2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars philosophically interesting, but extremely difficult with no guidence
The Tractatus, for me, has been very enjoyable to study and many of the concepts, such as 'the limits of language' and 'nonsense', are riveting once they are understood. But that is the problem; to gain anything from the Tractatus it needs to be understood and this is difficult. Famously, Wittgenstein handed the transcript of the Tractatus to Bertrand Russell and claimed...
Published on 30 April 2011 by RW
3 of 4 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence
This knotty and cryptic work was very difficult for me to comprehend at first and, as I have only a superficial knowledge of philosophy, I still find it somewhat bewildering.
Here is a very simplistic summary of how Wittgenstein develops his argument in the Tractatus via seven propositions (which are in turn supplemented by numerous pithy elucidations):...
Published on 23 July 2011 by Paul D
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars philosophically interesting, but extremely difficult with no guidence,
The Tractatus, for me, has been very enjoyable to study and many of the concepts, such as 'the limits of language' and 'nonsense', are riveting once they are understood. But that is the problem; to gain anything from the Tractatus it needs to be understood and this is difficult. Famously, Wittgenstein handed the transcript of the Tractatus to Bertrand Russell and claimed that Russell would never understand. Wittgenstein turned out to be correct. He was appalled by the misunderstanding in Russell's introduction for the book, particularly with the claim that he was 'stating the conditions for 'an ideal language'. Wittgenstein attempted to have the book republished without Russell's appraisal. So, if Russell cannot understand the Tractatus it would seem unconquerable for someone with a passing, or even deep, interest in philosophy. Or rather, it is unconquerable without guidance.
My recommendation is that if you want to enjoy the book for the fascinating content it has to offer, buy a study guide (or take one out from the library). When I first bought the Tractatus for my undergraduate course it seemed unapproachable, but after going through the guides I became engrossed in the many, varied and contradictory insights it presented. The guides I have read are the Nordman, White and Morris and I found that White was good for a step by step approach with the outlines of the modern interpretation, Nordman represented those modern interpretations in a interesting and accessible way, and Morris was a nice middle ground, although sometimes a little drawn-out. Although I haven't read it I hear good things about the Mounce guide also.
What I found most interesting about the Tractatus are the many and varied understandings of the book explained by the introductions, so I urge that if do study the Tractatus, do study it. It is certainly not a quick read for sunny afternoon on a park bench.
41 of 49 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Worth a struggle!,
By A Customer
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was meant to put an end to philosophy. As it turned out, it didn't, because he continued to write later on in life, although after reading it, most of his contemporaries had to keep silent for a bit. It undermines much thought of the early 20th Century. It's a hard one to read. You need to go over these short aphoristic mind explosions slowly. So it's a good thing that the whole text only amounts to about 70 pages. If you do get to the end, though, you can not read philosophy in the same way again. It is worth it for the final lines. The Tractatus is something you grow into. You love it or you hate it. If you get it, you can't ignore it. If you don't, you probably will.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars The Best Translation Around,
Anyone who really wants to understand the Western tradition of philosophy, including where it goes wrong, should get to know the Tractatus, and this translation is by far my favourite.
It may take a little while to become familiar enough with Wittgenstein and his way of going about philosophy to appreciate the Tractatus for what it really is, but when you do you realise that it is a great book. Flawed, but great. In fact, Wittgenstein spent over twenty years working toward a book which would overcome the Tractatus's flaws while showing that the overall intelligence within the Tractatus was valid and important. This second book was published shortly after his death as Philosophical Investigations, and only by understanding the two books together can you, philosophically, begin to "see the world aright" [Tractatus, 6.54].
