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I am: A Philosophical Inquiry into First-person Being

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Volume two of Raymond Tallis' three book plunge into philosophical anthropology deals with first-person being. It begins, interestingly, with Descartes cogito and uses Wittgenstein's arguments to illuminate the meditations deficiencies (i.e. the error of beginning an inquiry from a position of absolute doubt). Tallis contends that Descartes' cogito, `was a reflection at a higher and more sophisticated level, of the Existential Intuition.' (p.332) The Existential Intuition is `the sense that I am this', which arises from a sense of agency enabled by the human hand - a point Tallis examines in chapter eight.

Leaving Descartes Tallis then draws on Heidegger's Da-Sein, but argues that Heidegger bypasses the vital point of embodiment - a position Tallis' encapsulates by noting `No Da-Sein without Fort-Sein' (p.133). From here Tallis looks at the necessity of embodiment whilst conceding that using embodiment to allow for Fort-Sein (and therefore Da-Sein) is problematic given the nature of the body. Tallis proceeds to examine identity, drawing on Locke, revealing the flaws in his contribution and coming back to The Existential Intuition to offer a solution to these flaws. Finally, Tallis examines how The Existential Intuition and agency stem from each other before preparing the way for the third volume in the series.

Stylistically `I Am' is accessible without being condescending or diluted; philosophically `I Am' is startling, but humbly aware of its limitations. Tallis' ability to draw on so many strands of philosophical thought and bring them together to posit an original look at first-person being is worthy of praise. The Existential Intuition is particularly fascinating and something I would like to see explored further. Overall this is an engaging, intelligent work of philosophy.