The Prehistory Of The Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art, Religion and Science [Paperback]

"The prehistory of the mind" by Steven Mithen is a book dealing with some of the mysteries of human prehistory. We know that Neanderthals had larger brains than modern humans, and could manufacture spear points by a rather complicated process. We also know that they managed to survive in really forbidding territories during the Ice Ages. It's obvious that the Neanderthals weren't stupid. And yet, they never created anything resembling a human culture. They had no art, no religion, and even their technical skills were static. They never developed beyond making those spear points. Why? Similar problems arise during studies of even earlier humans. Homo erectus could manufacture hand axes and successfully spread from Africa to Asia and Europe. But once again, the hand axes never developed pass a certain point. The technology of Homo erectus also remained static. Nor did they develop a symbolic culture.

The plot thickens when we realize that originally not even our own species, Homo sapiens sapiens, had a culture. The first artwork has been dated to 40,000 years BP. Yet, Homo sapiens sapiens was around already 100,000 years BP. For about 60,000 years, "modern" humans (with large brains and all) lived on the same level as the Neanderthals - smart, perhaps, but not smart enough to creatively develop new technologies, let alone art or religion. Even more curious, culture seems to have come into being all of a sudden, without a gradual transition from more primitive forms. What on earth is going on?

Some people have drawn supernatural conclusions from this. Perhaps creative human intelligence can only be explained by invoking gods, spirits or space aliens? An example of such a wild approach is Graham Hancock's book "Supernatural" (which I reviewed some years ago). As a mainline archaeologist, Steven Mithen naturally cannot accept the supernatural approach. Intelligence as such clearly evolved. Therefore, it's reasonable to assume that even the sudden appearance of culture has some kind of natural explanation. But what could it be?

Steven Mithen takes as his point of departure the idea that the mind consists of several different moduls. One of these Mithen calls "general intelligence". The other moduls are technical intelligence, linguistic intelligence, social intelligence and natural history intelligence. The idea that the mind can be divided in this fashion might still be contentious in some circles, but Mithen believes that there is empirical support for the idea. Studies of brain damage, autism or epileptic seizures suggest that different parts of the brain do indeed control different abilities. Even more controversial is the idea that the moduls are genetically determined. The human mind isn't a blank slate. In a sense, we are born with innate concepts about how to organize the world around us. Small children seem to have an intuitive knowledge of elementary psychology, biology and physics. They also seem to have innate templates for language acquisition.

Our species have the ability to integrate the separate moduls of the mind. This seems to happen already when we are about three years old. But what would happen to our intelligence if the moduls weren't integrated? What if there was no connection between, say, social intelligence and technical intelligence?

Steven Mithen believes that this is the clue to the mystery of the early human mind (or chimp mind, for that matter). The general intelligence probably evolved first. Then the social intelligence was added. Chimpanzees have a developed social intelligence, most famously documented by Frans de Waal in his various books on the subject. Chimpanzees can also use twigs, branches and stones as tools, but chimpanzee mothers have great difficulty teaching this primitive tool-use to their offspring (they do try). The success rate seems haphazard. It's almost as if their technical intelligence (which makes tool-use possible) isn't integrated with their social intelligence (in this case, teaching and learning). Indeed, Mithen believes that chimpanzees must use their general intelligence to learn tool-use, which makes the process a difficult one of trial and error. Mithen is also sceptical to the claims that chimpanzees and bonobos have learned to master language. In his opinion, even the famous bonobo Kanzi falls far short of three year old humans when it comes to language use.

Over the course of evolution, more and more moduls were added, and the existing ones became more advanced. However, the integration of the various moduls didn't take place until about 40,000 years ago in our own species. This might explain the seemingly anomalous intelligence of the Neanderthals and other early humans. As already noted, Neanderthals could manufacture points and spears, but their spears seem to have been very primitive compared to spears used by modern hunters and gatherers. For instance, an Inuit harpoon consists of 26 different components. A Neanderthal spear only had two or three! Nor was there any development over time, despite an obvious selection pressure for technological advances (the Ice Ages). The Inuit in the Arctic have responded to their own "ice age" by improving their technology. The Neanderthals did nothing! The author also notes that Neanderthals almost never used bone, ivory or antler to manufacture tools, despite having access to this material. They only used stone. This too is curious. The only possible explanation is that the various moduls of the Neanderthal mind were to a large extent still operating independently of each other.

