A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9 [Hardcover]

British intervention in Iraq was a war of choice, not a war of necessity. As early as 1999 Tony Blair argued it was legitimate for one country to intervene in the affairs of another. This fitted in with New Labour's "ethical" foreign policy, a policy which unravelled almost immediately when it transpired the Foreign and Commonwealth Office knew about an arms deal with the deposed President of Sierra Leone contrary to a United Nations embargo. Prior to New Labour focus was was on the defence of Europe, Blair switched this to one of expeditionary warfare and rapid deployment into war zones and humanitarian crises. This laid the foundation for Blair's self-belief that he was a player on the world stage. Blair himself "more than any other figure, drove the country to war."

He received support from Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College - and now a member of the Iraq Inquiry - who argued the removal of Saddam's regime would enable Britain to wield more influence in Iraq and the Middle East generally. This was based on the premise that force has to be combined with political, socio-economic and cultural leverage. However, as logistics expert Tim Cross discovered a month before the war began, there was no post-war plan for Iraq. The issue had not been high on the agenda when Blair attached himself to Bush's coat tails. Blair set three conditions for British involvement which "reflected his preference for grand strategic thinking and preoccupation with the media". He wanted time to convince the electorate who were opposed to war and overcome the skepticism of the Cabinet. After meeting with Bush at Crawford, Blair spoke of "regime change" although the United Nations' founding charter stated that, "no country can invade another unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the United Nations." Britain and the United States both pushed for a second UN resolution to justify the invasion but realising they would not get one acted without UN approval and contrary to the UN Charter.

Jack Straw, who claimed he could have stopped the war, told the Cabinet evidence that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was "thin" and Attorney General Peter Goldsmith wrote 'that current intelligence suggested there "would not be any ground for considering Iraqi use of WMD as imminent.'" Clare Short was adamant she would not support an invasion unless the UN authorised it then temporised in the hope she could influence the post-war situation. Robin Cook made no such compromise and resigned. Whether Peter Goldsmith was forcibly held by his lapels to make him change his mind will never been known but the senior legal adviser to the US National Security Council John Bellinger boasted, "We had a problem with (Goldsmith) who was telling us it was legally doubtful under international law. We straightened him out." Alistair Campbell was doing the same to dissenting ministers.

Blair had already privately pledged his support to Bush no matter what the evidence showed. His deception had serious consequences. The Ministry of Defence asked for 37,000 suits of body armour in September 2002 but these were only ordered in November which left British troops unprotected during the invasion. Cross noted Blair was running on adrenaline believing he was "at the zenith of his power, the world statesman who had put Britain at the heart of the American war on terror and who was now marching bodly with his allies to confront the enemies of Western liberalism." Seven years later when Blair faced the Iraq Inquiry "he struck a defiant pose saying he did not regret the war or its aftermath" a line adopted by his cohorts Alistair Campbell and Jonathan Powell. His motive, his memoir revealed, was "he had no intention of giving the newspapers a headline such as "Blair Apologies For War". "At Last He Says Sorry."

He was not the only politician for whom power outweighed responsibility. In 2003 six Red Caps, lacking ammunition and a satellite telephone, were murdered by a mob in Majar al-Kabir police station. A Board of Inquiry concluded the deaths were "not preventable". It was a predictable cover-up, faciliated by the Minister of Defence, Geoff Hoon, who denied the families access to the report until thirty minutes before he met with them. Reg Keys, whose son was one of the Red Caps, stood against Blair in the 2005 election, polling ten per cent of the vote. Ignored by Blair, Keys told the cameras, "I hope in my heart that one day the prime minister will be able to say sorry". Some hope!

Over time information has emerged which has exposed Blair's deceptions. The "dodgy dossier", the refusal to treat "intelligence" with the skepticism a single source requires. Blair foolishly endorsed Gordon Brown's comment when Britain finally withdrew from Iraq that the war had been a "great success". Presumably the 179 British soldiers who were killed, the 222 who suffered debilitating injuries, the additional 5748 soldiers injured in the conflict would disagree. Many taxpayers would argue that £44.5 billion was too high a financial price to pay for overthrowing Saddam while failing to bring peace to Iraq. Britain's international influence has weakened and Blair's reputation shattered.

Fairweather argues "Blair is not the only one who should shoulder responsibility for Iraq and Afghanistan." He blames the military for providing bad advice and the Ministry of Defence for defending its own turf. Ultimately, responsibility lies for those who wanted war, over-rode opposition to their intentions and the craven politicians who lacked the backbone to oppose their leaders' policies. The recent Libyan campaign suggests the "myth of progress" still prevails in policy-making circles. Fairweather concludes, "until Britain's leaders recognise the limits of intervention, the country is bound to repeat the mistakes of the past." Iraq was one such mistake. Five stars for an outstanding book with extensive notes and bibliography.

As a student of Politics at both Princeton and Oxford, I especially appreciate books that are both academic and readable. Jack Fairweather's "A War of Choice" is one such book. It provides valuable insight into one of the major wars of our time and leaves us questioning the decision-making process that leads to the use of force. It is especially relevant in this day and age where war is becoming increasingly lethal due to modern military advancements. The character portraits and occasionally (darkly) humorous conversation exchanges lend personality to this book, bringing it alive with the feel of the place itself. Fairweather's personal experience as an embedded journalist clearly shines through. It is a great pleasure to read a book that is at once vibrant, informative and beautifully written. It is a highly commendable first book by an excellent journalist and a must read!

This is an impressive read; well structured, knowledgeable and very well researched. The background details and the failings of the British are well laid out, particularly the lack of preparation and exit strategy. It is in the small human details that the book comes alive however. The travails of an Iraqi translator whose story counterpoints the arc of the war, is gripping and makes very clear the human cost of the conflict. An excellent book - highly recommended.