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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant study of the effects of finance capital
Andrew Smithers, Chairman of Smithers & Co. Ltd., has 45 years of experience in international investment. He is not the most likely critic of recent economic policy, but in this excellent book, he shows that our problems are structural not cyclical, and therefore urges radical policy changes.

He argues that current CEO incentives caused the present depression...
Published 11 months ago by William Podmore

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Excessive attribution to too few variables
Doubtless perverse incentives of executive compensation have been partly responsible for recent economic woes but the reader is left a little exasperated as there are many obviously more significant variables that come to mind.

One is mindful of giving too much weight to dire forecasts from someone who has rarely been positive over many decades and wonders...
Published 12 months ago by praxeologue


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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant study of the effects of finance capital, 7 Jan 2014
By 
William Podmore (London United Kingdom) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   
This review is from: The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change (Hardcover)
Andrew Smithers, Chairman of Smithers & Co. Ltd., has 45 years of experience in international investment. He is not the most likely critic of recent economic policy, but in this excellent book, he shows that our problems are structural not cyclical, and therefore urges radical policy changes.

He argues that current CEO incentives caused the present depression (and also the huge gap between high and average pay). A growing share of CEOs' incomes comes from bonuses and options rather than as salary. This change in the structure of incentives, not a loss of confidence, nor general uncertainty (which is surely standard), nor a rise in anti-business rhetoric, has changed business behaviour.

Smithers sums up, "Money spent on buying shares will boost managements' bonuses more than money spent on capital equipment ..." So they have the strongest incentives to cut investment and raise prices.

So firms under-invest. He points out, "Since 2008, the proportion of cash flow invested in capital equipment is the lowest on record and the proportion spent on buy-backs is at or near its highest level." "the proportion of cash generated from depreciation and profits after tax that is currently being invested in plant and equipment is the lowest in the US that it has been in the post-war era and the proportion returned to shareholders is nearly 55%." In Britain, gross investment in 2012 was just 14.2 per cent of GDP, against a world average of 23.8 per cent. Productivity is down by 5 per cent since the crash.

Managements "benefit when cash or debt is used to finance buy-backs and suffer when they are used to finance investments in plant and equipment. The natural impact of this rise in the perceived cost of capital is to make management prefer to use more labour rather than more capital to achieve a given output."

Firms are even more excessively indebted than before the crash. But they are not borrowing to invest: "companies are far from seeking to improve their balance sheets. If they were, they would be repaying debt, but in practice they are choosing to spend their cash flow and any new debt that they can borrow by buying back their equity at a rapid rate."

In all, managers are rewarded for extracting short-term rents while running their companies into the ground. They have become not captains of industry but agents of destruction, a predatory elite, whose interests conflict with the interests of the economy and of the vast majority of the people.

All these failings are particularly acute in the financial sector. Further, our bailouts are giving bankers the money to buy political power: "we are, ... in effect, currently subsidising bankers to make political contributions aimed both at preserving their subsidies and their industry's ability to obtain excessive profits through inadequate competition."

The government policy of keeping interest rates low produces not greater investment but higher profits. As Smithers observes, "Whereas low interest rates would have been likely to stimulate investment in the past, by lowering the cost of capital, the impact is different today. The cost of capital, as perceived by management, is not reduced but the cost of buying back equity is." And, "low interest rates today seem to encourage companies to buy their own shares or those of other companies through takeovers, rather than to increase their capital spending on new plant and equipment."

The corporate sector cash deficit must be balanced by cash surpluses in either the public, household or foreign sectors. The government's preferred solution seems to be for foreigners to own ever more of our country's wealth.

The government refuses to admit the disastrous effect of its policies. So its Office for Budget Responsibility continually makes absurdly optimistic forecasts, for example, that the economy would grow by 5.7 per cent from Q1 2010 to Q2 2012. It grew by 0.9 per cent. Consumer spending, investment, productivity and exports were all lower than expected, and inflation was higher than expected. Smithers sums up, "Both higher than expected inflation and lower than expected investment reduce demand and thus account for the excessive optimism that the forecasters have had regarding growth."

