Hugo Young unashamedly wears his heart on his sleeve in this tome; lauding the merits of European supranationalism and Britain's "destiny" within the Union. It may be perceived and denigrated as unnecessarily partisan and lacking balance, but it shouldn't. I prefer history that is conveyed with a passion and the depth of knowledge that Young brings to this work.
Although Young's reading of events is coloured by his perception of a chronic lack of political short-sightedness, it charts the course of Britain's engagement with the "project" superbly well. There are laments for the neuralgia this relationship has induced, despair at the perceived "visceral" barriers to British engagement and a yearning for the political class to "make the case".
The writing style is sharp, witty and, at times, barbed. The name-calling (of those of a sceptical persuasion, needless it be said!) and the criteria for distinguishing whether one qualifies as sufficiently "European" in Young's lexicon becomes silly and tedious at times. Nevertheless, the chapters flow wonderfully well and Young brings a sense of drama to this historical tale. The device of using a pivotal character is this "play" for each chapter's title as each act unfolds gives a sense of what Young was aiming for, and to my mind, succeeds in achieving.
I would highlight two weaknesses however. Firstly, Young attributes the major change in French attitudes prior to the UK's third (and final) application to join the EC as down to the departure of De Gaulle and the personal chemistry that developed between Heath and Pompidou.
I personally find the arguments advanced in the other key polemic on this subject - The Great Deception - more convincing; namely that by the early 1970s the CAP and latterly, the CFP, had been sufficiently developed to give France a strategic advantage within the EC and that advantageous terms vis-a-vis the UK could be enshrined. Young oddly touches on the "cynicism" in which the CFP was hastily arranged prior to the accession of the UK (and potentially Norway) in 1973 but doesn't run with it.
Secondly, while Young recognizes this is a project for the "political classes" he's unable to produce any cogent argument (to my mind) to reconcile his strong belief in supranationalism with democracy, or the presence of any European demos. His discussions with the then Dutch PM, Lubbers, in the final chapter (concerning the merits of weak leadership and nationalism) seem to confirm the point. In this light, one wonders how he would have viewed the conduct of some leaders concerning the string of referendums and contortions that occurred over the Constitutional/ Lisbon treaty.
Overall though, this is a thoroughly entertaining and informative read.