The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century [Hardcover]

That's exactly my rating for this book - seeing as 4 stars means "I like it" - whereas a fabulous 5 would mean "I love it" - yet I don't think I would go that far.

However, I truly enjoyed reading this well articulated argument that war is not revolutionary - rather evolutionary, and according to the author - we have been in the 4th Generation of Warfare for the past 70 or so years. And if the past evolutionary stages have shown us that warfare is evolving faster than it used to - we are well on the way to a 5th Generation... when Western conventional armies are just about learning to adapt to the current.

There are several chapters that can be described as case-studies- including:

The initial development in the sense of modern warfare starts with Mao's People's War- to be further developed by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.... with some refinements with the Sandinistas of Nicaragua... not to mention the Two Palestinian Intifadas (I liked Hammes's interesting interpretation that the first Intifada was in the Palestinians' favour with that strong media image of stone throwing youths against hi-tech tanks... only to be over-turned by the more violent approach of the Al-Aqsa Intifada - which Israel (With a clever provocative and political maneuver by Ariel Sharon in visiting the shrine with bodyguards).

Of relatively more recent cases - the Colonel brings into perspective the highly tribal political arena of Afghanistan and the low-tech insurgency of Iraq... as well as a chapter on the very transnational nature of Al-Qa'ida.

Essentially, this work adds to the current debate about the alleged obsolescence of major interstate warfare. The U.S military, it is argued- highly bureaucratic and still obsessed with hi-tech warfare as a solution to its military problems (there is no doubt that when it comes to state-state warfare - none can compare to the U.S war machine in obliterating an enemy's armed forces and infrastructure).

But what happens when you are faced with low-tech, insurgent and protracted warfare? - bearing in mind 4th Gen. Wars are measured not in months or years- what the U.S is used to (or weeks in the case of Iraq 03) but decades. And along with too many body bags returning home - patience is another American weakness - which 4th Gen. warriors seem to have in abundance. So what happens when faced with such an enemy? you get defeated that's what - as Vietnam, Lebanon (the 80's baracks attack), Somalia (think blackhawk down).. and for the Russians (their own 'Nam)Afghanistan followed by Chechnya in the 90s.

Unlike the U.S military - which seeks superiority- primarily but not exclusively in hi-tech warfare and military fighting capabilities... the 4th Gen. Warriors seek not to destroy the superior army (obviously) but to defeat their political will - back home where it counts - the voters and policy makers.

After all, warfare's character may change - but its nature will always be as Clausewitz stated - organised violence for political means. Now if war is not being waged for the benefit of the political goals of the leadership backhome - it isn't war. Therefore, all the 4GW have to do is simply stay in the fight.. the fact that they can tactically retreat and re-emerge (as in Afghanistan now) illustrates this. Moreover, they seek to send the message home that it simply isn't worth it to stay and fight - they merely need to carry on sending the body bags home till the American public have had enough - they seek the superior political will.

Technology, as the author argues facilitates the means to send the political messages more effectively than ever before, therefore the 4th Gen. Warriors are more suited and indeed are capitalising on the tools available in this Information Age, while the conventional armies are struggling to keep up who are better equipped from warfare of the Industrial Age.

Having said all this - as soon as I finished this book I made a start on another book - though I am currently still reading, I am certain it would be worthy of a 5 stars.. and that as you may have seen on the related books feature is Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare - this work is impressive and maintains the grim, realist approach that war will always be with us - and that it is still too early to be talking about the demise of inter-state warfare. I bring this book up not to diverge from the review of the Colonel's book - but rather to bring up a point which Gray makes about the 4th Generation Warfare theory - he even quotes from the Sling and the Stone- the "gospel" as he calls.

Gray dismisses it as being the latest in a line of trendy buzz-words, that as he sees it are just re-packaged, re-branded forms of warfare that have actually already been in existence - Gray, merely passes "4th Generation Warfare" as Irregular Warfare being opposed to Regular Warfare, as such he has two highly informative chapters on both concepts, respectively.

There are always arguments for and against with ideas and theories - and as I have said, I liked the Colonel's book - and I agree with many of his findings - yet it was because of this book, it more or less led me to look at the other perspective on the matter (Another Bloody Century) - as I recommend you all do too if you want a balance for this timely topic.

