Book Description
Modern science has no explanation for consciousness. In this book, the author claims that this is because the conscious mind is simply not physical. To understand consciousness, we must therefore go beyond physical science and into metaphysics. Rigorous philosophical arguments are given by the author to show that the metaphysical theory called 'mental monism' provides the only correct understanding of consciousness. Mental monism turns conventional wisdom on its head. According to this theory, consciousness itself is the primary reality, and the physical world is a derived construct - a convenient fiction that helps us to deal with our experiences of the world. Although this theory may seem paradoxical at first, compelling arguments are given by the author to establish that this is the correct view.

The theory of mental monism was first given a clear statement in Western philosophy by George Berkeley, an eighteenth-century Irish philosopher. Berkeley put forward mental monism as a reaction to the rising tide of mechanistic Newtonian metaphysics, which had gained popularity by riding on the back of the scientific revolution. The stranglehold of materialism has lasted three hundred years, but there is now a growing awareness of the inability of physical science to address the problem of consciousness. Burgeoning interest in consciousness studies makes this an ideal time to revisit mental monism and reassess its value.

The hegemony of the Newtonian world-view has been so powerful that the Berkeleian approach has been almost totally excluded from curricula of teaching and research in academic philosophy. Outside academia, remnants of Berkeley's vision have been transmitted only in the 'New Thought' religious groups of the United States, such as Christian Science and Science of Mind. Ironically, the immaterialism of traditional Hindu and Buddhism philosophies is now more widely known in the West than its own indigenous form of idealism. The author seeks to redress this balance, by presenting Berkeleian thinking as a stong candidate for the best way to understand reality.

The reigning orthodoxy in neuroscience is that the conscious mind is reducible to information processing in the brain. Versions of this orthodox view range from crude mind-brain identity to the seemingly sophisticated notions of functionalism and of the conscious mind as an emergent property. Those versions, however, share basic flaws that undermine any physicalist account of the mind. The author carries out a sustained and detailed critique of this orthodoxy, showing that it is not a tenable position. At the very least, we can conclude that the conscious mind is part of a mental world, distinct from the physical world.

Part of the critique rests on thought-experiments that involve surgical modifications of a conscious brain. In one experiment, the physical substrate of a singlel experience within the subject's mind is removed from the subject's brain. It is then shown that interfering with that corpus yields contradictory predictions according to physicalism. In another experiment (following Pylyshyn and Chalmers), the cells of a conscious brain are progressively replaced by artificial components that have the same in-vitro functional behaviour.

The author then presents a second, and more subtle, line of argument. This shows that the conscious must, in fact, be the primary reality. The physical world is relegated to a fiction that conveniently lets us handle our conscious experiences more easily. Essentially, this argument is a modernised form of Berkeley's semantic argument. The author has taken on board the more recent insights into the philosophy of language offered by Wittgenstein, and makes use of the idea of a hierarchy of language-games. For example, the discourse of physical science is regarded as a subsidiary language-game to that of phenomenal experience. This approach enables us to avoid the paradoxes of saying that everyday objects, such as tables, exist in one sense but not in another.

Given the radical nature of mental monism, the author recognises that any presentation of the theory raises questions about the purpose of philosophical argumentation. It is implausible to suppose that anybody would revise their fundamental notion of reality just on the basis of a piece of reasoning. Revising one's beliefs and concepts at such a deep level can be achieved only by apprehending a new perspective: the world must be seen anew. Whilst the philosophical arguments must be given, and must be rigorous, nevertheless it they are impotent to change people's fundamental view of reality. That insight, that new vision, can be achieved only by contemplation of one's personal encounter with reality. The author hopes that this book will help to steer the reader's contemplation in that direction.

Whilst mental monism solves the philosophical mind-body problem at a stroke, it nonetheless encounters substantial technical problems, because it must give an explanatory account of the structure and function of the natural world, including the mind itself. The author outlines an approach to modelling the mind purely in the mental domain, without any physical substrate to fall back on.

This book is an exciting and stimulating contribution to the modern debate on the nature of the conscious mind. The author adheres to rigorous philosophical reasoning, whilst presenting the issues and arguments clearly with a minimum of technical terminology. Advocating a position that is highly unorthodox, the author expects his views to receive strong opposition. Nevertheless, the book has the merit of giving a clear and forceful statement of one possible solution to an entrenched problem

The author's companion book, "Paranormal Phenomena and Berkeley's Metaphysics" explores the relevance of mental monism to providing a coherent explanatory account of psi phenomena. See also http://www.ursasoft.com/publish/

From the Publisher
This is the first of a planned series of books entitled Psi Informatics. Our guiding premise is that the ultimate nature of the world is mental and that there is an informatic structure underlying the manifest world. Normally hidden under the veneer of the physical world, the informatic machinery of the world is sometimes exposed and made accessible in psi phenomena. Our long-term aim is to carry out analyses of psi phenomena in informatic terms in order to achieve a scientific understanding of them, and ultimately an engineering command of them.

