A good addition to the corpus of historical literature about America's most horrendous war and tragedy.
Oates' treatment of Lee, Longstreet, et al, at Gettysburg is solid and well-documented. To consider as a "popular Civil War myth" Longstreet's sulking, insubordinate, and ultimately devastating performance at Gettysburg, as another reviewer does, is an opinion, and an innacurate one at that--and if Glenn Tucker believes as such, he is misguided as well.
Our day is replete with "historians" who amass selective mountains of facts and figures to arrive at the pre-ordained, and often incorrect, conclusions they desire. Glenn Tucker, Alan Nolan, and Michael Shaara notwithstanding, "Old Pete" Longstreet demonstrated an obstinate lack of cooperation with and support for his commanding officer's orders at Gettysburg, as well as a half-hearted effort at positioning his First Corps for battle on the second day of that engagement--all the while urging Lee on to Longstreet's own course of action that Lee wisely considered and rejected.
Lee wanted an early morning attack on the second day--not the third. His mistake was in placing similar trust in lesser corps commanders like Longstreet and Ewell as he had in Stonewall Jackson. On the evening of the first day at Gettysburg, Lee said, with Longstreet present, "If the enemy is there in the morning, I mean to attack him." The enemy was there, Longstreet had abundant time to get his men there, and Stonewall Jackson would not have needed a picture drawn for him (Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, etc.)--nor would he have rebelled against the authority over him.
The Confederates came within an eyelash of overruning the Federals on the second day at Gettysburg. Without the eight hours or so of additional preparation time provided Meade's army by Longstreet's foot-dragging, what do you think would have been the result?