War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 [Paperback]

How do I start this review ?
I guess the first thing would be the recommendation to buy it. The read is easy and flowing. Easy, in that it is gripping and holds you, flowing in that as a history piece, it never becomes stodgy or bogged down.I would also say that I found this book to be tremendous value at the price as well. 580 pages for a few pounds in paperback.

The book provides an account of the opening months of Barborossa and does not, unlike other books on 'Barborossa' then file off to the years after. This book sticks with the opening operation, and the German attempt to knock out the Soviet Union quickly and in a series of co-ordinated hammer blows. Where the book or Mr Kershaw differs from other titles is that, not only is there the strategic overview, but we also get accounts of selected tactical encounters (rather than the strategic), and many letters and diary entries from soldiers serving. Most of these eye witness accounts are German, but Soviet offerings are included as well. Mr Kershaw does not then fall into the trap of "Well Corporal so and so who was there said this, so this must be true". He keeps these entries purely as embellishment, and as colouring of the subject he is trying to impart.

Despite having read many books on the subject matter, this was the first I have seen to concentrate on one of the first German obstacles, Brest-Litovsk. I was surprised to find out just how tough a nut this was to crack. But the main thrust of the book for me was the highlighting of the German Army's massive and quite frankly, unprecedented victories that kept bleeding themselves dry, or as Mr Kershaw put it from the translated German "Victoring itself to death".

and this seemed to be the main problem. Despite inflicting 2.1 million irretrievable casualties on the Red Army over 6-8 months, German losses, though nowhere near as high were simply not replaceable in military terms. Tanks, soldiers, experienced officers as well as other equipments too, could simply not got to the Front quickly enough or in quantity enough, especially as the front got further and further away from the Western border.

Memorable highlights of the book for me would be:
The unimaginable tenacity required to keep fighting in the bitterest cold of -40 degrees at times !
Some of the indecision of the German High Command as to where the main schwerpunkt (point of concentration) should be.
The Russian command's regular ineptitude and lack of care of losses taken.
The pure violence exhibited by both sides on the enemy and civilians (yes both sides on civilians).
This truly was the Ali v Frazier contest of all wars.... nothing could ever be comparable, and though I hate to say it, puts the Western effort very much as a sideshow (read "Europe At War - Norman Davies).

If I had anything to say against the book, I would post two arguments. First, I would take issue with solely blaming Hitler for the things that went militarily wrong in the first year. I think the German High Command made a few indecisive mistakes before he intervened, and Alan Clark in his 'Barborossa' makes a good case as to where Hitler could actually be credited with helping to save the Wehrmacht in the winter of 41/42 by keeping it standing despite the winter rather than a suicidal retreat with millions of Soviets on their tails.
To be fair, I think Mr Kershaw swings on both sides of the coin on this one, and for me did not come down on one side or the other TOO obviously.

The other point I would make is that this book is for me, really an accompanament to perhaps a more 'clinical' history on the subject. What I mean by this is that there are other books that give a much more sterile miliary overview of the battles, and leave you in no doubt as to where each division and corps were. 'War Without Garlands' does not entirely attempt that because it enters other spheres of importance that come into the story, including the 'Human interest' stories that so enrich this tome. That being the case, I would have to say that this is not a completely purist Military overview of the campaign...... it has other depth to it that you will not read in other offerings.

A fantastic read ! The first I've read of Robert Kershaw's, and have now been moved to buy other books by him. Thanks Robert ;-)

An outstanding account of the first six months of the Russo-German war from June 1941 onwards which I would heartily recommend to anyone interested in World War II and the Eastern Front campaign.

This book combines text on strategy and operations of Operation Barbarossa with an enormous amount of 'worm's-eye' view experiences of German soldiers, with a good balance of coverage.

I read this very readable book, over 550 pages, in only two sittings. Particularly interesting to me were the experiences conveyed in the text of the German army, firstly, in the period immediately preceding June 22nd 1941, the moment of invasion into Russia, and, secondly, of the German army infantry's progressive discomfort during its long distance march further and further into the Soviet Union. I am sure there are many other individual battle experiences that others will find interesting to read.

There are some very useful maps of strategic and tactical operations.

An index to these maps somewhere in the book would have been useful but this omission did not detract from my reading experience.

I have studied the Second World War for the last fifty years and in that time, there have been some dramatic shifts in perception. In the early days,the German Army, via Blitzkreig,was seen as all conquering. Only the mud then snow before Moscow stopped the Wermacht from defeating Russia. In his book, Mr Kershaw goes a long way to rectifying this falacy. Far from being the mechanised route march to round up hapless Russian prisoners,portrayed by earlier authors, Barbarossa was a titanic struggle from the off. The Wermacht began to suffer serious casualties from day one and despite being far more oganised than their Russian foe, could not afford the casualty rates involved. Indivdual soldiers in their letters home began to express grave doubts about the outcome. Despite massive encirclements at Kiev,Minsk & Smolensk,capturing almost one and three quarter million Russian prisoners in the process,the cost to the German Army was unexpectedly horrendous. Mr Kershaw's forte is his ability to combine grand strategy with a selection of personel letters that reflect the serious doubts of the individual Landser. Whilst the Nazi Party apparatus trumpeted colossal victories,these letters tell of Divisons down to twenty tanks and Companies down to single figures with little or no prospect of immediate reinforcement and all this in the first six months. I cannot recall any other book that demonstrates more starkly the absolute folly of the German invasion of Russia. A superb book.