4.0 out of 5 stars Why this was almost certainly helpful
An almost certainly helpful critique of Dawkins' least credible and creditable offering. Ward's arguments are not as accessible to the reader as Lennox or Polkinghorne. Worth the read for that, however.
Published 5 months ago by David
37 of 48 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars More fallacious arguments for theism
I thought long and hard about how to write a review of Keith Ward's book, 'Why there almost certainly is a God?' precisely because reviews of theistic books are normally perceived as being merely partisan - 4-5 stars from theists and 1-2 stars from non-theists - and it's not my desire to write a merely partisan review, so I want to detail, clearly, those things that I...
Published on 8 Oct 2010 by C. Collins
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37 of 48 people found the following review helpful
2.0 out of 5 stars More fallacious arguments for theism,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)I thought long and hard about how to write a review of Keith Ward's book, 'Why there almost certainly is a God?' precisely because reviews of theistic books are normally perceived as being merely partisan - 4-5 stars from theists and 1-2 stars from non-theists - and it's not my desire to write a merely partisan review, so I want to detail, clearly, those things that I believe to be the most egregious failings. So, beyond the fact that I don't find Ward's book even slightly persuasive, what is one to make of it?
The title is borrowed from one of the chapters in Dawkins' book, 'The God Delusion' with, in Ward's words "... one little difference: I have changed the word 'no' to the word 'a', because I think that change reflects the situation more accurately."
So, this is partly a 'response' to Dawkins' book but, more importantly, it is also an attempt to justify the claim that 'there almost certainly is a God'. Does it succeed? Well, firstly, I don't doubt that Dawkins' book is flawed, in some respects, and that a competent philosopher ought to be able to illustrate 'why' Dawkins' book will not be the last word on the subject of 'God' but, then again, it wouldn't take a professional academician to accomplish that. With reference to the rather more ambitious project of demonstrating that 'there almost certainly is a God' does Ward succeed? No - of course not.
On that score, Ward's book offers approximately the same combination of questions gone begging (i.e. circular arguments) and arguments from ignorance that one has come to expect from any book attempting to defend theism. The reason for the two stars, then, is because this is not absolutely terrible and certainly not comparable to the dross that creationists routinely produce but, yet, there are more weak (indeed, very weak) links in Ward's reasoning than one should expect from a philosopher of Ward's credentials. As a skeptic, is it unreasonable of me to ask that Ward put together at least a moderately 'persuasive' argument, rather than merely asking me to suspend my critical faculties altogether?
Although Ward is obviously a theist (a Christian theist), most of his arguments are, in fact, Deistic in nature. Even if these arguments were persuasive (and they aren't in the least), he would, to paraphrase Christopher Hitchens, still have all of his work in front of him. Rather than critique each and every one of Ward's assertions and ineffectual arguments, however, I'll try and focus on the fundamental reasons why, I believe, this book, and others like it, are simply doomed to fail.
There are a couple of jokes that I used to like, as a child that go something like this:
Q: How does an elephant hide in a cherry tree?
A: It paints its toes red. [Cue laughter].
Q: How does an elephant get down from a cherry tree?
A: It sits on a leaf and waits `til autumn (or fall). [Cue hysterical laughter].
My point is that these jokes have no chance of being funny to somebody who does not understand that the idea of an elephant sitting in a cherry tree is nonsensical, in the first place. If anybody has actually got so far as to persuade themselves that elephants *are* capable of hiding in cherry trees, it's unlikely that they're going to be easily dissuaded from this viewpoint and so, I suggest, it is with theism.
Ward's book is predicated on the fundamental presupposition that "there is a consciousness that does not come into being at the end of a long physical process. In fact it does not come into being at all. It did not spontaneously appear out of nothing. It has always existed, and it always will. There is something that has thoughts, feelings and perceptions, but no physical body or brain. Such thoughts and perceptions will be very different from human thoughts." This is, to Ward's mind, 'The God Hypothesis' and, yet, he cannot offer any reason whatsoever for supposing it to be so. Many objections against it can be raised, but two points come to my mind immediately:
1. Ward goes to some length to illustrate just how poorly understood is the idea of 'consciousness'; in fact, 'consciousness' does not even have an agreed definition, never mind a sufficient explanation.
