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38 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Compact but excellent account of Waterloo., 3 Mar 2005
"A slender volume" tends to be a derogatory way to refer to a book, but Andrew Roberts has proved that that need not be the case. Physically, his book is certainly small; if there is a smaller book among the many on the subject of Waterloo, I haven't encountered it. This is so well written, however, that the brevity of the book is no disadvantage. The events are recounted with admirable lucidity, but Roberts still finds space for numerous well-reasoned arguments. He does not set out with an axe to grind, as does Peter Hofschroer (with a degree of justice) and as do numerous French authors, desperately trying to prove that the French actually won the battle. He is properly dismissive of the kind of francophone pseudo-historian who is still unable to accept, one hundred and ninety years after the event, that the French were defeated, or that they deserved to be, but his tone is admirably balanced overall (Hofschroer gets a respectful reference). Roberts never explicitly tries to compare Wellington's generalship with Napoleon's, but does draw attention to the flaws in Napoleon's command on the day: late start, unsubtle tactics, assumption of British inferiority, failure to comprehend the significance of the fact that the Prussians were still very much in play, failure to shift his position, to see the battlefield from another vantage-point. There is an ingenious and actually quite plausible explanation of how the insanely conducted French cavalry charges began. I shan't spoil it here (you'll have to read the book). Admittedly, massed frontal charges were exactly how Napoleon conducted the whole battle, so he may well have ordered them, even if his defenders maintain that that is impossible. Roberts leaves space for some illuminating conclusions about the significance of the victory. Napoleon would almost certainly have been steamrollered by the Russians, even if he had won at Waterloo, but a war won by Russia would have led to a very different Europe in the nineteenth century. I don't think that you can have too many books about this fascinating and dreadful battle. Roberts himself pays tribute to Jac Weller, Ian Fletcher and Mark Adkin and is certainly not seeking to supersede their efforts. As far as modern-day analyses of the battle are concerned, however, you can't go wrong with Adkin's masterpiece and this gem from Andrew Roberts, with Hofschroer's works, perhaps, thrown in for a provocatively different perspective.
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6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Compact but not Bijou, 20 Mar 2007
As a regular battlefield tour guide at the site Andrew Roberts's knowledge of the ground is apparent in this elegant little book. He introduces some interesting aspects of modern analysis, such as climatologist Dennis Wheeler's model of the weather system that deluged the battlefield with `apocalyptic' rainfall: the French guns could not operate effectively until the ground had dried appreciably, causing a serious delay that helped the Prussian army under Marshal Gebhardt von Blücher to come to the Duke of Wellington's assistance. For this battle was not won by the British alone.
However, the book has curious features such as the comment that the Dutch-Belgian component of Wellington's army was not as 'politically, ideologically or racially motivated' as the British. Race is not a factor normally associated with the Napoleonic Wars, and although Mr Roberts pays tribute to them: 'Never should the non-British and non-Prussian contribution to the victory be underestimated ... '; yet despite two-thirds of Wellington's army being non-British, these troops make little impact on the narrative. Anglo-centrism has long been a problem with Waterloo studies, and this book breaks no ground in that direction.
There are technical shortcomings as well, with unit names frequently garbled such as the '95th Rifle Brigade'. In fact the 95th Regiment of Foot (Riflemen) - or 95th Rifles as they were commonly known - ceased to be the 95th when they bacame The Rifle Brigade in 1816. Thus, despite a comment on the back by Paul Johnson that it 'should remain the authoritative account for many years', it falls a long way short of that. But it remains a good read, and should encourage further delving into this fascinating period.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Waterloo Sunset, 23 Feb 2009
Was warfare - of the type which had its last grand "Hurrah!" at Waterloo - the most Extreme Sport of its day? And did it appeal to precisely the type of psychology that enjoys the vicarious thrill of risking life and limb at the very edge of things? These are the questions that Andrew Roberts' book - Waterloo: Napoleon's Last Gamble - has left me with.
Generally speaking, I am not in the habit of reading the Appendices to books of history, but those for Waterloo do contain some particularly entertaining and illuminating letters, plus the famous "Waterloo Despatch" - the Duke's own account of the battle, written on the following day. The extraordinary thing - for me - was that I found the Duke's terse, spare and matter-of-fact relation of the military facts to be the most moving account of all. Even more so than Roberts'. And the Duke's account does indeed confirm how thoroughly he had read his ground and how wisely he had already secured the strategically advantageous points before the commencement of hostilities. This, in itself, contributed greatly to his success.
The book itself is an economical, fast-paced and highly informative account of the battle. It is clear that although both sides made mistakes during the course of the day, those made on the Anglo/Allied side were neither as numerous nor as fundamental as those made by the French. However, allowing La Haye Saint to fall into enemy hands so late in the day - for want of the right sort of ammunition or of the means to transport it to the strategic outpost - was, I think, a more serious error on the part of the Anglo/Allied side than perhaps Roberts is inclined to admit. This could very well have turned the battle in Napoleon's favour and - as things stood - it placed a very nearly intolerable stress upon the Anglo/Allied front line.
Another serious error was the Union Brigade's disobeying of orders and continuing - with disastrous consequences for itself - to charge after D'Erlon's men in retreat. This particular error put me in mind of the reason for the British defeat at Hastings in 1066. They lost because - through a lack of discipline - they broke ranks and pursued the apparently retreating Norman knights down the hillside. A moment of rashness which had nation-losing consequences for themselves and which explains why the British Army has always been big on discipline, order and steadiness in the ranks.
This book has certainly made me curious to read more about Wellington's career before the Waterloo Campaign - and most particularly in the Peninsular War.
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