The author also criticises the eurozone's `policy of needless austerity'. Ireland's national debt before the crisis was 28 per cent of its GDP. The cost of bailing out its banks pushed its debt up to 109 per cent of GDP. Its GDP in Q4 2011 was 12 per cent down on Q4 2007.

Smithers warns us that another crash is all too likely, given the continuing high levels of company debt and overvaluation of assets. He points out that before each of the three great financial crises - the Wall Street crash of 1929, Japan's stock market crash in 1990, and 2008's crash - there was a very high level of private sector debt, and in each case a sharp fall in asset prices triggered the crash.

He notes that the government policy of "`quantitative easing' ... involves central banks buying assets and thus pushing up their prices." And, "Not only does it seem likely that bonds are massively overpriced but we can be reasonably sure that a likely cause of this is the fact that the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve have been buying them heavily. ... Only those who have faith in the efficiency of financial markets at pricing assets can surely expect that massive buying of bonds by central banks will not push up their prices and will probably push them up to absurd levels. ... the bond buying by central banks has added to the risks that we suffer from an overvalued bond market by contributing to the overvaluation of the US equity market ..."

He warns, "important classes of asset prices today, including US bonds and equities and UK house prices, may be dangerously high." He notes, "houses in the UK are roughly three times more expensive than those in the US relative to household incomes and, unlike US prices, they have barely fallen from their peak levels. The reason for the relatively high cost of UK housing is not the cost of materials or labour; it is the price of land ..." He observes that the standard `Efficient Markets Hypothesis' denies the importance of asset prices by assuming, not proving, that they are always correct.

Smithers concludes that we must separate casino banking from ordinary retail banking. We have to de-fang the finance sector, and make it serve industry not itself.
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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A brilliant book, 5 Sep 2013
By 
Martin Wolf - See all my reviews
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Andrew is among the most brilliant analysts of the economy and financial markets - perhaps the most brilliant - now alive. He brings to bear a unique combination of practical experience with analytical economics. In this book, he has done an extraordinary job of analysing what has gone wrong with western economies and proposing radical reform. This includes a much-needed assault on the pernicious bonus-culture that is sapping the vitality of the corporate sectors of the US and UK. The book is also beautifully written.

A confession: I wrote the Foreword.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Excessive attribution to too few variables, 18 Dec 2013
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Doubtless perverse incentives of executive compensation have been partly responsible for recent economic woes but the reader is left a little exasperated as there are many obviously more significant variables that come to mind.

One is mindful of giving too much weight to dire forecasts from someone who has rarely been positive over many decades and wonders whether the thesis of the book really warranted anything more than an FT/WSJ article.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Essential ideas to improve Western society: individual and not easy but highly rewarding, 4 Dec 2013
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This review is from: The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change (Hardcover)
The author of this book has created a largely coherent evidence based view of why Western economies and to a lesser degree the global economy has arrived at the position it has. He position as a practicing economist with a highly successful business background has gives him the ability to think and express those thoughts without fear of challenging the ruling orthodoxy. This made it for me an essential read, especially as I can observe and agree first hand many of the results of the bad management motives and false economic ideas that the author contends are at the root of Western economic weakness and societal fractiousness and gross inequality. One can only hope policy makers and the wider press take up some of his core ideas. They could be game changers should certainly be tried given the very obvious failure of the current approach to most of the issues tackled.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Essential reading for investment professionals, 8 Nov 2013
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This review is from: The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change (Hardcover)
A stimulating, entertaining and, at times, alarming survey of what is wrong with current economic policy and the economics profession. Smithers' attack on the malign influence of the US/UK corporate bonus culture and assessment of the risks posed by quantitative easing are persuasive and his analysis of the very different challenges facing Japan insightful and new to me.

I felt at times that a firmer hand from the book's editor would have been welcome, notably to cut some of the repetition. I'd also have liked more discussion of how policy-makers should go about altering corporate management compensation structures to avoid or at least mitigate the negative consequence for growth that he highlights: it's not obvious that politicians and regulators are any more likely than shareholders to be successful here.

