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45 of 46 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Ingenious and Plausible Alternative History of WW 2, 24 Aug 2001
What would have happened if Hitler fell into a coma at one of the most critical junctions of the war? Would decisions be made in error that his intuition had so many times in the past been correct on, or would his professional officers devise better strategies than he did?Many alternative histories have fatal flaws in logic which after inspection causes them to fall flat on their faces. This one does not. David Downing bases his ideas on facts, and in an extensive war the limiting factor is logistics. All strategies were based on possible options, from amphibious landings to bombing raids to troop movements. In 'The Moscow Option', history forks from the true course to the fictional course when Hitler is sent into a coma in an air crash. Barbarossa has just kicked off with the Wermacht advancing rapidly, but a critical decision must be made. Do the Germans implement 'the Kiev Diversion' and capture Marshal Budeny with 700,000 troops? Or do they push on to Moscow without closing the pocket? With Hitler out of the picture the Generals under Goring decide the latter is the option to deal the Russians the most damage. There are only two major changes to world history as we know it, yet they result in a myriad of consequences, like ripples in a pond. We often take history to be determined or forordained, and for much of this book so does the author. That's good because it's grounded in fact. What he does explore are possibilities like different start dates for battles due to weather (Barbarossa), different force compositions for battles (North Africa), and different tactics (Japanese at Midway). He also explores how Hitler's reluctance in employeeing airborne troops would have been different if Crete had not been so bloody. Would the Germans have agressively employed an airborne corps as the allies did at Arnhem? You'll have to read the book for that one. This is a thoroughly readable and enjoyable book that expert or amateur can appreciate. It has been written as a history and does make comparisons as it goes, so some knowledge of major battles and characters is vital. Fascinating reading! I own a first edition copy last in print in 1980. I'm very pleased to see it back in circulation.
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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
If the Germans had gone straight for Moscow in 1941, 20 Aug 2006
This excellent counterfactual history makes two quite plausible changes to the course of World War II in 1941 which, as the author argues in the introduction, "give the Germans and Japanese significant military advantages without altering their fundamental historical situations."
In the real history of 1941, Hitler diverted his Panzers from the drive on Moscow to surround and destroy a major Soviet force around Kiev. This resulted in the capture of over half a million men, but delayed the advance on Moscow for six weeks, with the result that the Wehrmacht did not reach the Russian capital before the snows came - or ever. A prominent German general was to describe this as "the greatest strategic blunder of the war."
In the first chapter of this book, the author describes an aircraft crash on 4th August 1941 during which Hitler is injured causing him to remain in a coma for several weeks. During this period the German Generals keep up the attack on the Soviet capital, and capture it.
The other change from real history has the Japanese, using information which was actually available to them in Spring 1942, realise that the USA had broken their codes and change their plans for Midway.
The author then works through a realistic projection, not of how the Nazis and Japanese could win, but of what sort of history would have been most likely to follow given those changes. His analysis takes full acount of the limitations of both Axis and Allied powers.
The masterly narrative which follows does not "prove that Hitler would have lost anyway" but it does illustrate how the internal contradictions of the Nazi and Imperial japanese states would have made it very difficult for them to win.
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18 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Counterfactual reasonableness, 5 May 2005
Too many counterfactual historians, when addressing World War II, seem to suffer from a sneaking sympathy for the Wehrmacht. Furthermore, it is often accepted at face value that, if Hitler had not directed the thrust of his Panzers twice (towards Kiev in '41, and away from Stalingrad into the Caucasus in the summer of '42) then the Germans would have defeated the Soviets.Downing falls into neither of these tracks. He explicitly refuses to give the Germans those things which would have given them potentialy war-winning advantages: an economy geared for sustained warfare or a political acceptance of liberation in occupied Russia. To do so, he rightly considers, would require fundamental moral and philosophical changes in the nature of the regime that were profoundly at odds with both National Socialist ideology, and with Hitler's personal Weltanschaung. Downing allows - as the title and cover suggest - for Germany taking Moscow. He also allows the Japanese a decisive triumph at Midway. The result is a counterfactual book that runs contrary to the trend in this area. Downing is not saying "what could the Axis have done differently that would have allowed them to win?" Instead, he guides us to the conclusion that, given their early decisions, whatever the Axis powers did, they were doomed to fail. This is not to say that he subscribes to a neo-Marxist analysis of "historical inevitablism". Rather, it is an intriguing exposition of how the logistical, manpower and strategic factors that faced the Axis would eventually have ground them down to an extent that rendered operational-doctrinal advantages irrelevant. Thoroughly enjoyable on the level of a page-turner, this also provides a range of historically-grounded argument that will interest the military historian without alienating the casual reader.
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