2. Having asserted, then, that we know close to nothing about what 'consciousness' is or from whence it arises, he then goes on to assert that whatever 'it' is, this self-same mysterious phenomenon (called 'consciousness') does, in fact, exist (contra-Dennett, for example) and that it is the basis of the 'God Hypothesis' - except with the important proviso that "[s]uch thoughts and perceptions will be very different from human thoughts."
So, 'God-consciousness' is the same as human 'consciousness', but different, right?? So, in what sense, can it still be referred to as 'consciousness'? Remember, 'consciousness' is a word for which we have no sufficient definition, in the first place, so it can - essentially - be used to mean *whatever* Ward wants it to mean.
Ward's book is plagued by this kind of nonsense but, to be fair, he's somewhat handicapped by his theistic belief set; Elephants in cherry trees, anyone? So, to summarize Ward's position:
1. We know precious little about what 'consciousness' actually is or from whence it arises.
2. What we do know, which relates entirely to human beings, could lead one to the (incorrect, according to Ward) conclusion that 'mind' and 'brain' are, in fact, inseparable.
So, then - if a) we don't know what 'consciousness' is, and b) 'God-consciousness' is not much like 'Human-consciousness', in any case - is Ward *really* in a position to even speculate about the reasonableness of a) substance dualism and b) the likelihood that 'God' is some form of 'consciousness'?
Methinks Ward may be extrapolating just a teensy weensy bit beyond what his data set can reasonably bear. Ward seems to think that, if he can sell 'substance dualism' the rest of his theistic enterprise will follow straightforwardly but, I suggest, that a) he can't sell it (to anyone who hasn't already bought it) and b) the rest doesn't follow, in any case. Substance dualism really is a pretty tough sell to just about anyone who isn't already a committed theist, for the fundamental reason that there simply isn't any good reason to suppose that it's true.
He writes: "Could there be an unembodied mind, a pure Spirit, that has knowledge and awareness? I can see no reason why not."
Let's pause here, for a moment, to ask 'just what *exactly* does Ward mean when he asserts that he "can see no reason why not."?' Does he mean, for example, that he cannot see any 'logical' reason 'why not'? Ward's entire case hinges on the plausibility of this claim; in fact, Ward's entire case cannot even get off the ground, because he cannot offer *any* good reason to suppose it to be so. He cannot - surely - be suggesting that there is no 'physical' reason why not - how could he possibly know that? So, it must be the former. Ward, therefore, actually seems to be arguing that because *he* cannot see any 'logical' reason why it couldn't exist that therefore *it might actually exist*. This is truly a fantastic assertion and fantastically vacuous.
As remarkable as this line of 'reasoning' is, he goes on to assert that "The God hypothesis has at least as much plausibility as the materialist hypothesis. Both are hard to imagine, but neither seems to be incoherent or self-contradictory. Either might be true."
Really? This is simply laughable! We *know* that 'material' (comprising matter and/or energy) entities exist, even if we do not understand, in totality, exactly what this entails. We do *not* know, however, that anything 'immaterial' exists at all, not least because we don't even have a meaningful ontology for the non-concept (as things stand) of the 'immaterial', i.e. the word 'immaterial' is presently meaningless, except to distinguish something from that which is 'material' - but if we don't understand the limits of the 'material' world, to begin talking about 'things' that are 'immaterial' is question-begging *in the extreme*. Ward's entire theistic premise is, indeed, question-begging, which (in essence) he later admits, as we shall see.
What Ward is asking one to believe (just for starters) is that it is *logically possible* for me to continue to exist without my body or any part of it such as my brain. But - and this is an important point - 'possibility' is what is not inherently contradictory: if A does not entail logical contradiction, A is 'possible'. But how does one get from 'logical possibility' to actual 'being'? As such, 'logical possibility' is all but empty possibility; almost anything is 'possible' this latter way, depending only on the limits of conceivability, e.g. flying pigs, people with 5 arms and the idea that the planets, and their positions, have a crucial bearing on who we are and what we do, but 'logical possibility' alone does *nothing* to establish 'ontological possibility' - that would require reference to the physical world *as it really is* and would necessitate reference to what is actually known and understood - e.g. in chemistry and physics. When we then start to look at the reasons why 'unembodied consciousness', in fact, makes logically no sense at all - for example, if it were reasonable, by the same token, it would be similarly reasonable to speak about a 'whole body amputation' - what is one to think?