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews   2 of 2 people found the following review helpful: A stimulating contribution to the current debate, 2 Jun 2000 By A Customer These books are not for the faint-hearted - they are technical, closely argued and erudite - but will interest those wrestling with problems raised by the philosophy of consciousness and who are looking for the kind of solution that makes consciousness primary rather than secondary. They are built on the idealism of the 18th century Irish Bishop George Berkeley, a man who has been wilfully misunderstood by generations of critics. In the first book Peter sets out the history and context of the mind-body problem, and provides an admirable summary of various theories of mind, all of which he finds wanting. He then goes on to consider theories of reality before advancing his own view of mental monism and its implications, ending up with a statement of the Berkeleian model of the mind. The second book builds on the first. It provides an account of Berkeley's metaphysics, a very good summary of the whole range of psi phenomena and theoretical approaches to explanation. He then proposes a Berkeleian model of psi and considers Jung's approach to UFOs. Peter's suggestion is that the conscious mind has its own ontological standing, 'and is neither identified with, nor supervenient on, the brain, or its activities, or its functions'. He proposes that the neural correlates of consciousness are non-deterministic events in the brain and that conscious experiences and acts of volition can occur in the non-physical mind independently of what happens in the brain. Perceptions are induced by what Peter calls the 'metamind' (he eschews Berkeley's use of God here). He argues that sensory ideas can only exist in the mind, and that objects likewise can only exist in the mind. This does not take account of the middle reflexive position developed by Max Velmans, even though it is logically consistent. Peter reverses the argument of Wittgenstein and Ryle that statements about the mental world are derivative by insisting that 'statements about the mind make genuine reference to the mind'. His Berkeleian view uses the term 'experientia' to denote the contents of consciousness and the term 'metaverse' to mean the mental universe or union of all minds at all levels of existence (not just physical). In this sense an 'ordinary mind' is a subset of the metamind, 'closed under ordinary operations of mental access'. This theory can now be applied to paranormal phenomena beyond what Peter calls the 'ontological myopia' of conventional neuroscience. Each mind is a vortex in the same common pool, although we are warned against conceiving this in a spatial way. This view means that psi phenomena are 'fundamentally the same kind of process as those that take place within minds' -- each mind being a set of exeperientia and the metaverse being the union of all minds. Peter does not claim to provide a complete theory, and certainly shows up the shortcomings of existing approaches. I think that his view is along the right lines since the data do point towards consciousness being fundamental rather than derivative in the scheme of things. Peter's books are a stimulating contribution to the current debate. [From the review published in Network, the journal of the Scientific and Medical Network, no. 72, April 2000, reproduced with permission.]  Comment | Permalink | Was this review helpful to you? (Report this)   2 of 2 people found the following review helpful: An original and thought provoking metaphysical analysis., 16 May 2000 By A Customer Peter Lloyd's book makes the case for a Berkelian monism, a metaphysical view which most modern readers may approach, I gather, with suspicion. The author makes his case very astoutly and, to my mind, successfully. The picture of reality that emerges from Lloyd's presentation is truly fascinating. All told, the text is a beautiful analytical composition in the context of which the author is dealing with many cnetral issues in the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. Indeed, even if the reader is doubtful about the metaphysical stance being argued for, the text is extremely valuable for the conceptual analyses it offers of key concepts and issues in philosophical psychology. These analyses are both systematic and thorough and many of the arguments presented are original and, to my mind, ingenious. Especially to be noted is the discussion regarding the location of the mind and that of the relationship between mind and brain.. Whether the reader shares the author's metaphysical worldview or not, the text is bound to make him/her think and reflect. For both its intellectual and asesthetic value "Conciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics" is highly recommended. Prof. Benny Shanon Department of Psychology The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel  Comment | Permalink | Was this review helpful to you? (Report this)   1 of 6 people found the following review helpful: Appauling, 4 Mar 2005 By  "petebreh2" - See all my reviews There is only one thing worse than this pretentious book; and that is the fact that the author deemed it necessary to indite it in the first place. I was disappointed with the obscurity of Mr Lloyd's writing and disheartened that anybody could write for so long on subjects as vague and unproven as Berkeley's theories on Metaphysics. Not only does "Consciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics" rate as one of the most self indulgent pieces of literary tripe I have ever read, I feel that Mr Lloyd could have done something more productive with his time, such as baked a cake or taken up a sporting activity. Although I did not enjoy this book, I do feel that it would have a better use in some other capacity; perhaps as a doorstop or support for a wobbling table. Quite like any other similar philosophy book that has been or will be published at anytime.  Comment | Permalink | Was this review helpful to you? (Report this) › See all 3 customer reviews...		Search Customer Reviews Only search this product's reviews