But overall, essential reading for practitioners of the 'stock-broker economics' that Smithers plausibly mocks.
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6 of 8 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Very Impressive Arguments Throughout, Including an Insider's View of the Damage Being Done By Bonus Culture, 19 Oct 2013
By 
Rob Julian (Birmingham, UK) - See all my reviews
This review is from: The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change (Hardcover)
This is a heavyweight book discussing technical economic points and also employing academic language in places, therefore be warned. However if you are really into these questions, and especially if you earn your living in related areas, this book seems to me to be absolutely indispensable and the best of its kind I have read. The author's other job is as the head of a City financial investment consultancy, which is reflected in the data centred and due diligence kind of style and approach.

Although this book is accessible and entertaining in places, other parts are quite challenging. But the reader is rewarded for his or her effort by a rather impressive and coherent set of ideas and arguments. The relationships between the different parts of the book is not spoon fed to the reader, and to me was not obvious at first, but the parts and the arguments do hang together quite well on reflection.

Being fool hardy, I will attempt to summarise the main arguments made (corrections welcome):

* The author is intent on emphasising the importance of data, and he argues that the popular and accessible 'balance sheet recession' analysis of the recent problems in our and other economies, is disputed by the actual evidence. The data, the author maintains, points to businesses not using historically high returns to pay down their debts and improving their balance sheets, as the popular theory would suggests, but in fact the opposite action of equity 'buy back' has instead been surprisingly popular, which increases rather than reduces leverage. (p77).

* Although companies are not seeking to improve their 'balance sheets' as that theory would suggest, the balance sheet recession analysis is correct in asserting that the relevant macro-economic 'identities' mean that the perpetuation of corporate net saving instead of investing sucks the counter balancing government borrowing into existence. Consequently the lack of desire or action towards improving the business investment situation, also means bad news for the government debt situation. The author argues that both issues should therefore be considered as possessing a worrying structural (bonus culture / incentives) nature, rather than cyclical (animal spirits / balance sheet repair) nature. In other words he presents a pessimistic stance, as we should not expect this lack of business investment issue to automatically disappear with the natural passing of the recessionary period.

* He argues that as well as the trend for shorter periods in senior management positions, the remuneration policies of large companies, which were supposedly designed to align managers incentives with shareholders interests, have had the unintended consequence of encouraging other undesirable incentives in terms of things like higher leverage and lack of investment. Because these bonus contracts are inherently asymmetric, they therefore reward volatile rather than simply high profit returns, which the author shows has indeed been the outcome. Managers are incentivised to create cycles of reported profit write downs followed by optimistic reported overshoots. (Good chart on p157 illustrating the nature of this overshooting). Using this device to overpay shareholders and managements, he asserts has been happening for decades, and is masked by habitually over stated company profits on average over time. (chart on p13).

* He therefore concludes that large companies are on the whole investing less and rewarding their management and shareholders more than would otherwise be expected or desirable. Under current incentives, businesses in the US and UK are tending to be milked for short term reward, while long term objectives such as investment to gain future market share and future competitiveness are neglected.

* This has he notes the perverse positive side effect of aiding the present reduction in unemployment, as short term extra labour rather than long term extra labour-saving capital equipment is employed by short-termist company managements.

* The author's understanding of the causes of a financial crisis are based on there being a combination of two factors. A crash in certain asset prices is usually the trigger, but this has to be overlaid upon a background where the conditions are ripe, such as high leverage levels and unsustainable high debts. The author details reasons why both of these components to a crisis are still higher than many people appreciate. He notes that theories surrounding the efficient market hypothesis still continue to infect behaviours and attitudes in the financial world, blinding many to impending dangers, even though such theories have been largely discredited by recent events and research. Debt levels are still high and debt still attractive to company managements, not helped by debt interest's favourable tax treatment in many countries. The author also notes quantitative easing as contributing to a worsening risk of bloated asset prices, making the potential for a bubble more likely.

* The author, resuming again the role of Cassandra, voices the possibility that monetary authorities may be forced to bring to an end our unprecedented low interest rates before economies are healthy enough to withstand such a change. He notes that raising interest rates are the accepted response to a high inflation expectations or a stagflation scenario, and subsequently worries that: "As today we have high debt levels and asset prices, I fear that a sharp rise in interest rates would precipitate another financial crisis." p195.