There are, I suggest, only two options, ultimately: One is to conclude that the knowledge (and logic itself) that we (presently) have is of no consequence, and has, in the final analysis, no bearing on the matter, because one already 'believes' it (a priori) to be true, or one must surely conclude that Ward's theistic enterprise is intrinsically irrational and based on little more than wishful thinking.
The 'idea' (such as it is) of 'unembodied consciousness' is, I suggest, one of those things that theists really have no choice but to just 'chalk it up to faith'. Such speculative reasoning *may* seem profoundly reasonable to someone who believes that elephants can be found hiding in cherry trees, so long as they haven't painted their toes but, really?? Who could Ward possibly imagine might be persuaded by such argumentation?
Things really don't get any better from here on in.
Ward draws on the arguments of Richard Swinburne; for example, his assertion that there is a class of 'explanation' that can be referred to as 'personal explanation', but he completely fails - indeed he doesn't even try, so far as I can see - to separate the idea of a 'personal explanation', which may be perfectly adequate for most everyday purposes - i.e. with reference to the intentional actions of *known* entities (human beings)- from a bad case of subjectivity and wishful thinking, when applied to things that are (currently, at least) beyond our scope. It's like trying to utilise 'commonsense' to reach conclusions about deep cosmology - i.e. profoundly daft.
At a deep level, Ward's 'argument' (and the theistic 'argument', at large) poses a fundamental epistemological question - 'if it were true, (how) could we know it to be so?' Since Ward strongly objects to Dawkins' suggestion that 'the God Hypothesis' is a scientific hypothesis - Ward even asserts that, "Of course, he [Dawkins] really knows this is not true." - it's very hard to see how he could possibly begin to construct a rational (i.e. non-circular) answer to this question.
To illustrate, as one reviewer (a one star reviewer, of course) of Dawkins' book wrote: "If you truly understood science you would know that science neither supports nor denies the existence of God. Science is properly relegated to the understanding of material things, laws etc. Science lacks the tools to inquire into the non-material being of God or to understand His possible interaction in this world."
So fantastically question-begging is this assertion, it pre-supposes (in addition to the non-concept of 'immateriality') that, although 'science' (the only reliable means humans have so far discovered of uncovering reality) "lacks the tools to inquire into the non-material being of God..." the reviewer himself, however, somehow and from somewhere *does* have "the tools to inquire into the non-material being of God..."
Amusingly, in the final chapter, Ward supposes that "for Dawkins, all this must seem like a wish-fulfilling fantasy." Personally, I can't possibly imagine why Dawkins might think such a thing!! He goes on to say - having spent almost an entire book arguing for 'Why There Almost Certainly Is a God' - that "The question of God is not purely an intellectual puzzle. It is bound up with the basic ways in which we see our lives, the cultural histories and traditions from which we spring and against which we often react, and the most fundamental values, feelings and commitments we have. It is not just a question of evidence, in the sense of clear public data that put matters beyond any reasonable doubt. It is a question of basic forms of perspective and action."
So, there we have it, in a nutshell! Having failed to demonstrate to you, dear skeptical reader, that there is any compelling reason whatsoever to cross the line from non-belief to believing what I (Ward) happen to believe, I'm going to lay it on the line for you - at the end of the day, it's not really all about evidence and reason, but about "basic forms of perspective and action." Blinding!
121 of 158 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Doubting Ward,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)With such a preponderance of books attacking Dawkins tending to uncritically recommend each other, it is hard to choose which makes the best case for theism to read as a foil to Dawkins. While the evangelism of John Lennox (or even the heartfelt sermonizing of David Robertson) might appeal more to committed Christians (and atheists playing "spot the special pleading"), this book comes closer to addressing Dawkins directly. More challenging than McGrath's rushed polemic, Ward describes his underlying position with clarity.
