Zorndorf 1758: Frederick Faces Holy Mother Russia (Osprey Campaign) [Illustrated] [Paperback]

Zorndorf 1758 has the usual sections on introduction, chronology, opposing leaders and opposing armies, but omits the section on opposing plans (which is incorporated elsewhere in the text). A rather lengthy 17-page prelude covers Frederick's abortive siege of Olmutz and his march to the Oder River. The Battle of Zorndorf is covered in a 40-page narrative, followed by a 5-page aftermath section. Millar provides a detailed order of battle, but unit strengths are not mentioned. The campaign narrative is supported by six 2-D maps (Eastern Europe 1758, Russian & Prussian movements in August 1758, the Siege of Custrin, Frederick's march to Zorndorf, initial positions at Zorndorf, and the final Prussian attacks) and three 3-D Birds Eye View tactical maps of the battle. The three battle scenes by Adam Hook are: Russian Cossacks burning Zorndorf; Russian cavalry charging the Prussian advance guard; and Prussian infantry attacking the Russian Observation Corps.

Although a Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1757 had come to naught, a renewed invasion in the spring of 1758 was more successful. Russian forces under General Fermor launched a surprise winter campaign (typical!) that caught the Prussians by surprise and quickly overran virtually most of East Prussia, while Frederick was busy facing the Austrian armies in Moravia. When the Russians approached the Oder River, a scant 80 kilometers from the capital in Berlin, Frederick was forced to race north to blunt the invasion. Millar's description of Russian conduct in East Prussia is interesting; the Russian troops did not molest the people or ravage the land, and they even read an official apology from the Tsarina for damages done in the 1757 campaign! Readers will surely be apt to contrast this self-restrained invasion in 1758 with the savage Soviet invasion of East Prussia in 1945.

Millar's description of the Russian army in 1758 is also interesting. The Russian army of this period was not the "steamroller" of later years but rather, a relatively limited, long-service force that could send fewer than 70,000 troops to fight in the West. Although Millar notes that the Russians had "the best trained and equipped" artillery in Europe, they were burdened with a sloppy command and control system (exercised from the court in St Petersburg) and a cumbersome logistic system. On the other hand, the Russian Army was blessed with tough, steady troops who could absorb a huge amount of punishment without routing. Since most of Frederick's tactics were designed to precipitate flight in unsteady opponents, the Prussian tactics were ill suited for dealing with the Russian threat.

Millar notes that Frederick was probably not in top form at Zorndorf, noting that he committed his smaller army to battle with conducting proper reconnaissance and failed to take advantage of the initially disorganized Russian forces. As usual, Frederick tried to turn his enemy's flank but when this did not work out, he decided to conduct a "frontal oblique order attack" (i.e. a frontal attack on one of the enemy's wings). Frederick's improvised battle plan was not particularly good and his subordinates botched it, resulting in 2/3rds of the Prussian infantry being rendered temporarily hors de combat. Indeed, Frederick's attempts to personally rally his routed troops failed. Millar is probably too generous with Frederick, preferring to blame his subordinates, but it is obvious that the Prussian tactical plan at Zorndorf was uninspired and possibly foolhardy. What saved Frederick from total defeat was the absence of the Russian commander from the field and the consequent lack of higher leadership. Nevertheless, the Russian cavalry commander was independent enough to overrun some of the Prussian artillery and disorganize much of the rest of Frederick's infantry.

However, Millar notes that the Prussian cavalry under Seydlitz got in some serious blows that did real damage to the Russian infantry. Frederick kept attacking futilely for ten hours until both armies were fought out. Both sides still held the field and Millar rightly calls Zorndorf a draw. It was also a very bloody battle indeed, with 35% losses for the Prussians and 45% for the Russians. While the Russian threat to Berlin was stopped for the moment, Frederick had badly damaged his ever-shrinking army in a poorly thought-out action. Zorndorf was certainly not one of Frederick's greater moments and his handling of the campaign was marked more by arrogant assumptions than tactical genius.

My only concerns for this volume are the author's wandering attention and apparent lack of research into Russian sources. Millar spends too much time on pre-campaign events in Moravia and then too much on post-campaign events in Bohemia. Meanwhile, the early phases of the Russian invasion get too little attention. Apparently, Millar is more interested in the Austrian Front than the Russian Front. This wandering focus is particularly noticeable in the 5-page Battlefield Today section, where Millar starts discussing a modern visit to Zorndorf then starts talking about toy shops in Berlin, the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp, Potsdam, and the nightlife in East Berlin. If I want to read a tour guide about Berlin I will buy one. Focus on the subject, please! It is also obvious throughout the text that Millar is a great admirer of Frederick and this probably colors his evaluation of mis-managed battles like Zorndorf.