Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Welcome to the future, kid., 24 May 2008
It sure requires a lot of effort to regard life as a pleasant experience when you have to wonder every day if you're going to get blown up in a bus on your way to work, or if there's going to be a sudden blackout, shortage of water or gas. This may seem like a distant scenario, something happening to some poor "unliberated" underdeveloped state - but according to John Robb, disruptions of this kind can take place anytime, anywhere. In fact, they're being prepared as we speak. New York, Madrid and London were merely a sneak preview - and of course, places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Thailand and Chechnya have become classic sites for such disorder. What we are looking at, Robb argues, is a new type of globalized warfare involving small and largely independent "terrorist" cells with lots of cheap and accessible technology (from the internet to explosives). Robb aptly calls them the Global Guerrillas.
Never mind WHY such "nasty people" would want to disrupt your neat way of living: wars have always been fought for myriads of reasons and every murderer can be called a hero, every freedom fighter a terrorist, if you're so inclined. There is nothing particularly extraordinary about people plotting to disrupt other people's way of living (in fact, directly or indirectly, that's what we're all doing, all the time). One of the most refreshing aspects about Robb's book is that he doesn't waste many lines vilifying the global guerrillas, but rather coolly observes and describes their tactics, methods, even finances - and potential to emerge victorious. The one common aspect in all these groups (Al-Qaeda being the most famous) is that they are opposing a state, i.e., a huge organization with the (supposed) monopoly over violence (or security), taxation and all kinds of essential services such as the supply of energy, food, water and health care. And the interesting thing is that the global guerrillas have developed a cunning little trick to actually endanger the legitimacy and power of states: instead of going about waging massive wars with millions of soldiers and billions of explosions (which is really quite expensive), they engage in "systems disruption", damaging or destroying the very infrastructure on which states (and above all the population under their jurisdiction) rely. By blowing up pipelines, electricity grids, bridges, railroads, airplanes and buildings, the guerrillas cause massive damage and financial losses - not to speak of panic and insecurity - all of which end up weighing heavily on the state. For the perpetrators of such attacks, on the other hand, the costs can be minimal, as it is relatively cheap nowadays to organize and execute major disruptive actions. Plus they can be endlessly innovative, learning from each other's mistakes and successes, even though they are not connected or even cooperating with each other. Robb calls this "open-source warfare", analogous to Wikipedia, where millions of people can participate and improve, without need of a "central command". Which, of course, makes it all the more difficult for global guerrillas to be eliminated: you destroy one group here, and in the meantime ten others have sprouted up somewhere else.
Much of the book concentrates on Iraq, not only because it is such an obvious conundrum for America and its allies, but also for its variety of "terrorist" groups wreaking havoc on a daily basis and undermining the West's attempts to "conquer the hearts and minds" of the invaded territory's population. This provides a good basis to observe a (supposedly) powerful state's inability to actually detect, much less control all the insurgency against it. The end-result, Robb predicts, will be the failure of the American intervention. Surprising as that may sound.
With this in mind, Robb provides also countless examples of successful (and quite ingenious) recent operations in other countries, to finally conclude that we have entered a whole new stage in world events: the end of globalization and the beginning of global chaos. As he put it: "Now with the new forms of warfare any small group can wage war... and they will." A chilling prospect, perhaps, but Robb's arguments certainly sound convincing. Especially because he teaches us not to regard warfare as something stable, but rather as en ever evolving human talent, full of surprising twists and turns. The future will be one hell of an adventure. It's just a shame we will (most likely) have to participate in it.
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3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Some good points but I wonder about the prescience, 18 Sep 2007
Futurist John Robb sees us going through a period in which increasingly things will get very local with people and organizations hiring private security companies to protect them. He sees a breakdown in global trade because of terrorist activities (both oil and security will become so expensive that a lot of trade will lose its value). Nation states will lose much of their power and legitimacy because of defective centralized command organizations (much the way communist economic systems failed) and because their great armies will be ineffective, even irrelevant, in combating the decentralized "swarm intelligence" of the Internet-like terrorist structures.