22 of 27 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Not quite the end of philosophy,
Before outlining the philosophical project of the Tractatus a cursory note about the style and structure of the text should be made. It consists of short supposedly self-evident aphorisms in the form 7 general statements as well as many supplementary sentences that explain or reveal the deeper meaning of the more general statement above, e.g. 7.1 is taken to be an explanatory proposition of 7, 7.1.1 supplements 7.1, and so on. There are no arguments per se in the text. This does not mean that the propositions are unreasoned, but the responsibility lies with the student in teasing the arguments out of Wittgenstein's subtle pointers. It is of necessity to point out that the Tractatus is not a work accessible to laymen or beginners: one does need some understanding of contemporary formal logic as well as the logical atomism of Russell and to a lesser extent the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
Wittgenstein's aim with the Tractatus was to demystify philosophy through the conceptual clarification. Wittgenstein did not believe philosophical problems existed in the traditional sense, but resulted from confusions caused by a fundamental misuse and misunderstanding about the form and meaning of language. In this sense, the Tractatus, according to Wittgenstein, was to put an end to philosophizing in the ordinary sense and instead see philosophy as a process of clarification of fundamental concepts that would aid those subjects that seek genuine answers in terms of facts, e.g. the sciences.
Central to this new definition of philosophy is the picture theory, for which the Tractatus is most famed. In the preface Wittgenstein alludes to the Kantian principle that the limits of language (thought) are the limits of the world. This link between language and reality lies at the heart of the metaphysics of the early Wittgenstein's philosophy. The picture theory borrows heavily from Russellian referentialism and can be briefly stated as the view that language represents reality. The first statement of the Tractatus is that the world is everything that is the case - or the totality of facts as the supplementary statements explain. Facts can be broken down into constituent parts (objects), which can be further broken down. Facts are expressed in language by propositions, which too are divisible. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein adopted the logical atomism of Russell and claimed that the chain of divisibility must end somewhere - he postulates the existence of simple ideas underpinning reality. Furthermore, it is by denoting real world objects that words gain meaning. So the words `chair', `table', `computer' all have meaning only because they denote objects in the world. So if words have meaning because they denote objects, propositions too only have meaning if they denote possible states of affairs (which are constituted of actual objects in a possible configuration). The result is that only propositions that can be subjected to tests of truth and falsehood have any meaning (or sense), everything else can be cast aside as nonsense. Wittgenstein's claim is that the sorts of propositions philosophers have used throughout history in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics & religion are nonsense since they use words and concepts such as `God', `Justice', `Knowledge' that do not denote objects in reality. They do fit within the boundaries of our language, according to Wittgenstein's model, therefore cannot form part of our meaningful reality and are nonsense.
The rest of the Tractatus can be separated into two parts. The first consists of the statements between 4 and 6.241 and outlines Wittgenstein's theory of an ideal language of logic. His analysis is done mostly through the use of truth-tables (a standard model of semantics in modern sententional logic). There is also a theory on the essential form of sentences, as well Wittgenstein expressing the view that mathematical and logical sentences are tautological and transcendental and therefore are themselves nonsense (and also re-iterating the Russellian thesis that all mathematic propositions are derivative of logical propositions). The purely logical language reflects the world and can only derive meaning from this and is in possession of none in itself (My lack of detail here does not reflect the opinion that I consider these parts of the Tractatus of lesser importance, but is due to my inability to render the technical features lucidly and with the justice they deserve).
The second part is of particularly interesting in light of what has gone before it and has sparked much intrigue and debate since (see the New Wittgensteinians). Beginning at around 6.3 it consists of statements that are taken to confront religion, ethics and the mystical. There is also to be found the claim by Wittgenstein that what one has just read (the Tractatus) is itself nonsense, expressed mischievously by the metaphor of the ladder (6.54). I leave the intrigued student to seek and figure this out for themselves.
The Tractatus is an incredible work in its scope considering its short length; its conclusions are profound, groundbreaking and contain serious implications for philosophers. However, as with any work of philosophy there are flaws. Most of these were ruthlessly exposed and criticised by Wittgenstein himself in his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations. The picture theory is now taken as an ultimately incorrect account of the relationship between language and reality - it is too narrow and the `use theory' of the mature Wittgenstein appears more versatile and far more robust to challenges. There is the work itself: Wittgenstein aimed to redefine philosophy as a therapeutic process of dispelling the myths of metaphysics that were caused by the muddyness of language; he rejected metaphysical doctrines as nonsense, yet a large chunk of the Tractatus is devoted to a positive metaphysical theory.
