Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Smithsonian History of Aviation Series) (Paperback)

The work of the Air Force is well detailed and the author presents a huge amount of information about tactics that are not commonly known. All of this in a language that anyone can understand.

Even so, one can not help but feel that the book is presenting the Gulf War as the first war won by air power alone.

A strong read, if you accept the prejudices, and realize that the land forces, and sea forces, and special forces also have a legitimate claim to the Gulf War victory.

Previous reviewers' comments on the rather sterile text that Hallion uses are not without truth, although I didn't find this a particularly important shortcoming of the book.

One of the book's key strengths is that it places the 1990-91 Gulf war into a detailed, well-explained context. He fully describes how US air power and military strategy reached the position it was in in 1990, and how this affected the ability of the US to fight the Gulf war.

The main shortcoming of the book - and this is a serious problem, in my view - is when Hallion tries to talk about Middle East politics and the arguments for and against Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These issues are peripheral to the subject of his book, and he displays a serious lack of knowledge about them (or an unwillingness to discuss and acknowledge them). Hallion talks about matters such as Iraqi aggression, its WMD program, its relations with its neighbours pre-August 1990, and the like, in simplistic terms. If he really thought that these subjects needed mention, he should have included some discussion of Iraq's claims against Kuwait, of Iraq's domestic political situation in the period 1988-1990 and how this may have influenced Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait, and of allied objectives in the region (ie: political economy factors other than oil - the US's desire to see and protect free markets, the UK's need to protect Kuwaiti investments in the UK lest the Pound plummet if Iraq 'cashed in' Kuwaiti assets abroad etc).

Worst of all, he seems to have fallen for the 'Sadddam as another Hitler' theory. If he wanted to look at the political phychology of Saddam, mention should also have been made of the 'Saddam as another Bismark', or 'Saddam as another Napoleon' or 'Saddam caught in a power vacuum' theories as well - these are all important explanations behind Saddam's political behaviour. Mr Hallion, stick to the subject of air power, strategy, theory, and history - for which you have an flair and knowledge.

Having said all of this, it is the role of a book reviewer to be critical of the work he or she is reviewing. Overall, this book is excellent, and highly recommended for readers looking for an introduction to the history, strategy, and tactics of air power.