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3 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Anglophilic and not particularly "fair and balanced", 1 July 2005
Michael Reynolds' book, Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory, is a quite readable piece of literature. Regrettably Monty and Patton is NOT great historical literature. If a reader is looking new revelations or new insights about these controversial leaders he/she will be disappointed - yet to Reynolds' credit he states in his introductory comments that Monty and Patton provides little new information but rather seeks to compare and contrast these men of arms and their lives. In this latter task Reynolds has, in general, done a fine job. Unfortunately much of the prose of Monty and Patton suggests that a less than unbiased approach to the comparisons was made. A reader is likely to walk away from this book believing Reynolds to be a strong Monty-phile. While it would be hard to characterize Reynolds as overtly American-phobic he has much less praise for Patton than Montgomery. In fact in the last few pages of the book while Reynolds is summarizing his treatise he states quite clearly that if given the choice, the choice would not be difficult - he would chose to serve under Monty rather than Patton, hands down. So why might one characterize Reynolds as a Monty-phile? As already mentioned the discussions in the book quite obviously favor Montgomery. Yet, in many ways a comparison of these two men is really like comparing apples and oranges; Monty served as a commander of forces in the Second World War for much longer than Patton and the former always maintained a position of higher authority than the latter. Thus, it is fair to say that most students of history would consider Monty one of the most experienced Allied commanders who is clearly one of the greatest tacticians of the war. On the other hand, for his more limited role, Patton achieved great success (often through tremendous bloodshed of his troops). Thus one cannot merely criticize Reynolds for choosing Monty over Patton on the basis of experience, tactical prowess, and more conservative use of human life (all of which he cites). Yet, when Reynolds gives credit to Montgomery for success achieved by American commanders and soldiers he severely curtails the strength of the book overall. For example, to imply to Montgomery conceived and planned Operation COBRA, which developed into the US First Army breakthrough of late July 44, is to patently mislead and misinform the reader. In reality COBRA was the brainchild of Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commander of 12th Army Group. By giving Montgomery more than deserved credit for COBRA Reynolds minimizes the tactical failure of Monty's brainchild of mid-July - Operation GOODWOOD. End result: Monty smells like a rose and the Americans seem to provide only manpower and resources for British planning. Readers beware, poor history distorts truth and in cases where two commanders of such stature are being compared the outcome becomes inevitably linked to the spin put on history by the writer. In the final analysis, Monty and Patton is a good straightforward read but it lacks the depth and unbiased approach so important for a work of historical literature. Not altogether bad but readers should realize that the "facts" put forth in Reynolds book are not always equivalent to reality. Rating: 2 stars.
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