Of course, it's very difficult for us to even imagine how such a mind can possibly work. How can social intelligence be disconnected from technological intelligence? The best analogy Mithen can think of is how we subconsciously master the driving of a car, while speaking to a passenger. After the car ride, we hardly even remember the traffic signs, turn pikes or other vehicles. Yet, we must have noticed them somehow! A more bizarre analogy used by the author is that of an epileptic seizure known as "petit mal", during which the subject might continue doing household chores or even playing the piano, while the conscious mind is blocked. Perhaps this was how Neanderthal mind worked? Mithen also believes that the Neanderthals had a very empirical consciousness. People were people were people, animals were animals, and so on. This empirical consciousness made it impossible for the Neanderthals to grasp the concept of art or religion, which requires symbolical thinking.

Only Homo sapiens sapiens have achieved cognitive fluidity. And once the various sectors of the mind are interconnected, culture sprouts fully formed, without transitional forms. In a sense, our symbolic minds are both a triumph and a tragedy. They make it possible for us to develop a sophisticated language, writing, art and modern science. However, they also make "modern" humans prone to illusions and superstitions. As Pascal Boyer points out in his book "Religion Explained", religion is based precisely on a kind of negative connection between our innate intuitions. The gods and spirits violate some of our intuitions, while conforming to others. A spirit violates our intuitive physics (it has a body, but can be invisible, or pass through solid objects), while nevertheless having access to socially relevant information (confirming our intuitive psychology). Mithen points out that racism is another product of symbolic thinking. In this case the intuitive idea that different animals have different "essences" is projected on various human groups.

Ironically, the Neanderthals couldn't develop racism or religion, precisely because their minds weren't capable of creative analogy and symbol. Another Neanderthal may have been seen as a competitor, but not as a member of a different "race" with other properties. A physical object was physical, period. They weren't imbued with any spiritual properties.

The cultural, scientific and aesthetic achievements of humanity are therefore ultimately the products of the same integrated mind that spawned religion, superstition and racism. At least according to this author! This may or may not be true. However, since secular humanism, enlightenment and even tolerant religion are also possible, humans aren't doomed to suffer from a beautiful mind...

This is a wonderful book. It starts with the question of whether we are fundamentally different from chimpanzies in the way our mind works. Taking the perspective of an archaeologist, and blending that with the views of evolutionary biology and of human developmental psychology and cognitive science, Mithen spins an extroadinary tale. The earliest and most primative primates probably had most of their cognitive world "hard-wired." They had all the specific knowledge they needed for survival. Primates really took off from the rest of the mammals when we developed "general intelligence," which could learn from trial and error, and which could make generalizations based on experience. However, this general intelligence was slow in acquiring new knowledge. To accomplish that, specialized intelligences, or programs, needed to evolve.
The first of these was social intelligence, which was the specialized ability to read and understand social heirarchies. Early empathy and the ability to infer from your own experience what other members of your species were thinking and feeling was the greatest power this new intelligence conferred, and became the origin of consciousness. The second specialized intelligence was that of natural biology. This was very helpful in expanding our observations of the world, and increased the food sources which were available to primitive ancestors of homo sapiens. The third specialized intelligence was technical intelligence. This enabled early man to fashion tools and to use them in ever more complex ways.

To these three intelligences -- psychology, biology, and physics, so to speak -- was added linguistic intelligence. This gave the conscious mind a voice. It also enhanced the other three intelligences, especially social intelligence. Prior to the evolution of linguistic intelligence, peer communication was mostly visual and tactile. Speech was much more efficient than grooming in building and maintaining social bonds. It was also linguistic intelligence that made possible the next great leap to meta-intelligence.

Linking the four specialized intelligences, there evolved during the period leading up to 40,000 years ago, a supraordinate intelligence which permitted what we might now call multitasking, or integration among the other specialized intelligences. We see the first evidence of this in the bursting forth of art and religion at that time. None of these appear to have been present prior to that time.

Much like a simple computer, the earliest primates had a set of basic information. Then came a generalized processor. To this were added specialized programs for psychology, biology, physics, and language. Finally, true homo sapiens developed a metaprogram linking the others and permitting genuine creativity to take off.

