1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow (Paperback)

As a historical narrative of events it is thorough and meticulous, albeit mostly seen through the invaders' eyes. The sufferings of the Russian people are given less attention, possibly due to the relative scarcity of sources. It has to be borne in mind that, during the Soviet era, this period of history was presented as a heroic struggle with no room for sentiment and it is only recently that this view has been revised.

The book asks but does not answer some important questions. Did Napoleon have a clear political objective? Why was Napoleon uncharacteristically hesitant and repeatedly made mistakes in judgement?

It also begs the question: why fight two major campaigns at the same time at opposite ends of Europe? What was the impact of the Russian campaign on the Peninsular War at this critical time?

It is said that his objective was to reach India, or at least conquer the Middle East in order to thwart Britain. That sounds imprecise and vague. He certainly would not want to find himself squeezed on either side by two major powers at the same time. But was Russia really a threat, considering the state that its army was in? It is simply not possible to discern a strategic objective. And, as the author says, "by definition, aimless wars cannot be won".

One possible reason for his indecisiveness is quite simple: Kutusov was an incompetent commander of whom the Tsar himself despaired and Napoleon could not make any sense of the chaos that surrounded the Russian armies. Consequently, he was not able read the character of the enemy and this was, together with his appreciation of the lie of the land, the principal ingredient of his success as a general.

Several reports, from Caulaincourt his ADC, Constant his valet and Mestivier his personal physician, indicate that he was suffering from poor health.

Napoleon's headquarters have been described elsewhere as a place "where a curious lassitude, so uncharacteristic of Napoleon in action, continued to clog the workings of the Imperial brain."

During the campaign, Napoleon's health deteriorated "to a degree that clouded his judgement." He was suffering from dysuria and a dry cough and loss of voice. His physician described Napoleon as having a "persistent dry cough, difficult irregular breathing, his urine came only in drops and with pain and was thick with sediment." In addition, "his legs and feet were oedematous, the pulse febrile in type and intermittent every twelve beats or so," and there were indications of oedema of the chest and fevers.
Following Borodino, Napoleon continued to have throat and cough problems, leaving him speechless. His urinary problems also continued throughout the campaign.

One of the strengths of Napoleon's leadership was the electrifying effect that his presence had on the troops, both his own and that of his enemy. He led from the front, did not delegate much and paid great attention to detail. It was said that his presence had the value of an entire regiment. Why then, as the book shows, was he absent so often?

Why did he never show up in the Iberian Peninsula during the six years that the French were active in the area? Contemporary accounts show that a visit was rumored on at least two occasions, but never took place. Had he not opened a second front in the East (it is doubtful that the Russian campaign was necessary in the first place), and concentrated his skills in the Peninsula, the outcome might have been quite different. It is no coincidence that Wellington's strategy, from being defensive from 1809 to 1812, became offensive after that date. I understood why when I read Adam Zamoyski's book. The Napoleonic myth expired on the road from Moscow and, indirectly, affirmed Britain as the major power for the next hundred years.

Zamoyski covers a wide range in this rather large book. He begins by giving a bit of the history of the Napoleonic conflicts. He doesn't go into great detail about them, but he does set up the political situation that both France and Russia were in right before Napoleon's decision to invade. He also gives a chapter to each of the rulers involved, detailing Alexander's strengths and weaknesses (Alexander is generally less known among the history non-fans) in regards to military as well as political matters. The politics of the situation set up, Zamoyski then sets the stage for one of the greatest debacles of all time. Napoleon keeps insisting that he doesn't want war with Russia, and if Alexander would just be a good boy and subjugate himself like he should, then Napoleon wouldn't have to do this. He doesn't seem to realize that the humiliation he's already forced Alexander to suffer will keep Alexander from doing it again. Thus, Napoleon's arrogance will finally cause him to meet his match.

Zamoyski sets the scene beautifully, in clear, interesting chapters that give the reader just enough detail without going too far. He delves into the make-up of Napoleon's army, the various satellite states, and even how the French soldier was typically outfitted. Some of this may sound boring, but Zamoyski keeps it fairly light, and it has even greater meaning later on in the book when soldiers are casting off as many possessions as they can to lighten their load, or when national divisions start to show their cracks as conditions worsen.

It's amazing, in a campaign that took at least five months, how little fighting there actually was. Sure, there was skirmishing, and the Russian pursuit of the fleeing French army which resulted in a few pitched battles and a lot of sniping, but Borodino is the only major battle. Zamoyski does a great job giving details for this battle, as well as all the subsequent ones when the French had to turn and fight during the retreat in order to avoid annihilation. The maps in this book are wonderful, giving positions of all the various armies, the leaders and the units they led, all of which match neatly the description which is on the same page or two that the map is. My one major complaint about a lot of military history books is how the maps are often elsewhere, but Moscow 1812 does a wonderful job with this. The reader can follow along with no problem, and see, both visually and mentally, exactly what happened.

Moscow 1812 spends almost half of the book on the actual retreat from the captured Moscow, and this is where it drags slightly. Not that it isn't interesting, because I found it fascinating. What happens, though, is that the book almost becomes oppressive. Zamoyski gives us a lot of detail about the retreat, all the way down to the cannibalism at the end when there was no food to be had. He details the cold, the snow, how the soldiers managed to survive, and how many of them didn't. Granted, there were some actual battles in this part, and Zamoyski does his usual good job with these, but then we get back to the retreat, and the freezing to death. I alternately loved and hated this part, and I do think it went on a bit too long. Some of the detail is not for the squeamish, including vivid descriptions of the affects of frostbite on a man walking.

That being said, I think it was important for us to get a lot of that detail. I have always known about the great retreat in concept, and that it was bitterly cold, and that Napoleon lost a lot of his men and his army was basically destroyed. I had, however, no idea just how horrible it was, and this book brought that home. The Cossacks in this book are especially effective, as they almost seem like a horrible force of nature rather than a group of men. They are always hovering on the outskirts of the retreat, waiting for people to fall to the roadside, swooping in to strip them of their valuables. We hear a lot about the brutality of the Cossacks, both in the raiding as well as the escorting of prisoners. This is an important story, and I'm very glad I read this book.

The best part of Moscow 1812 is that it is extensively researched, with a lot of footnotes. Most of these notes are from primary sources, letters home from the soldiers, or journals. Some of these are from letters that Zamoyski later says were never delivered, which implies that a Russian soldier found them and kept them. This is the story of the retreat told by those who were there, and it's all the more powerful for it.

If you have any interest in military history or Napoleon, and if you don't have a weak stomach, Moscow 1812 is the book for you.

David Roy