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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Ian Myles Slater on: A Wide-Ranging Narrative, 3 Feb 2005
Forester's sober, but generally fast-moving, account of the Anglo-American naval war of 1812 has had a mixed reception from historians over the nearly fifty years since its first publication. Looking at bibliographies and suggested readings in several volumes, I noted that one ignores it, while another grants that, "as to be expected from the creator of Hornblower," it is enjoyable reading.(Actually, it is rather far from the Hornblower narratives, which are in surprisingly large part about the inner life of the shy, sensitive, Gibbon-reading hero, who happens to be, to his own constant surprise, a resourceful and highly-effective naval warrior. Forester does describe Hornblower's naval engagements at a level of detail not found in the history, which is not much longer than one of the novels.) It has also been described as "potted Mahan," which under-emphasizes every subsequent historian's debt to the Admiral to suggest that Forester was especially susceptible. Another writer -- with whom I am in agreement -- points out that "The Age of Fighting Sail" is one of the few accounts of the naval war to emphasize that it was closely related to the war on land, and not some set of uniquely nautical events. (Which is what Mahan argued about naval wars in general; why complain that Forester had learned it better than others?). At least a few have noted that Forester made some points, not by laborious argument with elaborate documentation, but, even more effectively, by quoting relevant passages from the Duke of Wellington's correspondence -- a contemporary authority of some considerable weight, but not often mentioned in this context. Whether or not his advice to get out of the war had a decisive influence in London, it is a telling example of the impression the conflict made on a hard-headed strategist. Especially when American privateers had complicated life for British diplomats, with embarrassing illustrations that Britain did not exactly rule the waves unchallenged, even after Napoleon was gone. Forester gives a good idea of the shock value of a series of American victories in single-ship encounters, which the Royal Navy had long counted on winning as a matter of course. The accounts of some of the individual engagements are actually quite clear -- if you have read other, properly illustrated versions. Which brings us to a problem which is probably not Forester's fault. A series of publishers have not, I fear, ever given the book the proper treatment. In 1956 it needed, and it still needs, a good bibliography, a very detailed index, usable maps, and diagrams of the naval engagements. In effect, it has fallen somewhere between, on one side, the academic history or text-book, either of which would have its load of "apparatus," and, on the other, the purely popular book, with lots of illustrations (good or bad). And it has received neither. So I have to agree to some extent with those who refer to Theodore Roosevelt's 1882 account of "The Naval War of 1812," which has the kind of documentation and diagrams Forester's account doesn't. Of course, it also has Roosevelt's personal war with nineteenth-century historiography, both British (competent, but heavy with bias) and American (often not even competent). And it is interesting to see the workings of the mind of a future Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and President of the United States. For those seriously interested, it had a very nice paperback edition from Da Capo Press, in 1999, and there is also a recent Modern Library edition. Just keep in mind that it now over a century out of date. Forester seems to me to have read Roosevelt with care; so much for just re-writing Mahan. Another Da Capo reprint, from 1995, John R. Elting's "Amateurs, To Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812" (originally 1991) attempts to integrate naval and land strategy, primarily from the Army's viewpoint. It has a much more up-to-date bibliography than Roosevelt, obviously. Elting too has to spend time clearing away patriotic myths; this time Canadian as well. One thing that Forester does not deal with is the causes of the war. A long tradition of American historiography has looked to domestic reasons, including land-hungry westerners with designs on Canada. Bradford Perkins' "Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812," detailing the animosities and frictions, gives the impression that the real question is not why a war took place, but why it happened then, after being avoided for so long.
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