Nevertheless, the Tractatus constitutes a very noble attempt at establishing its theories in their own right, even if it fails to deliver on its promise to reduce philosophy to a process of conceptual clarification in aid of the sciences. Its influence remains strong and there are many scholars who consider the Tractatus the pinnacle of Wittgenstein's philosophical output.
3 of 4 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence,
This knotty and cryptic work was very difficult for me to comprehend at first and, as I have only a superficial knowledge of philosophy, I still find it somewhat bewildering.
Here is a very simplistic summary of how Wittgenstein develops his argument in the Tractatus via seven propositions (which are in turn supplemented by numerous pithy elucidations):
1. "The world is all that is the case."
2. "What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs."
3. "A logical picture of facts is a thought."
4. "A thought is a proposition with a sense."
(And here is where I start to get a little lost...)
5. "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself)."
6. "The general form of a truth-function says that every proposition is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of an operation."
7. "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
(Because this final statement stands alone, it seems even more stark and startling than what has gone before. Just what does he mean?)
What he seems to be saying is that to describe something that has no basis in physical reality is akin to nonsense, e.g. abstract concepts such as evil, God, love, and truth.
While this is all very well, what is the significance of this philosophy, and where did it come from?
It will be grasped more readily by those who have acquainted themselves with the branch of philosophy called logic; and more specifically, with logical atomism (as propounded by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica). They argued that Principia gives us the picture of a perfect language, via symbolic logic, because it mirrors the structure of the actual world. Principia informs us that the world is made up of "facts", and that all such facts are atomic in nature, i.e. every fact can be described by an atomic proposition (we call them sentences; logicians call them propositions).
Wittgenstein went on to develop in part of the Tractatus his own version of logical atomism, which is known as picture theory. According to him, the ideal language pictures or mirrors the world, just like a map mirrors a territory.
A perfect language pictures the structure of reality, or facts, since facts are composed of objects and their properties. These logical atoms stand in a 1:1 correspondence with the individual elements of the world.
What's the point of all this? To eliminate the confusion that can arise from the use of everyday language. For example, "The present king of France is wise" may make sense, but in fact it is nonsense because "the present king of France" does not refer to anything directly in the actual world.
All that said, Wittgenstein came to believe that the search for a perfect language which accurately mirrored the world could not be realised. Instead, in Philosophical Investigations, he went on to develop a technique called "language games", to identify the actual rules for the use of ordinary expressions, what they allow and forbid, and to pinpoint deviations from actual use which lead to conceptual confusion.
His view was that: "Philosophy is [a] battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."
15 of 21 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars I'll be honest,
I bought this so my bookshelf would look better to guests - it is currently full of werewolf porn and Chuck Palahniuk novels. It did not disappoint in that respect, especially as the title is in some kind of Foreign. As for the contents, I've not got that far yet.
2 of 3 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Foundation Stone of Mechanistic Reductionism by our Greatest Descriptive Psychologist,
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."(OC 94).
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book" p6 (1933)
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." TLP 6.52 (1922)
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979)p183
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: "Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding - understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall."--Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein'
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe the two systems of thought (fast and slow thinking now central to psychology). He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He also discussed many times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions and can thus be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. He described the psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this being possible only for behavior with a public language (the impossibility of private language). He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical computers. He invented truth tables and predicted paraconsistent logic. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since.
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him). "Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein.
Had W lived into his 80's he would have been able to directly influence Searle (the other modern genius of descriptive psychology), Symons, and countless other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank Ramsey had not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly have ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, one of the most amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful within philosophy have any real grasp of his work today. He could have shined as an engineer(he patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, a mathematician (he sketched out a proof of Euler's theorem, since shown to be valid, and grasped the psychological foundations of math , incompleteness, infinity etc., as no one else has to this day), a physiologist (he did wartime research in it and designed a heartbeat monitor), a musician (he played instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the modernist house he designed and constructed for his sister still stands), or an entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the world but gave it all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps (while writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (2 brothers succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the Nazis (he was partly Jewish), and that he was not persecuted for his homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized nobody understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was half a century ahead of psychology and philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that our behavior evolved like our body.)
