Although ostensibly written from an Italian perspective, the reader inevitably feels sympathy with the Habsburg armies. Few leaders on the Italian side emerge with any credit, and many of the key figures are downright evil. Italian troops--many of them illiterate peasants who had no idea what they were fighting for--were sacrificed in huge numbers to satisfy the blood-lust of Italy's intellectuals, generals and politicians. One can sympathise with the more conservative elements of Italian society that opposed the war: the Pope, the aristocracy and business leaders joined the workers in opposition to this madness. And Italian war aims were hypocritical--nearly all the areas they wanted to conquer were occupied by foreign people. Which is one reason why the Habsburg armies fought so effectively against them; ethnically, its soldiers were more representative of the areas they were defending. Their general, Boroevic, was a Slovene: like many of the Balkan races, the Slovenes regarded the Empire as their protector. German-speaking Austrians comprised a relatively small percentage of the soldiers fighting Italy. Boroevic, unlike the bone-headed Italian general Cadorna, deployed his forces rationally, and held the Italians to a virtual standstill despite being outnumbered by a ratio of 10 to 4.
However, the Habsburgs had to fight on many fronts, and their economy was backward. By 1917, they were hard-pressed to repel the human waves released by Cadorna--so Germany loaned them seven divisions for a daring counterattack at Caporetto. Edwin Rommel was a major, and with 200 men he captured a string of vital hills where Italian artillery was threatening the Austro-German attack. As Thompson emphasises, he was able to do this because command in the German forces was devolved to the lowest levels, and Rommel was able to exploit opportunities without referring back up the chain of command. Cadorna, by contrast, insisted that all decisions, right down to the lowest level, had to be endorsed by his staff. As a result, he lost his entire 2nd army, and Italian forces were driven back almost all the way to Venice.
Mark Thomson has written a brilliant history of a war, a popular history which doesn't patronise its readers. It's not really a military history: the maps are far too sketchy to satisfy a military historian. But it does put this forgotten conflict into an overall perspective of the times--especially the intellectual forces that created the perverse mentality responsible for this tragedy.