V-1 Flying "Buzz" Bomb, 1942-52: Hitler's Infamous "Doodlebugs" (New Vanguard) [Illustrated] [Paperback]

Military technical expert Stephen J. Zaloga delivers another excellent summary of a major weapons program in Osprey's New Vanguard #106, V-1 Flying Bomb 1942-52. As usual, Zaloga delivers the commonly known facts with incisive comments, while also offering insights into the lesser-known facets of the program. While the German V-1 rocket program has certainly received considerable attention from other writers, few readers will be aware that US, French and Soviets were all flying copies of the weapons after the war. On the other hand, Zaloga's conclusion that the V-1 program was not only a failure but one that actually hurt the German war effort appears based upon either specious information or faulty analysis. Nevertheless, Zaloga's volume on the V-1 is well worth having since there is a considerable amount of information packed into these pages.

Zaloga begins with a background section on the antecedents of the V-1 program and the early prototype tests. The author makes interesting observations about how the German Luftwaffe felt that it needed a rocket program of its own to compete with the Army's V-2 program, and the V-1 fit the bill of quickly fielding a competitor (file this under bureaucratic motivations for weapons programs). The rocket motor technology used in the V-1 was much simpler than that used in the V-2, although even by 1944 the pulse-jet technology of the V-1 was approaching a dead-end (the engine virtually shook itself to death by the end of its short flight of only 130 miles). On the other hand, the V-1 was ready to deploy by late 1943 but Allied bombing and German mismanagement delayed its combat debut until June 1944. Nagging technical problems with the gyroscopes and fuel-pressure system limited the V-1s performance further, and also made it easier for the rocket to be shot down by aircraft. Zaloga notes that British intelligence had a pretty good read on the V-1 program and bombed the deployment sites and factories mercilessly, but this only delayed the onset of the robot bombardment of London. Zaloga details the ground launches from France and the Low Countries, as well as the air-launches over the North Sea. The author also provides tables detailing V-1 production by month, the Crossbow bombing campaign, the organization of the V-1 launch units as well as diagrams of launch sites and the rocket in various configurations.

Zaloga notes that the V-1 cost about $2,000 each, compared with about $50,000 for a V-2 and $100,000 for a medium bomber. Over 30,000 V-1s were built and they killed over 10,000 people, including about 1,000 Allied military personnel. Zaloga says, "in retrospect, the V-1 was a far more cost effective weapon than the V-2 in terms of the much smaller cost of developing, manufacturing, and employing the missile." However, Zaloga believes that the V-1 program hurt the German war effort, saying "the warheads of the V-weapons consumed the equivalent of half the total explosive consumption of the entire Wehrmacht in the critical months of July, August and September 1944 ...at a time when the fate of the Third Reich was in the balance, the V-weapons were wasting more than half of the available explosives to kill a thousand British and Belgian civilians a month." Apparently, Zaloga is suggesting that the 7,700 tons of high explosive that went into producing warheads for the V-1s in this 3-month period so depleted Germany of critical munitions that the war was lost. This assertion is ridiculous on many levels (and very atypical of the normally very precise Zaloga), starting with the basic fact that Germany was manufacturing over 100,000 tons of munitions per month in this period, so the V-1 program used no more than 2-3% of the German output of explosives, not 50%. In fact, German explosives production fell in late 1944 because Allied bomber raids on the synthetic fuel plants, which led to a reduction in the output of nitrogen for explosives (German agriculture was also using 50% of the nitrogen production in 1944, which could have gone for explosives). The Allied post-war strategic bombing survey clearly spells this linkage out and Zaloga's assertion that it was the V-1 program that was the culprit for the ammunition shortage is specious.

The V-1 program needs to be put in strategic perspective but Zaloga does not do this. While British bomber raids on Berlin often lost 30-40 bombers and over 300 aircrew to kill a few hundred German civilians, the V-1s accomplished strategic bombardment without risking German lives, at less cost and with at least as much accuracy as British night raids achieved (which often missed Berlin entirely). If killing civilians was the goal, the V-1s did it better than the very expensive British Bomber Command. However, the V-1 had a strategic effect that Zaloga does not mention - the bombardment of London so angered Churchill that Eisenhower was pressured to let Montgomery clear out the V-1 launch sites in London. Thus, the V-1 campaign led to the disastrous Operation Market-Garden and the virtual destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division - not bad for $60,000 worth of rockets. Without the V-1 program, there would have been much less justification for Monty's drive into Holland and Patton might have gotten enough supplies (and the airborne troops) to crack the West wall in 1944. Thus, it is quite possible that the V-1 program actually prolonged the war, albeit only for a few months.

This book deals with the V-1 Flying Bomb,from its inception,its development,and its strugle to become an operational weapon of terror.This is a very short paged book with excellent color diagrams and period b/w photos;a good introductory book.