Consciousness Explained (Penguin Science) by Daniel C. Dennett  (14)
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Synopsis
Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: the trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor constrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the "Times Literary Supplement", the "London Review of Books" or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism and semantic atomism.
From the Publisher
New essays from a preeminent philosopher of the mind.
Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, the LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism, and semantic atomism.
Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: the trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor constrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the "Times Literary Supplement", the "London Review of Books" or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism and semantic atomism.
From the Publisher
New essays from a preeminent philosopher of the mind.
Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, the LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism, and semantic atomism.
These wonderfully written and frequently profound essays represent Fodor at his critical, iconoclastic, and humorous best- and it's pretty hard to get much better than that. No serious student of cognitive science or the philosophy of mind can afford not to learn from these incisively provocative attacks on Fodor's intellectual rivals and from the running elaborations of his own innovative, groundbreaking, and extremely influential views. This is an important book." -Stephen Schiffer, Department of Philosophy, New York University
Jerry Fodor is Professor in the Department of Philosophy and at the Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University. His most recent books with the MIT Press are THE ELM AND THE EXPERT: MENTALESE AND ITS SEMANTICS, A THEORY OF CONTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS, and PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Representation and the Mind Series
A Bradford Book --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
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