Both books attempt to discuss the nature of 21st century warfare - of the two, Gray acknowledges the difficulties and temptations that can cause one to make bold, definitive, historic statements - and as such says he could so well be wrong - yet maintains that history is still our best guide for the future prospects of warfare - and therefore with a rich history spanning 3 millenia of warfare - we have no reason to believe this century will be any different.. and there is no reason to assume both forms - "Regular" and "Irregular" will not be present. I feel Gray's epic work is the more convincing of warfare in our century. Though time will of course be the determining factor.

The Sling and the Stone is required reading for those students with academic interests in war and warfare and insurgency or terrorism. I myself being a student of International Security found this highly applicable.

Finally, a minor, unimportant question I have, and this is probably more to do with the publishers than the author - but why is there a 20th century image (from Intifada I) on the front cover for a book on 21st century warfare?! I am sure by now we have many archives available of violent, warlike imagery post 2000...

This is quite an easy read for non-military people and ought to be on the reading list of politicians in particular. It undoubtedly does what it says on the tin by spelling out the developing nature of war into the 21st century.

It is probably not worth getting hung up on the definitions of the phases - they are just a useful structure. Nevertheless, the book provides a good summary of how fourth generation warfare (as defined) started with Mao before World War 2 and focuses on the direct destruction of the enemy's political will. It charts progress and refinements from Mao through Vietnam, the Sandanistas, the Palestinian Intifada and into Al-Qaeda, Iraq and Afghanistan and shows how insurgents form loose networks that are resilient and difficult to destroy.

It is made clear that 5GW has already started but worrying about that is to miss the point that modern "opponents" seek to win by wearing down political will through a long drawn-out struggle. They don't have to "win" - only stay in the struggle until the other (democratic) side gives-up and goes home. There are lessons here for policy makers and the military.

No book can cover all aspects but this is a useful contribution to the debate to be taken with other inputs. There is an extensive reference section, but no mention of Gunnar Heinsohn and his demographic theory of war (Sons of World Power etc., in German but still not in English) despite a clear lead into the subject on page 183 about "angry young men with time on their hands". A pity - it would be interesting to compare demographic profiles for the listed countries/campaigns and to suggest alternative policy responses as a result. Perhaps someone else can oblige?

Reading this I reminded of how twenty years ago Senator Gary Hart (remember him?) led the military reform movement in the US. In the diagnosis of the reformers the Pentagon and the US armed forces in general were overly bureaucratic, conservative wedded to hugely expensive and irrelevant weapons systems, outdated personnel policies and backward in their thinking about war. Their solution - a turn to the ideas of John Boyd and other proponents of manoeuvre warfare. However much the Pentagon bought into Boyd the characteristics of the organization remain the same.

Thomas Hammes is a recently retired US Marine Colonel his argument is that war has entered the fourth generation (4GW) and the US has failed to prepare for it even though it has already been defeated by 4GW opponents three times in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia (this edition has a 2006 publication date but the text is unchanged from the 2004 initial publication) and is facing defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of learning how to deal with insurgent networks the Pentagon has invested in the high tech systems necessary to defeat a non-existent Warsaw Pact enemy.

Much of what Hammes has to say is sensible but trying to fit the whole story into four generations of warfare seems implausible. 1st generation is Napoleonic tactics, 2GW is First World War firepower based conflict, 3GW is blitzkrieg and 4GW is what comes after this. He argues that the transition is driven by changes in the broader social context of warfare. This doesn't work for me because the first of his case studies is Maoist People's War - if the level of development of the society drives innovation in warfare how can the China of the 1930s be more advanced...? I suspect that 4GW works more a marketing concept to sell his ideas in the military community.

My take on what Hammes sees as 4GW is essentially networked protracted war. Clausewitz realized that a stronger opponent could be defeated by protracted warfare provided that the weaker side could survive for long enough to build strength and/or transform the political situation. This insight lies at the heart of the Chinese/Vietnamese concept of protracted war. Hammes sees that in the contemporary world new civilian communications and transport systems provide new opportunities for the weak to challenge the strong while at the same time creating new vulnerabilities for their opponents.

If we look at the conflicts that the US has actually engaged in apart from Desert Storm and the March/April 2003 phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom Hammes is right. He seems on much weaker ground in putting forward ideas about how the US can actually prevail - can western democracies actually fight decades long wars in the current media environment? Here what he really needs is a more concrete analysis of current global politics.