Vietnam: A History [Paperback]

This book represents just that - the best single volume history of the war, in my opinion. The first couple of chapters cover the early history of 'Indochina' and French colonialism, and then the rest of the text covers the history of Vietnam up to ~1980. This breadth of coverage (notably the war under Nixon) is not available in 'Bright Shining Lie' or 'Fire in the Lake' - the best of the other histories of the Vietnam war, and 'Best and the Brightest' is a political history.

The chapter structure is logical and the writing style maintained my interest throughout the book. It won the Pulitzer, so why write more? A wonderful history book.

I have just finished this remarkable book and believe it to be the most comprehensive, lucid and beautifully written history books I have ever had the pleasure of reading.

The book covers the history of Vietnam including life before the French, life under the French and then the increasing US involvement culminating in the devastating war. The narrative flows beautifully and the author does not patronise his readers, but cleverly finds a style of writing that assumes intelligence of the reader, but no in-depth knowledge of the subject.

The book is also shocking in the revelations about how both the French and US underestimated the Vietnamese sense of nationalism. The direction of the war under LBJ and Nixon is shocking and it gives an incredible insight into the hawks and doves of Washington.

This book deserves to be read by the widest possible audience. It is authoratative without being biased or sensationalist. I would heartily recommend this book and would also concur with a fellow reviewer that this is really the only book you would want or need to read on this subject.

...at least the one in the 20th Century, was fought over this country, and the ramifications reverberate today. There were those who saw, and those who will never see. Those who lived through that period, and took sides in one camp or the other are unlikely to ever change their minds, even if the motivation took the form of the proverbial lightning bolt on the way to Damascus. And certainly one book is unlikely to do it, as evidenced by some of the other reviews, particularly the 1 and 2-star ones. However, for the "younger generations," those who look back on the ancient events of America's involvement in Vietnam as they might the Peloponnesian Wars, and want to read just one book, this one would be it, the sine qua non of books on Vietnam, covering both the prelude to American involvement, as well as the entire war to the end, in 1975.

Stanley Karnow is a reporter of astonishing erudition. He combines the first-hand knowledge that comes from the "field work," with a scholarly appreciation of the historical forces at work. Like other soldiers who were in the war, I've had my problems with reporters, and what they chose to see and report. Karnow neatly addresses the issue of page 279, when he reports an exchange between Peter Arnett of the Associated Press (and later famous for his coverage from Baghdad of the '91 war) and Admiral Felt. Arnett had asked Felt a hard question after the Battle of Ap Bac, and Felt shot back: "Get on the team." All too many did, buying the line that was peddled at what even they would call "the Five O'clock Follies," the spin the America military would put on the war each day for press consumption. Karnow was one of the courageous ones, along with Neil Sheehan, Jonathan Schell, and others, who would report what they saw. But as he sardonically says of others: "Frequently, though, the magazines distorted the dispatches of their reporters and relied instead on guidance from White House...True to their tradition, "Time" and "Life" stood up for America (p 503). In terms of how people "spun" the facts, Karnow quotes Komer about a situation report that was filed, and Komer corrects to say that he was asked to file a PROGRESS report, and thus all the non-progress had to be edited out. (p 515)

Over half of this almost 700 page book is devoted to events prior to the major American military buildup in 1965. It covers the French involvement, from the 1800's through their colonial demise in 1954. Another excellent book on this era is River Road to China: The Search for the Sources of the Mekong, 1866-73 which I recently reviewed. The first chapter of the book is aptly entitled, "The War Nobody Won," (like almost all wars.) It updates the 1983 edition to the early `90's. There are so many valid points to highlight, it is hard to select only a few, but one that has always been particularly infuriating to me was the campaign to give the MIA families the false hope that their loved ones might still be alive in Vietnam; all of which was a pretext for maintaining diplomatic non-recognition of the country. It was an effective campaign, and Karnow cites a "Time" magazine survey published in April, 1990 that showed 62 percent of Americans--and 84% of veterans--maintained that the Vietnamese were holding U.S. captives (p 55). Meanwhile, for all this support of imaginary veterans, the very real ones here in the States were all too often denied treatment for conditions caused by military service, such as the devastating effects from Agent Orange.

Like Sheehan, Karnow excoriates McNamara, the master of "can-doism," and famous for his statement: "every quantitative measurement...shows that we are winning the war" (p 271). Yet the qualitative picture "in the field," that was daily rubbed in the face of the G.I's willing to see was so vastly different. Karnow quotes Mark Smith, formerly of the 1st Cav. Division, who was also fascinated by the physical beauty in Binh Dinh province where I served. Karnow says of Binh Dinh: "...the lush green mountains rose from a plain of rice fields divided with such geometrical precision as to suggest that the peasants who had landscaped the scene were natural mathematicians. And then Karnow quotes Smith, who felt intimidated by the "subtle, incomprehensible villages--whole societies right in front of us, yet impenetrable even after we had entered them, never understanding anything or seeing anything understandable, the people staring at us as if we were from Mars." (p 482).

As for those who didn't see, it would be hard to top the statement made by someone who hide in the Texas Air National Guard during the war. During President Bush's "diplomatic" visit to Vietnam, he told the Vietnamese that the "lessons" of the Vietnam War are that if we had stayed long enough, we would have won! As for the "lessons" that one of those who did see, Karnow, said, and it was reported in this month's "Newsweek": When the commanding general of American and Allied forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal asked: "Is there anything we learned in Vietnam that we can apply to Afghanistan?" Karnow's reply was just as simple: "The main thing I learned is that we never should have been there in the first place."

Truly excellent advise for Afghanistan as well. This book is more than a 5-star read, it should be required reading for all American students.

(Note: Review first published at Amazon, USA, on November 23, 2009)