In his central arguments and conclusions, the author gives thought through reasons for real concern regarding the general economic outlook in Britain and the US. This summary has of course missed out a great deal of related issues discussed. These include points the author makes regarding Japan's unique situation. He mentions the too big to fail issue and spells out its connection to the 'law of large numbers' as well. The Eurozone is given quite a left wing anti austerity treatment. He argues controversially that there is: "no necessary connection between fiscal deficits and inflation. Nor, as can be seen in the case of the US ... has there been any apparent relationship between national debt and inflation." p197. He also includes (p72) the kind of insights I think Keynes would have also noted were he alive, concerning the broader picture of which countries have been doing the heavy lifting in terms of government stimulus / deficit spending, (UK, US, Japan) verses who should be doing more of it, (Germany and China in case you did not guess). In a world that is becoming more globalised, this common good and free rider dimension to government stimulus can only become more prominent. He returns to this subject on p207, where he interestingly considers the radical idea of moving currency exchange rates to help to shift the government deficits between countries.

Looking in from outside the financial world, his points regarding the short comings of business behaviour and the malign influence of the bonus culture are very potent and cutting. Furthermore they are written by an insider of that world in their own native language. The concerns he raises will therefore be hard for business culture and right of centre thinkers to shrug off and dismiss as just anti capitalist lefty rhetoric.

For me, there are too many charts in this book, but certainly some illustrate very effectively the points made. But whenever I perceive a stress on data I always remember what Eric D. Beinhocker wrote about in "The Origin of Wealth" regarding "Availability Biases" and "looking for your lost keys under the lamppost, because that is where the light is best." The most potent data for me was Chart 99 in the last quarter of the book, which illustrates the difference in affordability between housing in the US, where prices dropped during the recession, and in the UK where they did not much. Given this chart and the authors stress on the role of crashing asset prices in combination with a highly indebted environment as the terrible twin causes of crisis, it is a good job the government is not making this situation any worse with any of its recent policies. ...

Favourite quote which the author includes when discussing the conservatism of academia holding onto its invested ideas and theories: "Science advances obituary by obituary". p141.
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4.0 out of 5 stars An. Important Book, 22 April 2014
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A thought provoking book covering very important topics, it should be read in conjunction with The
Puritan Gift. We urgently need a fresh approach.
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5.0 out of 5 stars Flawed, but daring and essential, 7 April 2014
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This review is from: The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change (Hardcover)
This is perhaps the first sensible, non-sensationalist book that has been written to highlight that in the absence of new policies the current economic slump is here to stay. As usual with great books, while nothing fundamentally new is presented, theories that have existed for a while are combined to further our understanding of the world.

My favorite book of 2013, Stockman's "Great Deformation," argues that the financial crisis was caused by the lethal combination of three factors that in isolation could have been benign: (i) the tax advantage of debt financing over equity financing (ii) the tax advantage of income from capital gains over income from labor and (iii) the Fed's perception of its role as that of a guarantor of prosperity leading to permanently loose monetary policy. These factors, Stockman argues, combined to fuel 1. Corporate Equity Withdrawal in all its forms, from the Tyco, Enron and (dare I say it) GE and Cisco-style acquisition, creative accounting and profit management cultures that centered around the worship of the stock price, to the Private Equity bubble that has left North America with (just for example) 5% of the world's population but 42% of the world's hotel rooms (you can borrow against a hotel room) and tons of healthy companies disemboweled at the altar of current shareholders' short-sighted, narrow interests and 2. The Private Equity Withdrawal fest that was the 2000-2008 GSE / mortgage broker / subprime / Wall Street CDO housing bubble.

Andrew Smithers takes this much further. He asserts that the incentives which fuel Corporate Equity Withdrawal not only caused the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008 (all major recessions are started by falls in asset prices, he argues), but also stand in the way of recovery. Here's a set of rhetorical questions to summarize his argument:

1. Is everyone surprised at how profitable UK and US corporates are at the moment?
2. Is everyone surprised at how low corporate investment is right now in the US and the UK?
3. Is everyone, including the BoE and the Fed, surprised at how quickly unemployment numbers are improving in the US and the UK? Is everyone dismayed about how little these fresh new jobs are paying?
4. Was 2013 the new record year for corporate issuance following another record year in 2012?
5. Is inequality of income the topic on everyone's lips today?