Having written books attacking fundamentalism, Ward shows himself a more reasonable apologist than most with statements such as "The judgment as to whether or not the resurrection happened as recorded in the Bible is likely to depend on whether or not you already believe in God." Unfortunately the same is likely true for the claims of this book. Key claims such as the fundamental validity of personal explanation are justified briefly by (tenuous) analogy, a "most philosophers agree that..." assertion, and the implicit "trust me, I'm a much nicer guy than Dawkins". More space is devoted to Ward's musings on consciousness and quantum mechanics.
The book starts inevitably with praise for Dawkins' previous works followed by castigation of his temerity to comment on faith and a list of historical theist philosophers, with more barbed insults popping up throughout. For a book directly addressing Dawkins, Ward needs understand what he criticizes more carefully. For example he seeks to characterize "the ultimate nature of reality", and assumes Dawkins is attempting to do the same. Ward is brave to tackle Dawkins on evolution, and does make some interesting points on probability and complexity which challenge rather than undermine Dawkins' more accessible writing.
Ultimately, Ward's view of God will be too abstract for many: "Could there be an unembodied mind, a pure Spirit, that has knowledge and awareness? I can see no reason why not." So where's the evidence? Ward has an answer: "So it seems that God does make a difference, but it is not a neutrally testable difference that could be settled by experiment." More work is needed to show that he is describing something more substantial than metaphor - if indeed he is.
4.0 out of 5 stars Why this was almost certainly helpful,
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This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly Is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Kindle Edition)An almost certainly helpful critique of Dawkins' least credible and creditable offering. Ward's arguments are not as accessible to the reader as Lennox or Polkinghorne. Worth the read for that, however.
55 of 75 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars ... and such small portions,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)The previous book which I read by Keith Ward was both balanced and stimulating. There is very little which I can find to say about this book which is positive. Maybe the only thing to his credit is that he appears to have completely abandoned any attempt to defend the ontological argument.
However, he does attempt to resuscitate the argument from design by renaming it as the 'new argument for design'. The argument from design is unusual in that it can be cast in mathematical terms and be shown to be unsound. Essentially, it reflects a flawed understanding of the relationship between probabilities and their inverses. For anyone interested, there is a good treatment of it in 'Logic: A Very Short Introduction' by Graham Priest.
What Ward seems to be describing as the 'new' design argument involves a dash of fine-tuning with a dash of probabilities. His understanding of probabilities appears to repeat the same misunderstanding which is buried in the more usual formulation of the argument from design. And he does not appear to appreciate that the fine-tuning argument is a powerful argument _against_ the existence of an omnipotent creative deity (who would have no need to 'fine-tune' anything!) The philosopher Gilbert Fulmer has argued that the fine-tuning argument is logically incoherent anyway.
His discussion of consciousness was, in my opinion, little short of an embarrassment. He was dismissive of Daniel Dennett and appears to have little appreciation of how much research has been done in this field. He seems to think that it is a problem which is 'so difficult that no one has any idea how to begin to tackle it, scientifically'. Although it is true to say that it is a difficult problem, and it is very early days, Ward seems to be unaware of the research which has been done by neuroscientists over a period of 60 years or so. There are a number of popular books available on consciousness and there are already valiant attempts to deal with the problem of qualia. ('Seeing Red' by Nicholas Humphrey, for example.)
His conclusion on this is, roughly: we have no evidence for disembodied consciousness but it *might* exist. And then, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, he concludes that, if we can imagine this, we can imagine 'God' as the ultimate form of disembodied consciousness.
He discusses cosmology and, for such a short book, I found this section appeared deceptively long. At times, I had to pinch myself as a reminder that this was supposed to be addressing 'The God Delusion'. And reflecting that there are other writers who deal with cosmology in a much more engaging manner.
I awaited, in vain, for the 'clear definitions' and 'sharp arguments'. Coming in at around 143 pages, I was reminded of Woody Allen describing the two ladies discussing the food at a mountain resort. The first lady says, "The food in this place is really terrible." To which her companion replies, "Yes, and such small portions." Well, this more or less sums up my opinion of this book.
