglas Hofstadter concludes that the self is that is an illusion his is a wholly useless conclusion." mean??? Perhaps you are being mendacious ;-)
In reply to an earlier post on 15 Jun 2011 12:32:44 BDT
Olly Buxton says:
Not this time!: concluding that "I" is an illusion doesn't explain anything: an illusion on whom?
Posted on 17 Feb 2012 13:16:36 GMT
If reviews could be reviewed, I'd give this one five stars.
Posted on 9 Sep 2013 13:29:41 BDT
Last edited by the author on 9 Sep 2013 13:31:54 BDT
It's really neat seeing this level of analysis happening in an online shop. I really enjoyed the depth of this review and am looking forward to seeing for myself. Thanks very much for taking the time and thought to write this, and sharing it. Just one very small correction: glia, not gluons, unless that was very wryly intentional.
Posted on 28 May 2014 20:55:56 BDT
I found this review interesting and thought provoking. I would propose a few responses to the points that Olly is making.
Firstly the argument of the paragraph beginning
"Note, with another irony, his industry here: to express the physical parameters of a material thing - a brain - in terms of purely non-material apparatus (a conceptual language)."
I believe this argument is attempting to indicate a contradiction. Is the intended argument that Hofstader argues at once that consciousness is an emergent property and cannot be reduced and then later uses the reductionist model of nerves and impulses to argue against a 'soul.'? Therefore he creates a contradiction at being at once a reductionist and at the same time a non-reductionist.
I would argue that this hasn't occurred in 'I am a strange loop.' It is not contradictory to state that consciousness is irreducible, and that configurations of nerves are interacting in a deterministic way. The arguments are independent, not mutually exclusive. That is to say, if we say that configurations of nerves are operating in a deterministic fashion we are not implicitly non-reductionist.
Secondly the argument that
"Conceptually, perhaps, one might be able to construct a string of symbols representing God. Would it even need a substrate? Might the fact that it is conceptually possible mean that God therefore exists?"
"The same door that opens the way to consciousness seems to let all sorts of less appealing apparitions into the room: God, higher levels of consciousness and sentient pieces of paper bootstrap themselves into existence also."
Is a non sequitur. It does not follow that from creating a string of symbols representing God that God therefore exists. If your string of symbols is for something conceptual, then the God symbolised would remain conceptual. If however an individual had a set of symbols representing something physical, then. God would exist, but limited in scope to the physical thing represented.
Other parts of your argument are I believe valid and interesting, particularly
"Less provocatively, perhaps a community of interacting individuals, like a city - after all, a more complex system than a single one, QED - might also be conscious. Perhaps there are all sorts of consciousnesses which we can't see precisely because they emerge at a more abstract level than the one we occupy."
Also I would seek clarity on the argument "To the extent, therefore, that Douglas Hofstadter concludes that the self is that is an illusion his is a wholly useless conclusion."
By useless do you mean that serves no practical purpose?
If so perhaps I would simply argue that many theories, models and explanations serve only the purpose of satisfying the curiosity of understanding the world in which we live.
Or perhaps it is an argument saying that supposing we don't exist in the manner Hofstadter suggests is useless, as there is no further debate from this point?
If this is the case then indeed, I would agree, it is in a sense, unprovable. A lot of ends in philosophy are that way, and ultimately you have to make a choice, Is there a God? Does free will exist? Is the self an illusion? I would argue that for each of these the affirmative and negative answers are both very much possible, and then a choice has to be made. The choice being having extra entities or not, a larger or smaller ontology, I choose the latter. This is also why I enjoyed 'I am a strange loop' for me that are no extra entities and it is an explanation that fits.
In reply to an earlier post on 29 May 2014 12:12:07 BDT
Last edited by the author on 29 May 2014 12:14:58 BDT
Olly Buxton says:
Thanks for your post - appreciate you taking the time to read and think about my review.
If something as apparently magical as consciousness can emerge out of the dull deterministic interaction of neurons, then should we not expect something even *more* magical to emerge out of the (less) deterministic interaction of those conscious beings - and so on and so on?
I think metaphor and literature are good examples of such systems. And so might communities and cities be - or forests, or mountain ranges or weather systems. They operate on glacial timescales - for all we know their intelligence is simply not apparent to us.
And what about interactions between these magical systems?
In looking further down the causal chain to the interaction of atoms, isn't Hofstadter is looking in 180 degrees the wrong direction? Were he to turn around, might he not think his programme leave the way open to an infinite, ineffable hyper-intelligence that we are simply too dull and parochial to apprehend?
You could write a good book about it.
All the best.
In reply to an earlier post on 5 Jun 2014 06:39:16 BDT
Thanks for taking the time to reply.
I think I would definitely say that something as 'magical' can emerge out of something as 'dull' as the interaction of neurons. To me if we don't go down this line then we would be headed towards some variety of dualism, a view to which I am opposed on the basis of the extra entities that it would suggest exist.
Indeed this is the whole charm of Hofstaders 'I am a strange loop,' for me, as it accounts for consciousness, or how it could work in theory, from neuron interaction, without dualism, or any other extra superfluous entities. At least that's what I prefer :)
And although higher intelligences are indeed possible under the system Hofstader describes, they are not a consequence. Perhaps the strange loop system can be described as necessary but not sufficient. That is, perhaps there is a higher interaction going on, but this might not be the only condition required for consciousness to arise.
I'm not sure if there isn't something prohibitive against such systems. Perhaps the re-enforcement and growth of neurons that is documented in neuron interaction. I think this starts to drift a little away from Hofstaders argument, but even within Hofstaders argument one might say that perhaps there isn't the attribution of symbols in other complex systems.
At any rate, my point is that, yes Hofstader's argument doesn't exclude some variety of hyper intelliegence, but it doesn't entail it either...
All the best
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