Additionally (and this has less to do with the Macro picture, but it corroborates the whole argument) has anybody noticed that corporate earnings are massively more volatile than both their past volatility and their volatility in GDP accounts?

What if there is a single process/mechanism that powers all of the above? What if CEOs across the UK and the US were currently:

1. Refusing to lower their profit margins in the interest of temporarily sending up the stock price (and losing market share in the long run)
2. Refusing to invest in plant and equipment and R&D in the interest of temporarily sending up the stock price (and staying behind in developments in the long run) via higher short-term earnings?
3. Making up for the lack of investment by hiring cheap labor to fill in the gaps?
4. Issuing tons of debt, only to turn around and use the proceeds to buy back stock?
5. Taking huge writedowns as soon as they land a new job (like loan-book writedowns after the financial crisis, legal provisions after oil spills etc.) which they claw back slowly and goose up earnings with during their tenure at the top?
6. Compensating themselves with options that automatically get driven up in price as record amounts of stock buybacks are squeezing up earnings per share via the denominator and have taken the ratio of pay from the shop floor to management higher than 500:1?

Smithers basically addresses the major conundrum of the anaemic post-2008 recovery through a single explanation: CEOs across the UK and the US are only keeping their jobs for five years (rather than ten or fifteen like they used to) so they're doing whatever they can to drive up the share prices that turbo boost the value of the options they are awarding themselves. They are refusing to sacrifice profit margins to gain market share, they are refusing to make investments that won't bear fruit immediately, they make up for inadequate deployed capital by hiring cheap stop-gap labor, they are issuing as many bonds as the market can bear, landing tons of cash on their balance sheet, which then gets used to fuel massive stock buybacks, with the express purpose of sending up their pay pacakges.

As a result, expansionary monetary and fiscal policy has very little effect. Lower rates don't help with investment, because high rates never were the cause of inadequate corporate investment. Au contraire, low rates make it even cheaper to issue tons of bonds and buy more stock with the proceeds. And government spending is merely making up for the deficit in corporate spending, but at the cost of a continuously mounting government debt, which will at some stage become a source of instability.

I buy it!

This cannot be the only explanation, but it is very significant, because corporate profits are largely concentrated in the S&P 500-sized companies, not in the struggling Small and Medium Enterprises.

While he's at it, Smithers also demolishes two other explanations for the current slump in the UK and the US:

1. Balance sheet recession: Yes, it's what might have happened in Japan (about which more later), but not here, because firms in the UK and the US are not at all shy about borrowing at the moment and neither are households. Corporates are borrowing at record levels, while households' indebtedness has only come down by the amount of housing loan defaults. Everybody else is still borrowing all they can. Nobody feels chastened by the lessons of 2008.

2. Uncertainty: Corporates are refusing to invest not because they don't know what to do with the extra capacity, but because (i) it is more important for them to be able to keep prices and margins higher and (ii) they'd rather use any extra money to buy back more stock. Uncertainty is actually a good thing for corporate CEOs, it increases the volatility of the stock market and the value of their options...

A rival theory Andrew Smithers actually endorses is that since the crisis (which took out scores of competitors across many industries) the corporate landscape has become a lot less competitive. On the scale from perfect competition to oligopolistic competition all the way to monopoly, we have moved further away from competition and closer to monopoly. Monopolies, as we know, keep output below the competitive equilibrium output, prices above those at the competitive equilibrium, profit margins higher than their zero value under perfect competition and can act as monopsonists vis a vis their employees.

I actually like that theory even more. But I recognize it does not explain the current proliferation of crappy low-paying jobs (the cause of the celebrated "fall in productivity") as well as Smithers' theory.

In practice, both must be happening at the same time!

Having spent a hundred-odd pages on this main idea, the book drifts into stuff that did not captivate me as much.
There's a chapter on Japan which explains (convincingly to somebody like me) that the problem there is the opposite: too much corporate investment caused by overly generous depreciation allowances actually masks solid corporate profitability.

There's a chapter on Inflation that left me wondering if the author was scared of high or low inflation. You surely cannot reasonably fear both equally at the same time.