31 of 43 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Surely someone can do better than this?,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)I purchased this book because the reviews seemed to indicate that it was the best of the responses to 'The God Delusion'. I was, therefore, astonished to read a series of arguments that were so riddled with flaws and fallacies that my sixth form Critical Thinking students would be able to tear it to shreds. From my own experiences as an undergraduate, I assumed that everyone who studied Philosophy would have to take a course in Logic. What I don't understand is how someone as eminent and respected as Keith Ward could have gone through his entire academic life without studying Logic, for this is the only explanation I can find for this crude attempt at rebuttal (NB I am sure there must be another explanation but I want to give a flavour of the nature of Ward's arguments). I would love to spend some time with Ward going through his book paragraph by paragraph and hearing from him in person what he was actually thinking when he wrote it and whether he genuinely believes what he wrote has any grounding in logic.
There is so much circularity, assertion, poor use of analogy and factual (and conceptual) inaccuracy in this book that I felt cheated by the author. This is certainly not the 'satisfactory response' by a theologian to Dawkins that Polkinghorne claims on the back cover. Buy this, if only to see how not to construct logical argument.
28 of 39 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Good in parts,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)Like the curate's egg this book is good in parts in that it partially succeeds and partially fails in its intention to show 'Why there almost certainly is a God'. One of its successes is to highlight some of the philosophical weaknesses in 'The God Delusion'. It is, however, not surprising that a professional philosopher and theologian should score some points over a zoologist on this account. In my view as a lay reader of philosophy and serious sceptic of the existence of God, Ward fails to convince that there almost certainly is a God other than through the acceptance of premises that are far from secure. What he does do is to show that it is possible to construct a coherent and rational argument for the possible existence of a God but is it the God that many adherents of monotheistc religions would recognise? For people interested in reading accounts on both sides of the current battle between theists and atheists, this is a worthwhile contribution to look in to. It is not an easy read though and probably requires some familiarity with analytical philosophy to fully appreciate.
7 of 10 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Why there almost certainly is a what??,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)Keith Ward's task here is rather more onerous than Dawkins'. Ward must attempt to prove the existence of a certain entity, whereas sceptics have no such burden of proof upon them. If Ward wishes to assert the existence of a 'God', then he must first attempt to formulate a coherent definiton of this term. He attempts to explain 'God' as some sort of universal consciousness and proceeds to define it by that which he is not, but gets us no nearer to a meaningful definition.
There are also some inconsistencies in his attempted description of 'God'. The influence of mainstream, but entirely unfounded, Christian thought seems to exert an influence here.
For example, on page 78 Ward writes:
"It is vitally important that we do not think of God as some sort of human like being with lots of arbitrary characteristics"
Later, on page 87, he writes
"God is always free to act and respond creatively. But God will always and necessarily act for good"
The latter is an entirely arbitrary statement, which ignores his advice on page 78. Ward touches upon the intrinsic goodness of God's nature on several occasions, without giving any compelling arguments for his assumptions. This belief seems rather naive and is born out of basic human desires and preferences, rather than sound philosophical reasoning.
Ward, like many other apologist philosophers, largely seeks to promote a case for deism, unaffiliated to any religion. However, his true colours are revealed now and again. On page 64, he attempts to rationalize the Old Testament God with the rather strange assertion:
"This God was always the best sort of God - the ideal of moral perfection - that the people of the time could imagine."
This is palpable nonsense. For arguments sake, would the people of the time reject a God who acted in a similar fashion to the OT God, but who failed to kill all the firstborn of Egypt (just one example here, which seems a little incongruous ,given the mostly serious, philosophical nature of this post, but which serves simply to refute the nonsense written here by Ward).
The book is rather pointless until a meaningful definition of God is brought forward. It is then pretty straightforward to dismiss any definition as arbitrary. This logic also has implication for the title of Dawkins' book of course, but the important distinction is that Dawkins promotes a case for scepticism.
