Worse than a Monolith is a provocatively argued and deeply researched book. It deals primarily with Cold War alliance politics during the years between 1950 and 1979. The author, Thomas Christensen, is a professor at the prestigious Woodrpw Wilson School at Princeton and former Deputy Secretary of State. His basic premise is that when states are utilizing coercive forms of diplomacy (most notably containment) divisions among their adversaries are actually a disadvantage rather than an advantage. He demonstrates this by looking at America's efforts to contain the "revisionist" communist alliance during the Cold War period. Disagreements between Moscow and Beijing often caused the two to try to outdo each other in supporting revolutions such as the one in Vietnam. From the perspective of American policy makers, this made the Communist alliance "worse than a monolith."
After the introduction, in which Christensen lays out his theoretical framework, he spends two chapters describing how poor coordination in both the Communist and Free Worlds created misperceptions on both sides, especially during the Korean War. The fourth chapter covers the mid 1950s when the Sino-Soviet alliance was relatively harmonious and demonstrates how this worked to America's advantage. The fifth and sixth chapters describe how Sino-Soviet rivalry made containing the communist threat more difficult for the United States. Chapter 7 examines the post-Cold War period and looks at how alliances have continued to impact the Sino-American relationship. Finally, the last chapter describes the applicability of Christensen's thesis to other scenarios.
Christensen's research is generally very strong. He is up to date on the secondary source literature and uses a wide array of American and Chinese primary source documents. He does not use the most recent materials to be declassified by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which deal with the period between 1960 and 1965 but this is likely because these materials first became available when his book was already in press. Some of these could have helped with the few sections of the book that feel a little bit skimpy such as his description of PRC support for the Pathet Lao during the early 1960s.
The final section of the book where Christensen discusses the applicability of his theoretical framework for other case studies is somewhat less persuasive than most other parts of the book. Here, the author doubtless intended to be somewhat speculative. But he might have been better off writing a more focused conclusion that discusses the broader implications of his research for international relations and American diplomacy. Nevertheless, this is a rigorously argued, keenly intelligent books that will interest serious students of the Cold War, American foreign policy, and U.S.-Asian relations.