69 of 75 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A battle for the truth.
This book addresses a basic but to date un-remedied defect consistently present in most books written about World War Two. Now that in excess of sixty years have passed since the war's end fresh, un-biased books on this most complicated and emotional of subjects are still few and far between. In particular from an English speaking perspective, one is still given the...
Published on 13 Jan 2007 by Mr. Leszek S. Werenowski
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Mixed thoughts
Norman Davies' 'Europe at War: No simple victory' covers the European portion of the Second World War. Davies covers the military and political aspects of the entire European War and argues that the politics and diplomatic actions of the Eastern Front were the primary focus of the war. Davies argues that the Soviets were the clear victors of the war, that the efforts of...
Published 14 months ago by Carl
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69 of 75 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A battle for the truth.,
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Mixed thoughts,
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This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)Norman Davies' 'Europe at War: No simple victory' covers the European portion of the Second World War. Davies covers the military and political aspects of the entire European War and argues that the politics and diplomatic actions of the Eastern Front were the primary focus of the war. Davies argues that the Soviets were the clear victors of the war, that the efforts of the Eastern Front are largely downplayed in the west, that the war was not one of good vs. evil, and that the west is largely ignorant of the fact that the Soviet regime was just as evil as the Nazi regime.
Davies work is largely well written and easy to read, although there are numerous occasions were uncommon French sayings, German and Russian words and terms are used and translations are not provided. A key example is the use of the German term 'Ritterkreuz', over the more common English translation of 'Knights Cross'. Davies work is well researched with pages of endnotes providing the location of the sources he has used; although few primary sources appear to have been consulted resulting in what appears to be a reanalysis of already published secondary sources rather than a re-examination of actual evidence. There is a lack of a clear and complete bibliography and Davies notes early on that he would not cite everything as "there seems no point" due to the nature of his work.
The opening chapter presents Davies core themes: that the Soviet Union was just as evil - or even more so - as Nazi Germany and that the lion's share of the fighting took place in Eastern Europe. These themes are discussed in length and expanded on throughout the book. Davies argues his point well that the war was no battle of good vs. evil, in the end there was no moral victory in Europe. Everyone, even those who went to war with the best of intentions were smeared by the evils that is war. In the long run a background of all participants is provided: of the contradicting democratic-imperialistic western powers, the fascists of central Europe, and the communists of the USSR. The USSR soon becomes the focus of the book and Davies provides a damming assessment of the communist running of the USSR before and during the war along with the USSR's foreign policy. The argument is put forth that with the rise of Nazism and fascism across Europe, Stalin and the communists were able to dupe the western world into looking the other way about their appalling human rights record as they provided the prospect of an ally to fight Nazi Germany and later, once attacked, in fact did provide this crucial alliance. With the opening of the Eastern Front Davies attempts to balance the issue, as he sees it, of placing the centre of gravity of the war in the east: the heaviest fighting took place in the Ukraine and Belorussia and these populations, accordingly, suffered the most. These points are all well argued, however Davies also states he believes Hitler lacked a long term goal of going to war with the USSR. This particular point I feel is Davies weakest argument, the position contradicts an awful lot of other works that is out there and little in the way of solid evidence is provided to support it.
