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19 of 22 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
AN EMBARASSMENT TO PHILOSOPHY AND TO THE VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION SERIES, 3 Nov 2007
I have read a large number of the Very Short Introduction series and am on the whole very impressed with them. Reading this particular book, however, I felt I was reading a very bad exam paper. The text is replete with the type of flawed argumentation one would expect from a keen but unpromising high school pupil. It was so bad that I was able to find at least one major flaw per page, often more. Some of the worst flaws include:
* Pink frequently assumes that because something need not be the case that it therefore is not the case.
* Pink fails to present a theory for freedom, relying instead on very poor attempts to undermine the counter-arguments to the case for freedom of the will, arguments he is either willfully distorting or has not understood.
* Pink makes the flawed assumption that theories of causal determinism are necessarily reductive.
* Pink's arguments against determinism, garrulous as they are, are not more sophisticated than 'we have free will because we perceive that we have it'.
* Pink's book is, as another reviewer has highlighted, highly repetitive. In fact, this is an understatement. It could not be more repetitive if it tried. This could easily have fitted onto 30 pages.
* Pink takes certain key terms for granted (e.g. 'we', 'self', 'free agent'), perhaps realising that their definition may undermine his rambling hypotheses.
* At times, Pink seems to assume that prior causation must mean that things are mapped out for the individual since before birth, rather than acknowledging the chaos and flux which is at play in causal relationships. This in itself is an example of the reductionism he readily criticizes elsewhere.
* Pink argues against the Hobbesian view that action is driven by prior desires with the awful counter-example of 'if I am out walking, and decide to take a break on a bench, then decide to get up and continue my walk, that decision is not driven by prior desires'. His notion of temporality is skewed here, for 'man wishes to get up and continue walk, gets up, continues walk' is sufficient to undermine his argument. Immediately prior is still prior.
* In trying to undermine the role of desires in action, he replaces this term with `motivation'. However, he fails to define `motivation' and fails to show how it is any different or any more amenable to freedom than `desire'.
* Et cetera ad nauseum...
All in all, Pink has produced something that is an embarassment to philosophy. He shouldn't be teaching at a university, let alone publishing books. I suggest he goes back to school to learn the very basics of philosophy. Whether you come from the determinist, compatibilist or libertarian camp, this book has only one thing to offer: an example of how not to argue a case for the freedom of the will.
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14 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
too much opinion, too little introduction, 5 May 2006
I have read many of the books in the (generally excellent) Very Short Introduction range, and this is the first that has prompted me to write a review of any kind. Unfortunately, for all the wrong reasons...
For an introduction, I think this is more likely to turn people away from what is in my experience a wonderfully thought provoking subject. The author briefly introduces the key concepts, but then blends in their more detailed explanations with his own personal bias and synthesis; this distorts the meaning of terms, and muddies the debate. If you couple this with his tortured style of prose it becomes in some places both boring and unreadable.
I would recommend anyone interested in the subject to try and find a good anthology of classic texts, to better understand the positions of Hobbes, Hume, Kant and others, which are not as intimidating to the intelligent general reader as many would suppose.
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10 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A confusing initiation, 16 Feb 2006
This book is easy enough to follow (if you read certain paragraphs twice and can keep up with the typically philosophical endless repetition of the same words in one sentence) and does, I feel give you a good introduction into the subject.I was a total fresh-face to the subject when I started reading this, and whilst I did feel I was being well informed about the field, there were two things that threw me a little. The first was that Thomas Pink made it clear that he dissented from the views of most philosophers today about free will. On the whole I liked this, since his conclusion was that free will does exist, and we all like to believe that! But the biggest thing was the image of the Free Will Problem I had once I had finished the book. Is it just me, or do philosophers seem to have opened up a field to examine something we think we know by common sense (ie, that we DO freely make decisions), and made it immensely complicated, in doing so reaching the conclusion that decisions are not freely made (ie, the Hobbesian view)? And this book comes along and engages with the Hobbesian view, changing it so that free will is possible, but ultimately resting it's conclusion on what we knew by common sense in the first place? I did come away feeling that the free will problem was something of an unecessary problem. The only way in which is seems to become a valid problem to me is in the medieval context of "how can we have free will if God knows what all our future actions are going to be"? But this subject isn't really engaged, which is understandable given the book's scope. I enjoyed the book, but I must admit I find the field of Free Will Philosophy a lot less interesting now that I've read it.
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