Germs: The Ultimate Weapon (Paperback)

I was surprised to learn just how advanced the Soviets were in their germ warfare program (though I am not surprised that they wasted no time violating the 1972 treaty they signed and continued their secret, criminal work for almost three decades). We are still years behind the Russians in terms of our understanding of germ weapons (both offensive and defensive measures), to the point that we are practically dragging our tongues over the chance to visit former Soviet labs to pick up clues to what our former enemies already know. Other countries, Iraq in particular, are certainly working overtime trying to recruit former Soviet scientists and working to produce all manner of weapons with the intention of either blackmailing or destroying Western civilization. Now, finally, I hope we have seen the light and are determined to put aside silly political wrangling in order to protect the American population from possible extinction at the hands of madmen.

I was surprised and pleased to learn that Bill Clinton did give some serious attention to the BW problem in his final years in office and actually did attempt to strengthen the nation's defenses against germ warfare. Unfortunately, as with most things, his focus, while committed, was also sporadic; Clinton surely meant well, but he approached the problem in a series of fits and starts, often distracted by embarrassing problems of his own creation. If the incentive does not now exist in the hearts and minds of the American people and the country's leaders to really address this huge problem, then surely it will never exist, and we will remain woefully vulnerable to attack from a myriad of madmen. Biological and chemical weapons become easier and cheaper to produce every single day, and this threat will not go away. Recombinant DNA technology already allows for the combination of two or more deadly diseases into one superbug, the type of killer that tortures and kills in more than one stage, becoming incredibly difficult to identify, let alone trace, while it is killing men, women, and children in untold numbers. Every concerned citizen should read this book, for we can only face the coming threats with open eyes, knowledge, and steadfast determination.

Although bioweapons have been banned by treaty since 1975, several countries have been busy as bees working covertly on this area. The former Soviet Union seems to have been in the lead, producing huge volumes of new microbes whose infectious efficacy was improved by bioengineering, processing to make the germs easier to disseminate, and experiments to create delivery systems of great efficiency. The book also details efforts by the United States, Iraq, and South Africa over these years. A major potential problem has been that there are a lot of unemployed scientists in this field from the former Soviet Union who are being recruited to start new bioweapons programs for other countries. Iran has been trying to do this. The book also describes attempts by terrorist groups to get involved. The infamous Osama bin Laden is described in the book as one terrorist leader who has been training his followers in chemical and bioweapons.

After having fallen asleep in this area since the treaty was put in place, the United States began to scramble to catch-up in the 1990s, and left itself just about as vulnerable as when the decade started despite spending serious money. Identified weaknesses in the book included a poor ability to diagnose diseases caused by bioweapons, limited vaccines and medicines to counteract the diseases, a weak structure for coordinating the response, and limited tools to fight a contagious bioweapon (which conventional anthrax is not).

On the other hand, bioweapons are attractive for terrorists. It doesn't take much money to build them. Off the shelf equipment can be used. They are easy to transport. Few people are needed to deliver them and start a contagion. All that is needed is the knowledge of what needs to be done. The book describes the efforts by terrorists in the past to use bioweapons. The most significant domestic event occurred in 1984 when followers of the Bhagwan Shree in Oregon deliberately spread salmonella in restaurant salad bars as part of an attempt to gain political control.

In some ways the most chilling part of the book is the evaluation of how close Coalition Forces came to facing bioweapons in the Gulf War. Iraq had the bioweapons and the delivery systems to have created a major loss of life. Nuclear saber-rattling seemed to have been effective in deterring Saddam Hussein not to use his bioweapons. There may have been deals through back channels that we don't know about. Perhaps the decision not to oust him from power was part of some bioweapon blackmail. Who knows? It is well worth considering the implications of the fact that Iraq was willing to forego many billions of dollars in oil revenue since the Gulf War in order to protect its ability to develop and produce bioweapons.

The book ends with many suggestions for how to limit our exposure to the full threat of bioweapons. If you add to these observations the experiences we have been having with anthrax-laced letters, you will see that an ounce of prevention is worth vastly more than a pound of cure after the fact. However, even the prevention is very expensive. But I don't think we can afford the alternative. After you read this book, I'm sure you will agree with me.

I graded the book down one star for being overly bulky in telling its story, and mischaracterizing some details with which I am familiar.

Will we use advanced science to unleash horrible epidemics on each other? What internal and external forces will be sufficient to avoid such a catastrophe?

Use science to serve humanity . . . and to become more humane!