The second chapter provides a concise look at the various campaigns waged across Europe, between September 1939 and mid-1945, and the reasoning behind why they were launched. Compelling arguments are made on why Stalin undertook his various campaigns, prior to June 1941, and the importance of the Eastern Front is clearly highlighted throughout. On the whole the chapter provides a good general rundown of the various campaigns of war. It also highlights that Hitler was not the only leader launching wars of aggression against neighbours: Stalin attacked Poland, took on Finland, absorbed the Baltic States, and grabbed land elsewhere. However, Davies looks at the Western Front in a very simplistic and extremely bias way. While in the grand scale of the war the Fall of France took place in a very limited timeframe, only six paragraphs are used to detail the 1940 campaign. This short summary appears to be a grossly simplified attempt to detail what happened and lacks any of the arguments put forth by Julian Jackson's (The Fall of France) excellent work that highlights that the defeat of France was anything but simple. Likewise Davies argues that Hitler stopped his tanks from completing the defeat of the British Army, on the beaches of Dunkirk, for political reasons without providing so much as a single piece of evidence to support this position when the weight of the historiography on the subject states it was due to various military reasons that the German tanks were halted and an excellent rear-guard action that allowed the British army to escape. In a similar vein, Davies opines that Operation Sealion would have been a complete success and claims that the British Isles were almost completely defenceless, but fails to highlight the defensive efforts that were being made by the British, the Dominions and the Empire to defend the United Kingdom. Furthermore, an overly simplistic opinion is made that - regardless of historical logistical constraints - if Hitler had wanted to, troops and tanks could have just been pumped into the North African desert and the Middle East captured without much trouble. For a work attempting to downplay myths, Davies repeats the myth of Italian troops being next to useless. The accomplishments achieved in Normandy, by the allied forces, are belittled and the rate of advance is criticised as being a result of poor soldiers and leadership with a need to rely solely on rockets and big guns to move forward (although ironically, later in the book, the Germans and Soviets are hailed for their use of rockets and big guns) yet the German effective in-depth defences and terrain that suited the defender (which removed the power of the offense, and resulted in the same problem when the Germans launched their own attacks in Normandy) is barely mentioned. The allied drive across France, post Normandy, is described as being at a "snail pace" regardless of the fact it was conducted just as fast as the German conquest in 1940. Operation Market Garden is deemed as a "reckless" move, but such criticism are not levelled at the various German or Soviet disastrous operations launched on the Eastern Front.
During the Political chapter, the earlier themes are expanded upon. Davies piles on the evidence to highlight the terrible domestic conditions within the USSR - mass murder, collectivisation, man-made famine etc. - and the ever-changing foreign policy of a shrewd and paranoid Stalin. This point is hammered home by Davies who wants the reader to be well aware of the crimes of the Soviet regime were akin, or more so, to the crimes committed by the Nazi government. The pre-war contradiction that was democratic-imperialist western powers is further discussed, and how the problems that cropped up between them were ironed out through treaties and diplomatic manoeuvring rather than threats and war as seen by the fascist and communist powers. The lack of a unified front among the western powers when it came to dealing with the Soviets is discussed and Davies argues that the west basically 'dropped the ball' with Stalin and gave him a free hand to mould post-war Eastern Europe to his own liking.
The next chapter covers the military power of all sides from 'enlistment to war grave'. This chapter covers a variety of subjects ranging from the weapons utilised, short biographies of generals and war heroes, to how war cemeteries differ across Europe. The entire chapter seems somewhat out of place to the rest of the book, does little to further the earlier arguments of the book (other than a veiled attempt to reinforce the point of the importance of the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front), and somewhat feels like filler. The various subjects covered are done so in a very simplistic way, and deal with generalities rather than hard facts. Davies comes across as rather naive about the Anglo-American military, their commanding officers, and how they conducted the war. Davies states quite clearly that due to new access to the ex-Soviet archives, the heroics of Soviet heroes has come under close scrutiny and it appears most are pure propaganda stories. However, the same level of scepticism is not levelled at the Germans. For example Hans-Ulrich Rudel's list of achievements are presented, but the same type of questions are not asked of his accomplishments. The impression is that German propaganda is more legitimate than Soviet propaganda.
