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Product Description
Review
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory."
--R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas
"This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions--including results that are very recent--but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work."
--Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.
"The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions."
--Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
"This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject."
--Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K.
Product Description
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions
*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information
*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
See all Product Description
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory."
--R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas
"This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions--including results that are very recent--but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work."
--Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.
"The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions."
--Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
"This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject."
--Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K.
Product Description
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions
*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information
*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
See all Product Description
Inside This Book
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First Sentence
We begin the formal analysis by considering equilibrium bidding behavior in the four common auction forms in an environment with independently and identically distributed private values. Read the first page
Front Cover | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index
We begin the formal analysis by considering equilibrium bidding behavior in the four common auction forms in an environment with independently and identically distributed private values. Read the first page
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Concordance
Browse Sample PagesConcordance
Front Cover | Table of Contents | Excerpt | Index