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1 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A well researched piece of work that is notable for what it leaves out. , 29 Dec 2007
From the politically obedient point of view which Rear Admiral Richard Hill, editor for the past quarter century of the Naval Review, so admirably represents, Lewin's career was, to all intents and purposes, impeccable. Here was a man who was always behind the right desk in Whitehall at the right time. British admirals tend to fall in love with their own image, and Hill is no exception: his admiration of Lewín borders on adoration.
After war service, specialization in gunnery and early promotion to commander, Lewin went to Whitehall in the early fifties where he played a major role in re-organising officer training. This was the time when plans were in hand to amalgamate the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Admiralty into the bureaucratic leviathan known as the MoD.
There followed a succession of plum jobs: command of the `C' class destroyer HMS Corunna, service aboard the Royal Yacht Britannia, and command of the Dartmouth Training Squadron. After that, from 1963 until his retirement in 1982 as Chief of Defence Staff, Lewin was at, or very close to, the centre of naval politics.
Hill does a fine job of recounting Lewin's career as a Whitehall Warrior, and to that extent his book is of great value - though, infuriatingly for researchers, one cannot copy excerpts from Amazon's `look inside this book' facility.
So that's the bright side of the coin. The other side - studiously avoided by Admiral Hill - is murkier.
1. In 1966, under pressure from Wilson & Healey,`the Naval Staff [...] reluctantly embarked upon a paper entitled The Navy without Carriers' (p. 170). Why? Were they afraid that they might dip out on promotion íf they didn't comply? No one in MoD had the guts to tell the politicians that depriving the Royal Navy of its carriers would deprive the fleet of its ability not only to strike at the enemy (the Cold War was at its height) but also to defend itself from air attack. Year after year, captains and admirals lined up in Buckingham Palace to receive rewards for their political obedience in the shape of gongs and knighthoods. The effect on morale was devastating. People left in droves.
2. There was bitter rivalry between the RAF and the RN. Politicians played off one service against the other, with the result that the Naval Staff adopted a `can do' cut and stretch policy that had (and still has) an adverse effect on recruiting and retention. In his various hats, Lewin cooperated with this policy.
3. In the realm of public relations, the Royal Navy has a record of secrecy, paranoia and cover-up: (i) Ín 1962 the press were sent on a coach tour (by Lewin's colleague Admiral LeBailly) in order to hush up the fact that the British nuclear submarine HMS Resolution had been damaged in a collision with the escorting US destroyer on the morning that the first test firing of a Polaris missile was scheduled to take place. The press were deliberately misinformed that the telemetry needed further adjustment. (ii) After the sinking of the Belgrano in 1982, HMS Conqueror's signal log was conveniently `lost' - and yet no officer was court-martialled for the offence. (iii) MI6, which has very close links with the RN, knew that the infamous `blockade of Beira' was being by-passed by Ian Smith with the assistance of South Africa. Yet for twelve years from 1966-1978, HM ships were kept on patrol off Beira. I served on two of those patrols, and every man jack on board knew that we were wasting our time and the tax payers' money. All we achieved was to put Mugabe in power.
4. The task force sailed for the Falklands in 1982 with inadequate weapons to shoot down aircraft and no airborne early warning capability. The low-flying air threat was virtually ignored as was the threat from Exocet missiles, which the naval staff regarded as `a bit of a toy' (p.262).
5. On p.397, Hill writes: `Controversy over the sinking of the Belgrano was kept going by three sorts of people: those who were trying to make money or reputation out of it, those who were seeking to make political capital, and those who were genuinely shocked by what they saw as unnecessary violence and escalation [...] Lewin made no differention.' This, in my opinion, is a most extraordinary statement. It reveals the underlying arrogance of admirals who apparently believe they can sweep away opposing arguments with a heavily gold-braided cuff.
6. Lewin's support for Trident has had an adverse effect not only on the Royal Navy but on the Army and RAF as well. Trident has bled all three services white in terms of equipment and morale, and deters nothing and no one. Hill seems to take it for granted that we all agree with the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction. He reports that Lewin selected Admiral Henry Leach to be his successor as First Sea Lord partly on the basis that Leach was `sound on Trident' (p.320).
7. Hill is very cagey about Lewin's attitude to homosexuality in the Royal Navy, which was a burning issue when he was 1SL and CDS. While it was widely known, in the late seventies, that two retired rear admirals were in a gay relationship, the mere admission of homosexual orientation on the part of an ordinary sailor was enough to have him booted out `Services No Longer Required'. This injustice did not go unnoticed on the lower deck.
Over three decades Admiral Lewin and his contemporaries on the Naval Staff created an image of the Royal Navy as being headed by arrogant, self-satisfied and secretive people (Freemasonry is strong among submariners and engineers) who believe that they are always right because they are admirals, and that they are admirals because they are always right. Hill's biography does nothing to persuade us otherwise.
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0 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A superbly written book about an outstanding naval officer, 12 Nov 2000
By A Customer
Great care has been taken to write an interesting and eminently readable biography of a truely outstanding naval officer and 20th Century leader. From his humble beginnings to his pivotal role as Chief of Defence Staff during the 1982 Falklands war, this book charts, in great detail, the rise of Lord Lewin through the ranks of the officer corps, his commands at sea and his mastery of the corridors of Whitehall. A must read for anyone interested in the role of the navy in the latter half of the last century.
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