Before TLP there is a ProtoTractatus and a few desultory comments made even earlier. It is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best minds in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely with it appearing frequently over a century after it was first conceived. The first thing to note is that W later rejected it entirely for reasons he spent the rest of his life explaining. You can see the review of S Guha on amazon.com for a splendid précis of some of what TLP means IF you assume phrases like "propositions are pictures of reality" have a clear meaning (they don't). He was doing philosophy (descriptive psychology) as though the mind was a logical mathematical machine that processed facts (i.e., information processing) and behavior was the result. Thus, long before computers W gave the ultimate statement of what was half a century later to become known as Behaviorism, Strong AI, Functionalism, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and most recently DST (Dynamic Systems Theory). Eventually, W realized that perception and memory were the raw material acted upon by our innate psychology (EP) and logic and math were some of the results. Being able to say or understand anything presupposed EP and trying to make logic primary (unless one means our axiomatic psychology) leads to incoherence, as is evident throughout TLP (and the explanation for its many bizarre statements-see e.g. Hutto). Even so, one can "understand" TLP in the sense that one can state the confusions he labored under and which most of the world still does.
In the decades after TLP, W evolved slowly and his ideas crystallized into a unique and amazingly deep and prescient description of behavior not yet fully appreciated by even his brightest and most ardent admirers (e.g. Hutto, Stern, DMS etc.). Although W wrote thousands of pages and is the most discussed philosopher in modern times, only a few have any real grasp of what he did and how it anticipates in detail many of the latest advances in psychology and philosophy (descriptive psychology). It is essential to first read some of the commentaries on his later work by others. One of the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume "Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty" is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein, psychology, philosophy and life, since it explains the unconscious, axiomatic structure of animal behavior. Next, I would suggest the writings of Peter Hacker and of Daniel Hutto, especially his "Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy"(2004). However (in my view) like all analyses, they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advances in describing behavior by failing to put them in a broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal outline here. Finally, all of Searle should be read, with special attention to his more recent works such as PNC and MSW (see my reviews). Though Searle does not say and seems to be unaware, most of his work follows directly from that of W.
To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said. I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI.
Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 Primary Language Games (PLG's) of counting as extended into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, CTM, DST or Functionalism seems to be aware that W's Tractatus is the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (behavior as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Decades later he described in great detail why CTM was an incoherent description of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life).
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior of all time and this is his most famous work. He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see "On Certainty" for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others. This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of behavior, is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the automatisms from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W's work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs dispositions--see below), but nature and nurture.
What he laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Few realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who have more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical (psychological) conclusion, nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (TOM, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc.,--see below). His heir apparent, John Searle (S), refers to him periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W's, but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W analysts such as Hutto, Horwich, Hacker and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs.
I suggest regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It seems clear that, insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior ought to translate easily into one another. Thus the recent themes of "Embodied Mind" and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work. However few follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even redoubtables like Hutto, Searle and Hacker (see below and my reviews) have to be heavily filtered to see that this is true, and even they do not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (potential acting).
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics--the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view not only lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen butter of all discussions of behavior. To repeat Dobzhansky's famous comment: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.
The failure of even the best thinkers (with a few possible exceptions) to fully grasp W's significance is partly due to the limited attention "On Certainty" (OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, but even more to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we accept this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default of the second self of slow thinking conscious S2,(which is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of S1). S1 is more or less equivalent to "mirroring"(Goldman), "neural resonance"(Gallagher), "biosemantics"(Millikan), and "biosemiotics"(Hutto). Steven Pinker's brilliant `The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature' is highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and limited in various ways, and he has no clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. Also, he seems not to grasp that the Blank Slate view is an expression of the cognitive illusions that constitute our mental life.
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (now we say Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And so, speech is the mind, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As with his other aphorisms I suggest one should take seriously his comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind.
