The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford History of Modern Europe) [Paperback]

"The Transformation of European Politics" has become THE standard text on diplomatic affairs of the 1763-1848. Its sweeping theses capture the reader. Where the book runs into trouble is the author's insistence on the culpability of France and Napoleon for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. According to Schroeder the British and their allies were willing to accept French domination of Western Europe but Napoleon never accepted any limits to his goals and embarked on a campaign of World Conquest. Anything the Brits did to organize coalitions to destroy France was only in response to French aggression, etc. And the Congress of Vienna was the greatest human achievement since man learned to write, despite the fact that it stiffled the development of democracy in Europe. In particular I noticed points where Schroeder selectively uses arguments of older historians, but then fails to use arguments of the same historians which contradict his thesis (Albert Sorel for one). An important work, even if you need to argue against it.

This somewhat dense but well written book is the standard work on European international politics in this period. In many ways a fairly traditional diplomatic history, Schroeder provides a detailed and thoughtful narrative of diplomatic manuvering and the political aspects of wars in the period leading up to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars themselves, the nature of the post-Napoleonic settlement, and European diplomacy from 1815 to 1848. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are a particular focus; out of 17 chapters, 10 are devoted to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

The narrative is detailed and quite readable, though many of the events described are fairly complex. What really distinguishes this book are some of Schroeder's broad interpretations. One important interpretation, which I believe is now accepted generally by historians of this period is that Revolutionary-Napoleonic France would have been accepted by the European state system if not so unremittingly aggressive. Other themes pursued throughout the book are the particular difficulties of the Austrian empire and the emergence of Britain and Russia as geographically peripheral but hegemonic powers. Schroeder's most important interpretation, however, is his argument, reflected in the title, about the metamorphosis of the European state system.

Schroeder argues convincingly that the Napoleonic wars produced a decisive and beneficial change in the European state system. The latter is construed quite broadly as it includes the Ottoman empire and there were connections with the USA and even Persia. Schroeder describes the 18th century balance-of-power system as an instrinsically unstable zero-sum that promoted aggression by the major powers and in which smaller states were continual victims. The experience of great conflict, particularly that provoked by Napoleon, produced a distinctly different system in which great powers restrained themselves in potential conflicts that could produce war, territorial borders were generally respected, and the security of weaker states was respected as essential to to providing buffers between larger states. Schroeder makes this argument quite convincingly and points to the relative success of the Congress of Vienna and the relative durability of European peace up to the 1840s as evidence of the strength of the new system. As a corollary, Schroeder argues also that it is incorrect to see the Congress of Vienna settlement as an attempt to turn back the clock and restore the ancien regime.

While Schroeder's broad interpretation is convincing, there are some limitations in the nature and presentation of his analysis. Because of the unavoidably complex narrative, there is something of a forest for the trees problem for readers in appreciating the evidence for Schroeder's argument. Perhaps more important, Schroeder's narrative tends to omit what may be some important features that probably contributed to the transformation of the state system. One of the reasons for the change of the state system was that these were different states. Led by the French state, this period sees a considerable increase in state power, including war capacity via conscription. In some states, international politics becomes more entangled in domestic politics, somewhat different from the more dynastic nature of most 18th century states. Readers interested in an interesting overview of the changes in European states resulting from the Napoleonic wars should look up Michael Broers interesting book on this topic.

A truly refreshing look into the evolution of European diplomatic history from dynastic politics to cabinet politics to Realpolitik.

A refreshing look into Napoleon as a bumbling egomaniac a captain of the art of war in a sea of mediocrity, and an evil empire builder, despotic and neopotic. A pillager, liar, and bungler who was courting disasters in his every endeavours, only to be saved by his more incompetent, moronic adversaries.

Schroeder also blasts the system of the balance of power amongst the Great Powers (Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, France) as leading to instability, partitions and war, all at the expenses of less powers like Danmark, Poland, Ottoman Empire etc. as each of the Great Powers angled to tilt the balance to its favour.