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31 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent analysis of the German Forces fighting in Normandy, 4 April 2002
A very detailed analysis of the structure, deployment and combat performance of the German formations (Army, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe) engaged in the Normandy battle. Clearly, the author has carried out an enormous amount of painstaking research to produce this book.He has also revealed new aspects of the Normandy campaign which up to now, have not, I believe, been given sufficient attention. Most obvious is the unprepared ness of many, supposedly, elite formations to meet an allied invasion. The author shows conclusively that all the SS panzer divisions committed to the Normandy battle lacked both sufficient fire power and more importantly, sufficient motorized transport to be deployed effectively against their opponents. The same appears to be true for the ground force parachute divisions and army panzer divisions as well. Another interesting aspect of the Normandy campaign, which the author has brought to light, is the reason for the delay imposed on many of the elite German formations in reaching the Normandy battlefield, quickly. Up to now, the most common explanations have been 1) the mistaken belief held by the German High command that the landings in Normandy were a prelude to the main invasion in the Pas de Calais (hence their reluctance to commit the panzer divisions en masse to the Normandy battle) and 2) the constant interdiction which the allied air force subjected all German forces to that were attempting to reach the Normandy battlefield. However, the author demonstrates, that quite simply, a lack fuel, was another major reason for the delay imposed on many German armoured formations attempting to reach Normandy. Finally, the author reveals that although, many German divisions suffered serve casualties during the Normandy campaign they were not completely destroyed as has been previously supposed. The losses sustained were borne by the front-line fighting formations while the rear-area supply and administrative units were left largely intact. Overall, this is an excellent piece of historical analysis which sheds new light on the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Normandy. Zetterling's work is must for any serious student of World War 2.
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