We can see in the fiascos of the Bush administration with the great George W. as "I'm the Decider" and Dick Cheney and his neocon cronies as Designers, that the view from the top, when it becomes superimposed upon the real world, can lead to disaster. Quite simply the "intelligence" at the top is no match for the independent intelligence spread out among the populace. There is more wisdom in the Internet than in the all the heads in Washington.
However I have departures from Robb's text that I would like to present. First of all he keeps talking about how the terrorists are winning. What are they winning? They kill people and destroy wealth, but what do they gain? Bin Laden may be a hero in the many parts of the Muslim world, but he has gained nothing but that celebrity. The terrorists are creating no wealth. They get their finances through donations, illegal activities, such as dope smuggling, and kidnappings for ransom and the like. Legalize street drugs and stop paying ransoms and where will the bulk of their financing come from? Counterfeiting designer jeans? Stipends from Saudi princes? Currently they are enjoying international notoriety and support partly because of the overreaction of the US. A lot of money goes into homeland security. Little if any of it goes to Al Qaeda. Bush has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into the Iraqi sand, and some of that no doubt is benefitting Al Qaeda, but wiser leaders will come to power in the Western democracies in the future and will not aid the growth of Al Qaeda as Bush and Tony Blair have done.
Robb sees the nation state as at a disadvantage vis-a-vis guerilla organizations. He relies on ideas from Israeli military strategist Martin van Creveld to come to this conclusion (see especially page 28). But guerilla organizations only have an advantage in their homeland against outsiders. Imagine the Vietcong or Al Qaeda conducting a guerilla war while hiding out in the United States. They would not have the support of the populace and without that support a guerilla army is lost.
Robb states that the Bush administration invaded Iraq "to transform the political landscape of the Middle East." (p. 34) This is an after-the-fact justification since the stated reason (WMDs and Al Qaeda connections) was revealed as a lie, and the underlying reason (control of oil--remember Iraqi oil was going to pay for all this) was found not to work. Bush actually invaded Iraq in order to run for a second term as an "at war" president. Being at war also allowed him to greatly increase the power of the executive branch of government. As Commander-in-Chief he pretty much had his way with Congress and the American press, which is the reason he is still strutting around like a peacock.
Robb sees Baloch tribesmen as gaining "returns of investment (ROIs) of at least 1,000 to 1" in their "systems sabotage" attacks in Pakistan. (p. 84) But to use such terminology is a bit silly and is part of where I think Robb goes wrong in his overall analysis. The "return on investment" that the Baloch terrorists or any terrorist organization gets from blowing things up is little or nothing. However, by showing that they can and will sabotage structures and kill people, they may get financial support from those who want the Pakistani government overthrown. That's the way the economics of terrorism work. You don't--to repeat myself--create wealth by destroying wealth, unless you get the contract for rebuilding! Take away the financial support that terrorists are getting and squelch their criminal enterprises and they are out of business.
On page 100 Robb makes a similar point using the term "rates of return" instead of ROI.. He's talking about Nigerian guerillas blowing up Shell Oil facilities and finds that "the rates of return on these attacks are phenomenal." The only return they are going to get is if somebody pays them to stop or they are able to take over the government or the facilities. The (inadvertent, I presume) glorification of terrorists by the Bush administration and the press no doubt gains them some support from somewhere (Iran and Saudi Arabia?).
Despite what I see as errors in Robb's conception and conclusions, I still think this is a very good book that makes some important points. For example Robb predicts that "the knee-jerk solution [to terrorist attacks] will be to centralize security in the hands of the nation-state." But he sees this as "a wrong-headed approach. It will bring us to the brink of a police state for very little benefit." (p. 156) Another good point is from page 158 where Robb states that "preemptive war followed by aggressive nation-building" as a reaction to terrorism and extremism is "wrong." He calls this "the Bush doctrine" which has obviously failed, as he points out on page 160. He notes that Iraq and Afghanistan since the invasions by the United States have "become havens and sources of even more instability than they were before we invaded."
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by Nassim Nicholas Taleb
by United States
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