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on 15 December 2010
An immensely well written, accurate and academically rigorous book. If you want to understand game theory this is the book to read.
It is often challenging but that is due to the subject matter rather than any fault in the text.
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on 16 November 2008
This is a marvellous and extremely entertaining book.
Ideal for someone who has already read an introductory book on game theory
Annoyingly, it lacks a real table of contents, opting instead for cutesy chapter titles that fail to convey the content.
Here is the real table of contents:

Table of Contents

1 Getting Locked In

1.1 What is Game Theory?
1.2 Toy Games
1.3 The Prisoners' Dilemma
1.4 Private Provision of Public Goods
1.5 Imperfect Competition
1.6 Nash Equilibrium
1.7 Collective Rationality
1.8 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma
1.9 Which Equilibrium?
1.10 Social Dilemmas
1.11 Roundup

2 Backing Up

2.1 Where Next?
2.2 Win-Or-Lose Games
2.3 The Rules of the Game
2.4 Pure Strategies
2.5 Backward Induction
2.6 Solving NIM
2.7 Hex
2.8 Chess
2.9 Rational Play?
2.10 Roundup

3 Taking Chances

3.1 Chance Moves
3.2 Probability
3.3 Conditional Probability
3.4 Lotteries
3.5 Expectation
3.6 Values of Games with Chance Moves
3.7 Waiting Games
3.8 Parcheesi
3.9 Roundup

4 Accounting for Tastes

4.1 Payoffs
4.2 Revealed Preference
4.3 Utility Functions
4.4 Dicing with Death
4.5 Making Risky Choices
4.6 Utility Scales
4.7 Dicing with Death Again
4.8 When are People Consistent?
4.9 Roundup

5 Planning Ahead

5.1 Strategic Forms
5.2 Payoff Functions
5.3 Matrices and Vectors
5.4 Domination
5.5 Credibility and Commitment
5.6 Living in an Imperfect World
5.7 Roundup

6 Mixing Things Up

6.1 Mixed Strategies
6.2 Reaction Curves
6.3 Interpreting Mixed Strategies
6.4 Payoffs and Mixed Strategies
6.5 Convexity
6.6 Payoff Regions
6.7 Roundup

7 Fighting it Out

7.1 Strictly Competitive Games
7.2 Zero-Sum Games
7.3 Minimax and Maximin
7.4 Safety First
7.5 Solving Zero-Sum Games
7.6 Linear Programming
7.7 Separating Hyperplanes
7.8 Starships
7.9 Roundup

8 Keeping Your Balance

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Dueling Again
8.3 When do Nash Equilibria Exist?
8.4 Hexing Brouwer
8.5 The Equilibrium Selection Problem
8.6 Conventions
8.7 Roundup

9 Buying Cheap

9.1 Economic Models
9.2 Partial Derivatives
9.3 Preferences in Commodity Spaces
9.4 Trade
9.5 Monopoly
9.6 Perfect Competition
9.7 Consumer Surplus
9.8 Roundup

10 Selling Dear

10.1 Models of Imperfect Competition
10.2 Cournot Models
10.3 Stackelberg Models
10.4 Bertrand Models
10.5 Edgeworth Models
10.6 Roundup

11 Repeating Yourself

11.1 Reciprocity
11.2 Repeating a Zero-Sum Game
11.3 Repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma
11.4 Infinite Repetitions
11.5 Social Contract
11.6 The Evolution of Cooperation
11.7 Roundup

12 Getting the Message

12.1 Knowledge and Belief
12.2 Dirty Faces
12.3 Knowledge
12.4 Possibility Sets
12.5 Information Sets
12.6 Common Knowledge
12.7 Complete Information
12.8 Agreeing to Disagree?
12.9 Coordinated Action
12.10 Roundup

13 Keeping Up to Date

13.1 Rationality
13.2 Bayesian Updating
13.3 Bayesian Rationality
13.4 Getting the Model Right
13.5 Scientific Induction?
13.6 Constructing Priors
13.7 Bayesian Rationality in Games
13.8 Roundup

14 Seeking Refinement

14.1 Contemplating the Impossible
14.2 Counterfactual Reasoning
14.3 Backward and Imperfect
14.4 Gang of Four
14.5 Signaling Games
14.6 Rationalizability
14.7 Roundup

15 Knowing What to Believe

15.1 Complete Information
15.2 Bluffing
15.3 Incomplete Information
15.4 Russian Roulette
15.5 Duopoly with Incomplete Information
15.6 Purification
15.7 Incomplete Information about Rules
15.8 Roundup

16 Getting Together

16.1 Bargaining
16.2 Cooperative Game Theory
16.3 Cooperative Payoff Regions
16.4 Nash Bargaining Problems
16.5 Supporting Hyperplanes
16.6 Nash Bargaining Solution
16.7 Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly
16.8 Incomplete Information
16.9 Other Bargaining Solutions
16.10 Roundup

17 Cutting a Deal

17.1 Noncooperative Bargaining Models
17.2 The Nash Program
17.3 Commitment in Bargaining
17.4 Nash Threat Games
17.5 Bargaining Without Commitment
17.6 Going Wrong
17.7 Roundup

18 Teaming Up

18.1 Coalitions
18.2 Coalitional Form
18.3 Core
18.4 Stable Sets
18.5 Shapley Value
18.6 Applying the Nash Program
18.7 Roundup

19 Just Playing?

19.1 Ethics and Game Theory
19.2 Do People Play Fair?
19.3 Social Choice Paradoxes
19.4 Welfare Functions
19.5 Impersonal Comparison of Utility
19.6 More Bargaining Solutions
19.7 Political Philosophy
19.8 Which Fairness Norm?
19.9 Roundup

20 Taking Charge

20.1 Mechanism Design
20.2 Principals and Agents
20.3 Commitment and Contracting
20.4 Revelation Principle
20.5 Providing a Public Good
20.6 Implementation Theory
20.7 Roundup

21 Going, Going, Gone!

21.1 Telecom Auctions
21.2 Types of Auctions
21.3 Continuous Random Variables
21.4 Shading Your Bid
21.5 Designing Optimal Auctions
21.6 Common-Value Auctions
21.7 Multiunit Auctions
21.8 The Chopstick Auction
21.9 Roundup
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