9 of 13 people found the following review helpful
1.0 out of 5 stars Perfect for the person who already belives in god,
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This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)I bought this book as a recommendation from a religious friend on the basis that it might convince me to believe in god. (A big ask!) Anyway it failed on the basis you already have to believe in the supernatural to get on board with what the author is saying. He starts on quite firm ground but then suspends all rationality and ends up making huge untestable claims.
Once again a big fail on proving anything except wish thinking!
20 of 31 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars On several readings, a disappointment,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)I'm no philosopher, and Ward is, which confuses me, as one of us is being rather silly but I'm convinced it isn't me. The contradictions chase each other off almost every page of this book, beginning in the preface, where Ward tells us that when he was a philosopher (ah - was!) and defended theism, he was told this was a very original and unusual opinion. This is on page 6. Yet by page 12 we learn that "all the great classical philosophers" would agree with Ward (and indeed Ward has devoted a whole other book to this subject). This is not in the least germane to Ward's arguments but does indicate a touch of mental confusion. We later learn that materialism is both ancient and recent, and watch in wonder as Ward juggles too many balls, arguing at some length that the simple is not more probable than the complex while also ruling out the multiverse by a cunning use of Occam's Razor (which basically states that the simple is more probable than the complex).
In answering Dawkins' assertion that the God hypothesis is scientifically testable, Ward rules out experiments to test for God in the sloppiest way imaginable. He tells us there are "good reasons why God might not be subject to scientific experiment" by reference to Luke 4:12 ("do not put the Lord your God to the test"). Is that really a good reason? I don't think so. But perhaps it's meant to be another of Ward's bad jokes.
Ward later addresses the contradiction between omnipotence and omniscience (normally raised in the context of the "problem of evil") by defining omnipotence as being able to do the maximum any possible being can do. However, we know it's possible, for instance, to provide warning of earthquakes and tsunamis, as we can provide such warnings ourselves. This raises the question of why God chooses to give no warnings, if he can do the maximum that any possible being can do. Removing the contradiction in this way thus solves nothing in terms of the problem of evil, so one wonders why Ward bothered.
Ward does do a good job of illuminating some of Dawkins' wrong turns, but in doing so makes a few of his own. This will never convince anyone that there almost certainly is a God, but nevertheless it's a good read if the God question is something you spend a lot of time thinking about.
38 of 59 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Ward is the philosophical/theological heavyweight to Dawkins' populist pugilist,
This review is from: Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins (Paperback)There may not be any conclusive knockout blows in the ring of popular opinion (few will have their minds changed), but if it's a philosophical fight I know who my money's on.
In other words, you might not appear to win many casual arguments with Ward's considered and subtle approach but the genuine seeker of truth will recognise he's thought things through fully, whereas Dawkins beefs himself up with belligerant and irate rhetoric and is often lacking in depth (especially when it comes to philosophy or the understanding of spiritual experience).
Is this the ultimate counter-argument to Dawkins' 'The God Delusion?'
No, mainly because (sadly) it just won't sell as many copies. It's audience is more select, I suspect - those who desire a cogent argument against religious fundamentalists and creationists (Dawkins fans) probably outweigh those who are looking for an open-minded, rational quest for insight into ultimate reality.
The vast percentage of the book is written from an essentially non-religious, Theistic perspective. It's only towards the end that Ward mentions his own Christian beliefs. Personally, this is where I depart from Ward's beliefs but I am still interested in how Christians rationally and intelligently defend their faith.
It would undoubtedly be fun if someone could rip into 'The God Delusion' with the ferocity that Dawkins regularly displays.
But personal reactions aside, the truth is - none of these arguments (from either side) have the grounds for dogmatic certainty. Ward acknowledges this with grace - the title of his book is just an attention grabber in many respects - what he really means is - his 'certainty' is no less (and arguably much more) rational than Dawkins' own claim. So..not as explosive or controversial a claim as Dawkins makes, but in my mind a more reasonable, realistic and intelligent one.
I would have liked to have seen more emphasis on consciousness, the evolution of mind/spirit and the distinction between interior/exterior aspects of contemplation and personal experience of spirit (and the subsequent philosophical and ontological implications), but this was still an enjoyable and welcome book that can be read in one or two sittings.
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Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting Dawkins by Keith Ward (Paperback - 22 Aug 2008)