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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Only what is true explains what happens, 2 April 2009
This review is from: Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (Hardcover)
Alone it stands, assailed on all sides by priests and postmodernists and prophets and pseudoscientists and practitioners of public relations, how are we ever going to approach a word like "truth" in its solitary majesty? With a philosopher like Simon Blackburn at your side, and with this brilliant book in your hand. The difference between him and them is the degree of commitment to reason, the degree to which obfuscation is avoided and the temptation to hide behind jargon is resisted. Blackburn could easily dazzle most of us with technical arguments, but he wants to clarify, not mystify, and he succeeds. This book is about a "war of ideas and attitudes... not only between different people, but grumbling within the breast of each individual": today, are we a believer, a sceptic, a cynic, a rationalist, an absolutist, a relativist? And tomorrow? Many of us will sensibly shrug off such labels, but we should not and we do not shrug off questions about truth: it matters if "politicians claim that some country has weapons of mass destruction when they know that it does not, or if NASA says that a shuttle is safe" when it is not.
Chapter 1 - "Faith, Belief and Reason" - draws in three more similarly abused and important terms. While this might seem to be multiplying our difficulties before we have begun, these are all connected and their meanings interdependent. People either give reasons for or have faith in the truth of any particular belief. That sounds simple, inclusive and nicely symmetrical, and surely covers all bases. The harmony is an illusion. The absolutist, often of a religious temperament, cannot resist the allure of dogma, while relativism "chips away at our right to disapprove of what anybody says." Both sides bicker over questions of authority. Blackburn's opening sentences hold out the promise of finding a way through this maze: "There are real standards... We must not believe that anything goes."
Indeed, we "have a duty to believe carefully, in the light of reason alone" as the following story illustrates. A shipowner who acquires "a sincere and comfortable conviction" that his vessel is thoroughly safe and seaworthy, and who ignores any doubts to the contrary, is putting his trust in a higher power and putting his passengers at risk when he allows the vessel to sail. His belief in the safety of his ship has not been earned "in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts."
This is from the essay "The Ethics of Belief" by William Clifford, who argues that it is always morally wrong to take an intellectual shortcut and believe on faith alone. Blackburn agrees. Someone "sitting on a completely unreasonable belief is sitting on a time bomb. The apparently harmless, idiosyncratic belief of the Catholic Church that one thing may have the substance of another" (transubstantiation, a process still believed to fuel the Eucharist) "although it displays absolutely none of its empirical qualities, prepares people for the view that some people are agents of Satan in disguise, which in turn makes it reasonable to destroy them." Lack of faith is not a deficiency, and a refusal "to believe something is not a kind of faith." I would argue in addition that a lifetime of exposure to such false beliefs corrodes our powers of critical thought. How else to explain Cormac Murphy-O'Connor's recent assertion that secularists are not "fully human"?
"Making ourselves gullible or credulous, we lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them" and risk "sinking back into savagery". Children, who are naturally open to all sorts of beliefs and have their lives before them, must therefore be protected from their own credulity just as we protect them from running into the road. An important first step is to recognize that children "are born human beings, but nothing else."
Blackburn has a wonderful way of bringing a discussion about truth down to earth and can write the kind of sentence you're unlikely to find elsewhere: "we do not have to resort to dark forces to explain my status as an announcer of butter". He believes there is butter in the fridge because he has opened the door and seen it. What's more, since the age of around four, when we ceased to be self-centred realists, we have all known that it is possible for others to hold a false belief about there being butter in the fridge - if we have eaten it and not owned up! This appreciation of truth is not metaphysical speculation but an ordinary part of being a functioning human being. No one is "born a Muslim, or a Hindu, or a Jew" but we are all born with the potential to work out what is true and what is not true without recourse to supposed higher powers. A just and humane society must nurture and not extinguish such potential.