There's a chapter on the instability caused by the combination of very high government debt, over-inflated asset prices in US Equities, UK real estate and bonds all over the world, central banks that refuse to remove the punchbowl etc. but Stephen Roach could have written it (better) in 2004.

There's a singularly confused chapter on how Germany needs to spend more, but the only way to get them to do so is via trashing the JPY, the GBP and I think even the USD, such that German products will become expensive and the Germans will export less/ import more. Maybe it said something different, but it could have been written by Martin Wolf in the FT. He did write the forward to this book, after all. (I say that as a negative, I still don't understand how he's allowed to get the very same article through the editor of the FT every month without anybody saying "enough")

And then come the conclusions, which actually enraged me. It strikes me that if the problem is CEO shortsightedness, then those companies that have myopic CEOs, no matter how important, will be outcompeted by companies that don't treat their stakeholders like idiots. It will take no more than a business cycle. If Andrew Smithers is right about what's stopping the recovery from coming, then this slump will have the same ending as H.G. Wells' "War of the Worlds:" it will die of natural causes.

So I thought that the consistent reaction to the conclusions of the book is to be extremely hopeful. The author clearly does not see it that way and proposes a series of different ways to compensate management. But that's his prerogative, I'm just thankful he wrote this book. Oh, and I really hope nobody tries to do what he suggests, btw. The guy who has a written contract to work toward will always win, let's face it.

And just in case the monopoly explanation is important too, maybe somebody out there should wake up and start enforcing the Sherman Act!

Finally, in case Stockman is right, why not get rid of the corporate income tax and replace it with a tax on all distributions, and set it to the highest marginal income tax rate? But that's an altogether different kettle of fish.

Buy and read "The Road to Recovery" it is a unique book. I took away a message of hope. If he's right about the causes of the persistent slump, it can't be too long till things start going better.
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5.0 out of 5 stars Informative, authoritative and probably right, 6 April 2014
By 
jsm (London United Kingdom) - See all my reviews
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If you're interested in improving your understanding of the economic problems currently facing the UK and global economies, this book is pretty much essential reading. The book argues that the bonus system for remunerating managements not only damages the companies they run but also prevents national and global economies from recovering. Also important is the claim that academic economists are still expounding theories that have been discredited by the 2008 crisis and that this is important because the advice provided by these academics is still dictating the actions and policies of governments and central banks. Reforming the bonus system so that executives are encouraged to invest in the long-term future of their companies rather than boosting their own short-term remuneration and revising economic theory to take account of the events surrounding the 2008 crash are essential if national and global economies are to recover and another crash is to be avoided. Hard to disagree.
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5.0 out of 5 stars An Important book - should be required reading for Investors and Politicians, 28 Jan 2014
By 
james dalbiac (HUNGERFORD, Berks, GB) - See all my reviews
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ROAD TO RECOVERY
An important book – should be required reading for Investors and Politicians.

Andrew Smithers, the well-known economist, challenges conventional economic thinking with a volley of ground-breaking insights. Three of the most powerful deserve careful study, not only by other economists but also by investors and policy makers.

1.Smithers shows how over recent years managers of large corporations in the US and the UK have been perversely incentivised to maximise short-term share price performance at the expense of capital investment and to the detriment of the long-term health of their companies and of the wider economy. He identifies elements in the US and UK tax systems which are largely responsible – and which can and should be reformed.
2. Smithers shows how these perverse incentives lead to enlarged swings in reported profits, both in an upwards and a downwards direction – and correspondingly enlarged swings in asset prices.
3. He also – and crucially – identifies swings in asset prices as a key driver of swings in the economic cycle, much more important than conventionally thought, and at the root of ‘boom and bust’.

The book is thus invaluable reading for investors: Smithers shows how we can expect rather weak recoveries but bigger bull markets and deeper bear markets while this situation is allowed to persist. So the book is essential reading for politicians and their advisers who can and should do something about it.

Andrew Smithers writes lucidly, with an easy style , well-researched authority and the minimum of jargon. He also reveals a nice sense of humour and the occasional shafts of well-directed scorn at people in high places.
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The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change
The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change by Andrew Smithers (Hardcover - 20 Sep 2013)
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