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the automaticity of our personality, the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of behavior. System 1 is our involuntary fast thinking, true only, nonpropositional, untestable mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including S1 Truths and UA1-Understanding of Agency1), while the evolutionarily later S2 is slow thinking, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2, dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. A useful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which in some cases can be False). He recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our "inner life" (e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459).
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make them clear. After all, what exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind. W famously said "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but he was not antiscientific--cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating ways to examine our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, which remains unchanged. The true-only axioms most thoroughly explored in `'On Certainty'' are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background", which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution" for a pro intro.
Beginning with their innate automated responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but `theorem' is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands. This dramatically changes ones view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However as I note here W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 and of course these are multifaceted phenomena.
Likewise the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any rational educated person before the end of the 19th century. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable workings of EP. The logical (psychological) necessity of this was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out).
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 `mistake' are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions.
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception (including UA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes in many examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes" (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations" (which refer to abilities or possible actions), are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of occurrence. But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing" have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use, which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic System 1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out and which can become true or false (`I know my way home').
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP).
Another point made by W was that our conscious mental life is epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act. It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of recent work). It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W.
Among the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University as DMS. His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W's 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best deconstructions I know of Dennett's preposterous claim to be following in W's footsteps (in fact Dennett is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn't a clue about W) and of Fodor's LOT and other nonsense. One ought to read Searle too, and the title of his review of Dennett's book says it well "Consciousness Explained Away". Unlike most scholars, Hutto has put his papers (though often just proofs) free online at [...].
Here, as throughout W's works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from mostly unedited and handwritten German notes, with "Satz" being incorrectly rendered as "proposition"(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct "sentence", which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as "these are my hands" or "Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years ago".
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
16 of 23 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars did he mean anything at all?,
"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it -- or similar thoughts", so begins Wittgenstein at the start of this confusing piece of work. He later went on to contradict much of it in his Philosophical Investigations. Russell tells us in his introduction, "In order to understand Mr Wittgenstein's book, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned." I have to say at the outset that I am not a trained Philosopher but I am university educated and reasonably intelligent. However I am still struggling to understand exactly what problems Wittgenstein was trying to solve never mind what the solutions are that he is proposing. Anything else I read about this work is also shrouded in confusing language which doesn't actually seem to refer to anything other than itself. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that even Philosophers themselves can't agree on what it is that he actually trying to achieve. Having said all this I, for reasons I can't fully explain, find both Wittgenstein and his work highly compelling. In parts the book seems like a very dry academic discussion on the rules of logic and yet in others reads more like The Toa Te Ching. I would appreciate it if someone would write a genuinely accessible account of his work with illustrated examples of atomic facts and the kinds of propositions he was talking about. Without a proper background it's too easy to mistakenly think you know what he's talking about. I do have a sneaking suspicion that there is something slightly tongue in cheek about Tractatus though. Consider the following quote, "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them." Was he really just pointing out the futility of most if not all philosophical thinking? He states that, "The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem". Perhaps Tractatus should be read in a similar way to a Zen Koan. A logical nonsense to illustrate the futility of trying to grasp reality by thinking about it. Perhaps not. I sure as hell don't know if this is what he intended and I get the feeling nobody else does either. Richard Feynman who hated philosophy used to say that if you can't explain an idea in a way that anyone can understand you haven't understood it yourself. If Wittgenstein couldn't explain himself in an accessible way did he have real insights to share or was it just nonsense? The jury is still out on that one for me. Either way there is something inexplicable remarkable about this book.
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars old thinkers,
a waste of time if you haven't read simple philosophy...Wittgenstein should always start with 'can we know the truth?' and if you accept this the book makes sense, otherwise it is just a list of maxims.
0 of 2 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Dreadful cover,
This review is from: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Paperback)
What possessed the publisher to put such a ghastly cover on this historic book? I bought it for my son as a present. All the publisher has to do is choose a font and put the text between covers that are not offensive or off-putting, and they can't even do that.
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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Paperback - 31 May 2007)