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22 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Is the world a certain way, or can we only see a point of view?, 9 Aug 2006
By John Smeltzer - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: Truth: A Guide for the Baffled (Hardcover)
I had been really thinking about how some people think that the world is a certain way, and how others think that we can only talk about our perspective on it. I had more of the latter perspective, but with a feeling that the former was somehow right too. I couldn't really find a way to reconcile the two except by saying that it's absolutely relative (which seemed more like goofing around than a serious response). I ran across this book serendipitously at the library, and a quick look revealed that the book would be addressing the very issue I had been thinking about. I was a philosophy major so I've been exposed to philosophical writing before. Some reviews before mine allege that he's over analyzing or difficult to read. I think, as far as philosophical writing goes, his writing is fairly accessible. There are good endnotes for follow-up, and he doesn't get too entrenced in specialized language. Someone not familliar with philosophy might have to reference some things (Wikipedia may be a fine place to do so). I think the book is aimed at the non-specialist, and I think it hits the spot. He really does a fine job at explaining where both sides of the issue go wrong, but he's never willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater. The most common criticism of relativism is self-refutation (i.e. if nothing is true then relativism can't be true either), but even though he's not a relativist he shows how this criticism is too simple. He really does have sympathy for both sides of the issue. I think anyone who takes the time to read this book will come out with a much better understanding of the issues, and will have more interesting things to contribute to their conversations than they did before.
16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Decent, 29 Mar 2007
By R. Albin - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: Truth: A Guide (Paperback)
This is an interesting effort to make a general statement of Blackburn's views on epistemology. Aimed at a general audience, Blackburn covers some different aspects of the realist/anti-realist debate including a taxonomy of realist and anti-realist positions and a brief precis of classical skepticism. Blackburn is appropriately skeptical of anti-realism but very cautious about historic realist positions that require strong metaphysical claims. He adopts a position of 'minimalism' which denies strong metaphysical claims but argues that statements carry with them their own criteria of truth. Minimalism turns out to be a surprisingly strong position as the statements that carry their own truth criteria include all of the natural sciences and indeed almost all of routine life. Though this position originates with work of the great logician Frege, it seems almost too good to be true and in Blackburn's relatively simple presentation, a bit of a linguistic trick. Blackburn is better, I think, in his criticism of anti-realist positions. He does a good job of showing the internal contradictions of many attacks on realism. Richard Rorty, in particular, comes in for some pretty stringent (though polite) criticism for attempting to escape some of the logical extensions of his anti-realism by opening a backdoor to what are, de facto, forms of realism. This book has a decent though hardly outstanding bibliography.
17 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
"Old School", Yet Drives To The Heart, 7 July 2006
By Rev. Thomas Scarborough - Published on Amazon.com
This review is from: Truth: A Guide for the Baffled (Hardcover)
At the very heart of this book lies the question of fact and value -- of "is" and "ought". David Hume famously said that it is impossible to derive an "ought" from an "is" (this is called Hume's law).
For instance, one may say that you ARE reading this review -- yet on what rational basis should anyone say that you SHOULD read this review? In fact, on what basis should you do anything at all? To push this yet further, on what basis should courts of law make their decisions - or indeed governments? How does one make the giant leap across the divide, from fact to value? It is a crucial problem, and Blackburn considers it from various angles -- many of them historical.
A secondary question (at least insofar as it does not have the same prominence in the book) is how one may know what in fact "is"? How should one be able to establish the "facts" in the first place?
Generally speaking, Blackburn's writing has explanatory power -- although I did lose the thread at times, particularly where it was assumed that the reader would remember details of the previous chapters. Further than this, what would seem to make the book most worthwhile is Blackburn's ability to think his way into the heart of the problems, and to take one with him. Nor does he veil the real difficulties with premature answers. This has one thinking again and again: "How do we ever get around THIS one?"
In the final analysis, Blackburn is still something of a traditionalist. "We can take the postmodernist inverted commas off things," he concludes. "Truth, reason, objectivity and confidence" are stil very much alive, in spite of some "bewildering" problems. On what basis may we believe this? Blackburn considers: "Once we have an issue to decide, it comes with its own norms." We produce "well mannered animation by whatever is shown to work". This seemed to me not unlike the Polanyian "universal intent" -- the scientific method applied to human action.
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