'Civilians' is the longest chapter of the book and, outside of the central argument regarding the Soviet regime, the most powerful. The chapter is split into numerous sections covering many aspects of civilian life during the war ranging from the various types of occupation civilians found themselves under, the various types of camps operated by all parties, bombings, culture, crime, genocide and ethnic cleansing etc. Davies argues that life for a civilian was determined on a number of factors including social and ethnic background, to where in Europe one lived. For some, the war could pass by almost as if it did not happen whereas the majority were at the whim of Nazi or Soviet security forces, caught up in the midst of numerous civil wars between ethnic groups, or lived were the frontline happened to be passing through and for years life could be almost hellish. The chapter is also used to further the central argument and the crimes of the Soviet regime committed upon civilian populations before, during, and after the war are brought to light. While the chapter is the most powerful, painting a picture of continent-wide brutality, it is also rather vague in places with some sections being weaker than others. While the crimes committed in central and eastern Europe are highlight, it feels that in places those that are committed in the west are somewhat downplayed. The chapter is also littered with various errors, in regards to both Western and Eastern Europe. For example, Davies argues that more civilians died during the 7 July bombing of the French city of Caen than did on D-Day. Most online sources place D-Day civilian losses in the range of a few thousand whereas the 7 July bombing resulted in less than 500 fatalities, the only higher estimates come from immediate wartime British reports - later recanted following thorough investigation - and Soviet propaganda that placed casualties in the region of 20,000.
The final chapter 'Portrayals' looks at wartime and post-war culture regarding the war. Like the chapter on the various militaries that fought the war, this one feels out of place and does not further the central arguments. The chapter, while interesting in places, is mostly a dull list of authors and filmmakers. In fact Davies breaks away from one of his central arguments - that the west downplays/does not understand the eastern front - and highlights that both the east and west promote their own actions (or demote some, such as the GUlags) during the war. Davies highlights that while Hollywood and western literature focus primarily on the likes of Normandy or the Battle of Britain, Soviet movies and literature likewise focused on the actions of the Red Army. It is somewhat surprising to see Davies call Max Hasting - a journalist by trade and author of several historical works - to be one of the best historians out there. Davies, as vague as in other sections of his book, briefly comments on Stephen Ambrose and AJP Taylor yet he does not mention in detail the controversy surrounding them: such as the allegations, against both, of fabrication and ignoring evidence that did not suit their opinions. It is also interesting to note Davies label Guy Sajer's `The Forgotten Soldier' as fiction when there is still controversy surrounding the book as whether it is fictitious or not.
There are numerous errors throughout the book (i.e. the fictional account of the "MV Hela"). Not only does Davies appear not to understand the meaning of 'Wehrmacht' (meaning 'armed forces', and not the German army), he continually provides the incorrect designation for American, British, and Canadian field armies. A brief swipe is made at the reparation payments enforced on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, but Davies position is one that has long been dismissed by the works of Sally Marks and Stephen Shuker. One of the major issues has to be the inflated figures Davies repeatedly uses in regards to the death toll as a result of the bombing of Dresden. Davies comments how it is the historian's job to attempt to present the truth about a subject, and how for the last 70 years the Eastern Front has been neglected, the truth not told, half-truths and lies presented instead. With Dresden, Davies does the complete opposite of what he claims he is fighting against. The rationale for the attack, as provided by the RAF and USAAF, is ignored and not provided, the cities defences are not mentioned, nor is its importance to the defence of the Eastern Front discussed. While everyone has the right to disagree with whether the attack was justified or not, Davies only presents one side of the coin in regards to this issue and uses inflated death figures every time Dresden is discussed. Lower established estimates and statistics, which were available before 2006, are not provided to the reader and Davies inflated figures have subsequently been shown to be completely inaccurate by the release of more official statistics by Dresden city officials. To add insult to injury, to support his information on Dresden, Davies utilised the work of the disgraced David Irving. Furthermore the discredited work of James Bacque, 'Other Losses', is used to question the American handling of German prisoners of war at the end of the war.
