War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars [Paperback]

This is an important memoir of the two Iraq wars. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, was a member of the National Security Council advising President George H.W. Bush on Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. He was later a State Department adviser to Colin Powell on the second Iraq war in 2003. He viewed the first war as a "war of necessity" that we had to wage to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait; he viewed the second war as a "war of choice" where the objectives kept changing. In both roles, Haass sought to speak truth to power. In the second case, power didn't listen when he urged that we defer the invasion and give smart sanctions a chance to work.
The book is a poignant personal memoir as well, as Haass ties his connection to powerful historic events with dramatic changes in his own life--marriage and career decision.
All who lived through this cataclysmic period should read this highly readable and riveting book.

Richard Haass brings a unique perspective by having been involved directly in many aspects of the planning of the two gulf wars. During the first Bush administration he was more of an insider than in the second administration, but in both cases he was working directly with the likes of Powell, Rice, Bush I and II, etc.

This is essentially a personal memoir pivoted around the two wars, which were the most important events in the author's career as a policy expert and diplomat. As such, the conclusions about the wars are pretty conventional, i.e. the first war was justified and necessary, while the second one was not. What is more interesting are the little details and stories about the various government meetings and diplomatic trips.

Ultimately I found the book hard to read; it just did not draw me in. I like books that have illustrations, photos or charts, and chapters that are well organized by topic. This book was just an unbroken linear narrative, much of it filled with minute details of meetings between people whose names I didn't care to know.

I would recommend this book only to die-hard foreign policy junkies. The rest of us may found it a little dry and boring, with little original insights into the wars.

The author was a high placed advisor in the George H. W Bush (Bush I) administration and was in the inner circle of the decision makers during Gulf War I (GW I). He was part of an influential think tank during the Clinton Administration. During Gulf War II (GW II)the author was again a part of the administration, but a secondary player in the state department. He was not part of the inner circle of decision makers. Thus, the author was much closer to the decisions during Gulf War I, but much further away during Gulf War II. In a way I think it made the book somewhat uneven, because his insights into GW I were much better than GW II. None-the-less, the book is excellent in nearly every respect. I disagree with the author's reasoning about GW II, but that in no way detracts from the author's analysis of the two wars.

Mr. Haass's insights into the cost of ongoing crisis are invaluable. My own research for my Master's Degree substantiate his thoughts about exhaustion and poor decisions. My research confirms that after a rather short period of time under stress, people start making errors, and those errors increase exponentially as time goes on. The author makes this point strongly, and those in power (as well as us common folk) need to pay close attention to this insight. There are several such insights in this book, and those alone are worth the price of admission. His personal insights about the costs of government employment are fun (his postponed honeymoon).

As a diplomat, the author believes in assembling large numbers of partners before going forward in the international realm, and he feels working through international organizations is also necessary - not just desirable. As such, he feels the US went about putting together the first Gulf War correctly. The war was supported by the international community, the UN was behind the effort, the effort was limited, and the war achieved its purpose without high US costs. The fact that our enemy began breaking the agreements after the war was over was no reason to start another, because the breaches were not all that significant.

Gulf War II was an unnecessary war, and one that should have been avoided, according to the author. He feels the second war should have been avoided because a good analysis would have shown its risks, and it would have shown what was to be gained was much less than hoped for. The fact that the international community wanted nothing to do with the second war was a key indicator that we were doing something wrong. He also fears that to reach any kind of acceptable result in GW II, the US will have to be in Iraq for decades and expend enormous amounts of money. At this point in time, his prediction looks accurate.

The best thing about the author is his ability to admit his errors. Most unusual in a government official. Plus, he sets the record straight about Bush II lying or otherwise misleading people about the purposes for GW II. The author simply believes the administration was mislead by its own philosophy and its own inability to see the usefulness of taking another road to control Iraq. The author's perceptions into how government operates are terrific.

Good book.

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