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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A must for any WWII enthusiast, 28 April 2001
B.H. Liddell Hart was in a unique and enviable situation just after the war. He got permission from British occupation authorities in Germany to interview top German Generals and Admirals in order to get their thoughts on The War in general, on Hitler, on various campaigns and battles and on their Allied adversaries.Among the Gentlemen interviewed were General Heinz Guderian, the architect of the Blitzkrieg, General von Mantaufel, who commanded the fifth panzer army during the Ardennes offensive in, Field-Marshal von Manstein, the man who planned the invasion of France, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander of all of Western Europe and who directed the German response to the invasion of Normandy and General Ritter von Thoma, Rommel's second in command. The short time that passed between the surrender of Germany and the time of the interviews, coupled with the names listed above should be enough to convince anyone with a shred of interest in the Second World War to buy the book. The style of Liddell Hart is clear and easily understood by the non-military readers. It is direct and to the point, free of prolonged lists of various army units and unneccesary discussions about them - an evil that plagues far too many books on military history. The book will not reveal any startling surprises to the seasoned reader because of the simple fact that almost all books on The War written after 1948 have used it as a reference. But to read a second hand account of what went on in the various German headquarters during the war - to hear the views and thoughts of the German High Command straight from the horse's mouth - is unlike anything else. There is one subject however which is discussed in some lenght in the book and in a way not often seen. That is how Hitler managed to take to complete a control over the German Armed Forces, the officers of which were many decidedly anti-nazi. The question of why the Army didn't stage a coup earlier than it did is also answered. The only thing that bothered me about the book are the lengths Liddell Hart goes to prove that his writings on mechanised warfare, published between 1920 and 1930, were more influential than De Gaulle's on the way mechanised warfare developed in Germany. It is as if he wants to take personal credit for the Blitzkrieg and the subsequent German victories. All in all, and despite the author's somewhat conceited nature, this is quite a remarkable book and should have it's place on any self-respecting military historian's (be he professional or amateur) bookshelf.
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