Davies central thesis is that in the western world the efforts of the Eastern Front are largely downplayed and not given the recognition that they deserve while also not highlighting that the Soviet regime was just as criminal as the Nazi regime. While both points are correct, they are not as revolutionary as the book makes out, and for the last twenty years a steady stream of information has come forward that has brought balance to the historiography of the Second World War (a point only briefly mentioned in the chapter `Portrayals'). However, Davies argues his points well about the crimes of the Soviets and of the bloodshed that was the Eastern Front. While the central theme of the book is the politics of the Nazi and Soviet regimes, and the Eastern Front, it seems only fair that the balance of opinion of this review focuses on these areas. In this regard Davies has produced an enlightening look at the war in Eastern Europe, the politics of the Nazi and Soviet regimes, as well as their crimes. However, in highlighting the vast importance of the politics and war in Eastern Europe the role of the west has ended up being downplayed. Ironically, while the author states he is attempting to iron out the myths that have been built up about the east, a vast amount of misinformation is presented about the Western Allies. The opening chapters and 'Civilians' provide, on the whole, excellent arguments - if vague and repetitive in places - however the other chapters feel out of place and could have been excluded. In all, this is a work that ends up making one rethink their views of the war but at the same time is a flawed work.
26 of 29 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars How to demolish a lot of myths ..,
This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)I put this book down with a sigh because it completely explodes the myth of a good and bad side to WW2
I'd always been told that this was a war against the evil Nazis - but in fact a) we didn't do the majority of the fighting against the Nazis
b) the methods of our premier ally in the war was every bit as bad as what we fighting against (I clear case of 'they may be ********, but they are our ...'
Stalin may well have been right, in that England bought the time, the US the money and the USSR the blood' to the fight but the whole book just leaves you with a very nasty taste in your mouth, not just about the war but the methods used by the protagonists in pursuit of their aims
The image of two sides in the European war is demolished - there were qute clearly three on this evidence and the Allies had very different aims.
Its also quite clear that the battles that destroyed the German ability to attack were not fought by the US and UK - the USSR are shown to have destroyed that capability at Kursk and we should acknowledge that effort for the turning point that it was
The worst part of this book is not the campaigns but all the associated activity around the occupation of countries , police , summary justice, race murder and so on.
The Germans needed to be stopped - I still think that is a fact
But it was the USSR that did most the work in Europe and what the UK and US were unable to stop was the partition of Europe after the war that took another 50 years to change.
In fact the most chilling part of the book is the suggestion that the second world war was just the second military phase of a power struggle in Europe that lasted from 1914 to 1990
An excellent read with some uncomfortable conclusions
18 of 21 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars A fair account of history,
23 of 27 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars For those who THINK they know all about the war.,
11 of 13 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Towards an objective perspective of WWII,
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This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)Norman Davies had already made himself my favourite historian with his mighty Europe: A History and majestic The Isles: A History both of which provided pictures bigger than all my historical reading to that date. How many people realise that the Polish-Lithuanian empires extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea in late medieval times. Nuf said.
This history of WWII is in my opinion, his most important book to date, because it aims to place the first real dent in the deeply flawed mythologies that virtually all particpant and victim nations have inherited as their 'History' of WWII. The fact that this is something that needs to be done now, today, that might have genuine consequences for how future Geo-politics pans out, particularly with respect to relations between Europe and Russia, makes this more than just armchair historical reading.
The book makes explicit what was beginning to become apparent to me through my own various readings around WWII. That WWII was essentially an apocalyptic battle between two of the most brutal tyrranies devised by man, and that the contribution made by the allied democracies, whilst being respectable were not the decisive, good and just contributions that they have bought their children up to believe. Their intervention merely ensured that one of the two tyrranies would emerge as the absolute victor, and would be allowed to continue its programmes of nightmare oppression for the next 50 years of the cold war, before collapsing under its own internal contradictions.
It also makes the point, for me not forcefully enough, that none of the protaginists of the war started out with clean hands. The empires of the colonial powers were all based on slaughter and maintained on the threat of slaughter through superior technology and wealth. Apologists for the British Empire like to tell us of its splendid achievements for the populations concerened and to point at those places where its departure collapsed into conflict. That is not the point. The colonies were justified on the basis of outrageous chauvinism and all populations rejoiced at the departure of their masters, whereupon the business of normal history resumed. Early 20th Century US adventurism in central America, and more particularly the Philipines makes shocking reading for those who would care to follow it up. It is a story of million plus deaths, concentration camps and deeply cynical media manipulation, to ensure the folks back home saw it all from a righteous light. The story makes Roosevelts opprobium at the British Empire, as represented by Churchill, a cynical political manipulation with an eye to future US dominance, rather than the idealistic posture on behalf of American public opinion as usually portrayed.
