Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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5.0 out of 5 stars
One of the best books about WW2, 6 Dec 2007
This is one of the most interesting books I have read about WW2. It draws attention to an often overlooked battle - for the High and Low Vosges as the American army approached the borders of Germany towards the end of 1944 and the start of 1945. But this is not the author's only area of interest. He also bursts the myth of the Wermacht's invincibility, the myth of its doctrinal flexibility as superior to that of its (in this case) American opponents.
As the title of the book suggests, the battle for the Vosges was one which favoured neither side, yet historically, was a minor disaster for the Germans. The mountain and hill ranges of the High and Low Vosges presented a defender with a near ready-made defence. The weather was completely unsuitable for air support. Yet perhaps surprisingly, the German forces failed miserably to defend the area effectively against the Americans. The failure was compounded by the hopeless `Nordwind' counter offensive that the Germans launched.
The numbers on each side were relatively similar. The quality of the forces were not, but then the Germans did have an overwhelming defensive advantage in the mountains and hills. The Americans had mostly experienced infantry divisions, with some armoured support (which in the event did not prove that useful due to the terrain). The Germans had a large number of "Volksgrenadier" divisions - lightly manned, thrown together units made up of the shattered remains of other units and scraped together home guard. But one or two of these units were well trained, and quite capable - given intelligent and capable leadership. These were backed up by a handful of SS and panzer units.
The author's argument is that the Germans lost not because they were outnumbered, or lacked equipment and resources, but because they ignored their own doctrines, and failed to give time to their Volkstruum units to train together. At the start of the book, the author demonstrates how similar the American and German doctrines were. On paper therefore, the Germans should have fought more or less the same as the Americans. But what actually happened was that the Germans got sloppy and lazy. The volksgrenadier divisions were often not given time to gel together, with one or two exceptions. But the main problem was that the defences were created ineptly, and the counter offensives even more so. Wermacht doctrine outlines from experience how a defensive line should be constructed, with set distances between outposts, main lines of resistance, and reinforcements. These were ignored, with the predictable result that the defences were overcome. The counter-offensive doctrines indicated that an offensive should be launched after extensive recon of the enemy territory to obtain knowledge of enemy positions and suitability of terrain for tanks, etc. Before the Norwind offensive, none of this was done. The German commanders launched frontal attacks, presumably expecting surprise and élan to win the day. The result was that most units involved in Norwind barely got past their starting positions.
On the other hand, the majority of the American units seemed to be quite competently handled. The only exception was in a couple of cases - and in one of them, the author goes to some lengths to point out that this unit had been thrown together. The conclusion the author draws from the battle for the Vosges is that if an army ignores its own doctrines, then it can expect to do very poorly. The quality of the troops and the defensive advantages of the nilled by the German failure to operate in accordance with them. The fact that the Germans gave a bloody nose a couple of months before to the Americans in the Hurtgen Forest only demonstrates this point further.
The lazy assumptions made about the armies of WW2 is that the German army was consistently the best, followed by the Americans and Soviets, with the British a little further behind and the Italians with the wooden spoon. But what this book and other intelligent analysis of WW2 do (such as works by Carlo D'este and Robin Neillands) is really get to the roots of the matter. Certainly, some armies by their doctrine, equipment and organisation have advantages over others, but their existence does not guarantee against poor management and generalship.
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