General Smith's book is not one for the feint hearted - but if, like me, you are serving in one of the armed forces that is struggling to re-configure from one built to fight the Cold War but deployed to fight War Among the People, then you need to read it.
I agree with the reviewer who found it hard going, but if you want a thinking soldier's view of how the paradigm has changed and why we must change with it, then you leave this book on the shelf at your peril. It is detailed, but incisive. As for its alleged failure to address in detail the issue of assymetry, the previous reviewer clearly missed the central points of General Smith's thesis - that war as we knew it no longer exists and therefore the concept of assymetry is no longer valid. The author contends that huge armoured formations capable of massing phenomenal combat power became obsolete with the development of battlefield nuclear weapons designed to target that very mass. Their utility as a deterrent was superceded by the superpowers' appetite and capacity for MAD. Although we have seen such massed armoured formations loosed in battle on several occasions post-war, General Smith contends that these were not wars, but periodic and short-term deviations from a rhythm that sees a steady state of confrontation periodically interupted by short and sharp interludes of conflict.
The Utility of Force argues that heavy armoured formations are not suitable for conducting the War Among the People that characterises the more prevalent periods of confrontation. That is to say that while they might represent an overwhelming balance in terms of combat power they lack utility. Afghanistan and Iraq prove this to be the case.
For those whose who would like a bit of a pre-emptive strike to prepare the way, I would suggest you take a look at Martin van Crefeld's The Changing Face of War. An easier and shorter read, its sets down similar building blocks upon which Smith's thesis is pinned. But don't skip the main course - The Utility of Force is worth working through and a far more rewarding read than recent publications from Smith's near contemporaries. For any commissioned officer engaged in or preparing for counterinsurgency operations, it is essential reading. Even more so for the politicians and civil servants who have a hand in developing and funding the armed forces' changing capabilities.