The real victors of WWII are the generations of the western democracies who have grown up to enjoy freedoms so unprecedented that they cannot imagine alternatives. The real losers were their couterparts left to the tender mercies of the Soviets.
Each time I read a text on WWII I swear it will be the last because I find it so sad and harrowing. But it is clear that, 60 years on, the objective account, not coloured by nationalistic mythologies, has yet to emerge. So I guess there is more painful and harrowing reading to come for many of us yet.
Anyone unconvinced that the scale of the Nazi-Soviet conflict, made all else in Europe a side show should just try Googling WWII Eastern Front. Stalin put it best - 'Britain provided the time, America the money and Russia the Blood'.
10 of 12 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Different,
A large book but one that can easily be dipped into.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Not a ongoing narrative, but rather thematic in it's approach.,
This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)Not that I have read a lot of books about WWII in my life. Better, for most of my life and during my study I avoided it. So I mainly only followed my mandatory curriculum. But because I more and more get the feeling that if I want to understand something of the contemporary geo-political situation, reading about WWII is unavoidable. This book is doing an attempt to rectify the generally held impression that the war was won by the Allied Forces. Davis goes to great lengths to demonstrate that this is simply incorrect, as the biggest and the most decisive battles (Leningrad, Stalingrad & Kursk) were all fought on the eastern front. In school and in terms of public opinion we are completely indoctrinated with the importance of the Normandy Invasion but we hardly heard anything about what happened in the East. And one can wonder the level of respect. In the Siege Of Leningrad (that lasted for 900 days in which approx. 1.5 million people lost their lives), the Battle of Stalingrad (in which 1.5 to 1.8 million people lost their lives) and the Battle of Kursk (The biggest tank battle and most decisive battle in the war) all more people lost their lives than the Battle of Normandy (20 to 40.000 lives) or even the entire Operation Overlord which cost half a million lives. But still we keep on praising the Americans for opening a front, that was opened reluctantly, and was in the entire war, nothing more than a pinprick.
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Helicopter overview,
This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)It was like Norman Davies took me in helicopter to have an overview of whole Europe during WO II, instead of explaining the story through the eyes of only one country's. It was like Norman Davies didn't show me the map of one country, but of whole Europe. It was like Norman Davies told to me "don't look at the WO II only from your own country point of view, but look it from Europe's point of view."
I'm Norman Davies very gratefull for given me this point of view. Excellent.
9 of 11 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars World War II in Europe: more in the East than in the West,
This review is from: Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory (Paperback)Norman Davies, as in many of his books, makes a significant contribution to understanding the nations of Central & Eastern Europe, which are now members of the European Union. He is their champion and they deserve it.
The EU for long meant Western Europe, but the Eastern parts suffered the brunt of the dreadful 20th century history. The worst of the World War II atrocities and casualties occurred in the East. Kursk in Russia in 1943 was the deciding European land battle, not D-Day in 1944. The Red Army fought the fiercest encounters of the final stages of the war, and came off with more spoils than the West.
World War II was primarily a conflict between two sets of gangsters - Hitler and the Nazis and Stalin and the Communists. One set of gangsters won and the other lost. It was not so much a victory of over totalitarianism and racism as has been depicted in the West.
This puts the historical focus more advantageously on Central & Eastern Europe. The peoples of this part of Europe deserve our sympathy and support, since they were the victims of a "lost" war - being exposed to 40 years of Soviet-imposed Communism. The West did little to alleviate that wretched outcome of the war and we should refrain from continuing to indulge in excessive self-congratulation.
Marcus Ferrar, co-author Slovenia 1945
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Europe at War 1939-1945: No Simple Victory by Norman Davies (Paperback - 3 Aug 2007)