Western Warfare In The Age Of The Crusades, 1000-1300 (Warfare and History) [Paperback]

John France, as a military historian, may not have the recognition or popularity of an author such as John Keegan, but for the period of which he writes his work is no less valuable and perhaps more historically exact. This is a historical text, and those readers who have been attracted to the period by more popularizing authors such as Runciman may find this work, if more accurate, containing greater detail than sought. Nonetheless, this book is written with clarity and concision, and in this respect is an improvement over France's earlier and equally significant work "Victory in the East."

Revealing the largely proprietorial interests that motivated the warfare of this period, as well as the limited scope and ad hoc nature of its engagement, France does much to dismiss the formerly held image of early medieval warfare being epitomized by the massed charge of armored knights with lances couched. Not that such tactics did not occur, but more that warfare of the period was much more determined by circumstances that often precluded this practice's effectiveness, as well as the fact that much of the warfare of this period was predicated upon raiding and skirmishing in which military experience was based upon small conflicts and individual combat, where full-scale battle was more often than not eschewed in favor of limited engagements. And the social elements that influenced the makeup of a levy contributed to a decentralization of both leadership and constituency that often insured that when engaged, battle was hardly the set piece a tactician might envision. With the exception of household knights, most armies were composed of troops with varying degrees of training and experience, the former's loyalty tied to their individual lords, and the latter's reliability far from certain. With leadership based upon individual and often independent nobles of varying talent and experience whose value and ability to lead were often predicated upon notions of personal valor, the armies of this period were difficult to control and form, and their expected performance on the battlefield at best uncertain. Battle, when engaged, came about as often as not through accident, and could easily devolve into isolated islands of combat. Tight formation and precision of maneuvers were to wait until the more professional and standing armies of the 14th century, and it was not until this period that the massed charge of cavalry was to become standard. While at times this tactic was used effectively and with success---most notably in the East---during this period in Europe its use was often incidental and the results unpredictable. The use of siege and raiding were more often the norm.

This is an excellent book that offers far more than the comments above indicate. It examines not only the social, economic, political, and religious elements that contributed and informed the warfare of the period, but the armaments and changes in military practice---slight in comparison to other periods they may be---that defined warfare in the early Middle Ages. This book should be a must for any serious reader of the period.

First posted on Amazon.co.uk on 26 January 2012

This book is a rare gem. Within less than 240 pages (not counting the annexes), John France has come up with a complete and very accessible overview of medieval warfare from the beginning of the 11th to the end of the 13th century (1000-1300). This therefore covers both warfare in Europe and in the Middle East (the book's last chapter). This is perhaps not the most comprehensive book on warfare at the time of the Crusades but it certainly one of the clearest and of the most accessible for all.

Each of the 15 chapters makes at least one (if not several) major points. The first chapter, for instance, is titled "proprietorial warfare" and explains why medieval warfare was generally small-scale - raids and skirmishing rather than set battles and major sieges, with the two latter being somewhat exceptional. The second chapter is a superb summary on the weapons used, but also of troop types. The third one, although short, is just as good on technology, numbers, transport and logistical limitations. The last chapter - on Crusading warfare specifically - neatly summarizes in some 25 pages the contents of both Smail and Marshall. Note that the bibliography is just as good: it does not include everything, of course, but all the main references are there.

More generally, one of the book's strongest points is to include, alongside the strictly military elements, all elements related to society, the economic environment etc... From cover to cover, this book is a necessary starting point for anyone studying Western warfare between 1000 and 1300 or simply anyone interested in the topic. It very much deserves its 5 stars.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading Western Warfare. One of my favourite periods of history to study is Medieval Europe and I like medieval arms and armour. So France's book was a great addition to my limited knowledge on the topic.

France's main angle is to present the centrality of landholding to medieval society and warfare. With no kingdoms in existence local lords and nobles were in charge of their own lands and had to possess the strength and resources to maintain their land. Kings existed but their power was very limited and often they were on equal footing with their wealthiest vassals. Land was divided into tiny fiefdoms and any one noble had control of several areas, often spread out and not adjoining areas. Each noble typically owed vassalage to multiple lords, in a complicated web of alliances. For instance a count could give homage and support to both the King of France and the King of England and think it perfectly normal.

The nobles built castles and fortifications to act as defensive posts, but also as offensive posts to attack a neighbor. Medieval warfare tended to occur on a very small scale, raids and ravage and small skirmishes occurred far more often than large scale pitched battles. In pitched battles mounted troops, the knights and sergeants, always worked best when combined with large numbers of infantry. Sieges were the common tactic employed. Nobles tried to avoid bloodshed if possible and achieve victory through intimidation or treaty.

France includes chapters on the slow and uneven innovations in weapons, armour, and siege engines. Some localities advanced faster than others, and it took a long time for any one technique or improvement to become common practice. He overviewed the changes to castles and fortifications, from dirt mounds with wooden structures to small stone structures, to the huge sprawling city-defending castles with huge protective walls, like the Edwardian Conwy Castle in Wales. Initially kings were the only ones with the wealth to build in stone but eventually the nobles could afford modest stone structures as well. He also has chapters on the development of cavalry, infantry, the confusing use of mercenaries, and the necessary qualities in a good military commander.

In the final chapters he outlines how the European mindset fared and adapted to warfare in the Middle East during the Crusades. Cavalry became more central in the Holy Land, as much land was desert, there was limited water, and much distance to cross between locations. The First Crusade fared so well, in France's estimation, because the troops had had a long walk through Europe and Asia Minor and had actually managed to form a high level of cohesion, as compared to most medieval military expeditions. The huge force was governed by a council of lords, each strong and trusted by their men. The common goal of Jerusalem, mixed with shared suffering along the way, helped forge them into a united group. Granted there were still problems and bickering, but compared to other small scale military endeavors of the time, the fact that they succeeded in reaching their destination and had a successful mission owes much to the cohesion that developed. Some of the European "codes" of warfare were carried over into the Middle East, such as ransoming the aristocracy.

In summary, during the Middle Ages Europe was a land governed by warfare. The landowners fought to defend their holdings and expand their territory and influence. Wealth was measured in land, so the families with the most land were the richest. They could afford the best weapons, horses, weapons, and could hire the most troops to fight for them. Though existing sources are rather sparse France used what was available and provided a good introduction to the topic of medieval warfare.