Unlike most popular books on science for the educated layperson, Mithen does not go in for much chit chat. This is a pet peave of mine in other books, such as "Sex on the Brain," or "Why We Age." Too much irrelevant material on the appearance and personal quirks of the scientists and not enough of the science. Not so here. The writing is only a tiny bit repetitious, and is generally excellent.

A few other brief notes. Mithen explains some of the subtler aspects of upright posture, such as taking less direct sun, which permits foraging in the middle of the day. He addresses the role of a meat diet compared to a vegetarian one. He also demonstrates conclusively that while chimps and other primates have certain things in common with us, human intelligence is truly a unique phenomenon.

Mithen makes a valiant effort to establish the evolutionary roots of human intelligence. It's a complicated task, with so little physical evidence to support his endeavour. Still, he uses what there is with commendable ability. In presenting the development of intelligence, he falls back on three metaphorical images - the Swiss Army Knife, cathedral architecture and a dramatic play. The Swiss Army knife is a collection of specialized tools, each applied without relation to the others. You don't decork a wine bottle while trimming your fingernails. His cathedral is comprised of a central nave with connecting chapels. The chapels only connect to each other as intelligence develops. The drama is the history o1f hominid evolution, vague and obscure in the beginning, growing more discernible with more fossil evidence.

As with most cognitive studies, Mithen's book summarizes what is known of the similarity of chimpanzee [our nearest relative] intellect and abilities in contrast with our own. As do many of his colleagues, he finds our primate cousins lacking in all but minimal skills. With the chimpanzees thus disposed of, he moves to examine the hominid record. This is the great strength of this work. Instead of the usual tactic of portraying what is known of today's human intellect and projecting backward, Mithen starts at the beginnings of human evolution to carry his argument forward. Along the way he utilizes anthropology, morphological studies, even climate and geography. He uses evidence well, assuming little and carefully building the model. Key points in the narrative are two periods of hominid brain enlargement, which he uses to enhance his model of special "intelligences."

With the earliest hominids having only a Swiss Army knife array of mental tools, each segment of intelligence had to develop independent of the others. According to Mithen, this situation led to each "tool" building a separate "chapel" in the mind. Based on a central "nave" of "general" intelligence - keeping the body going, food gathering, sex - new intelligences would arise around it. These new intelligences are technical, natural, social and linguistic. Each operated independently of the others, so that tool-making enhanced "technical" intelligence, while learning about bird migration or fruiting seasons developed "natural" intelligence. The Swiss Army knife structure prevented these intelligences from interacting until the emergence of Homo sapiens. Then, according to Mithen, a "cognitive fluidity" tore through the walls of the "intelligence chapels" to acquire the broad range of abilities the mind exhibits today. While direct evidence of all this activity is, necessarily missing, the forceful presentation and elegant logic make it all a captivating read.

It's easy to critique Mithen's thesis. All you need is a competitive model of cognition. However, that would be unfair to what he has achieved, a carefully synthesized model of how human intelligence developed. Even without bringing in a competitive thesis, Mithen falls down in two important areas. After lengthy discussion of tool-making enhancing "technical" intelligence and its role in developing hunter-gatherer societies, he blithely omits any input from the "gathering" half of those communities. While rarely mentioning that tool-makers/hunters are almost exclusively male, even among chimpanzees, he restricts mention of female roles to the need to give birth to small-headed babies. He also depicts the changing of "social" intelligence associated with grooming in early hominids to the development of speech later. He ignores the possibility that speech is just as likely to have arisen within the community of females, who had greater reason to utilize it.

The second major flaw is his conclusion on how modern minds evolved from earlier ones. He argues that the "social" intelligence became the tool that opened the walls of his "intelligence chapels" of the cathedral. Since there is no reason to believe that intelligence should be so pigeon-holed as Mithen makes it, "social intelligence" as an integrating force is vague at best. Although comparison with a competitive thesis may be unfair, it's difficult not to refer the reader to Daniel C. Dennett's Multiple Drafts model of consciousness. If Mithen had consulted Dennett's Consciousness Explained, instead of blithely dismissing it, he would have discovered that his cathedral and chapels would have been built up over time instead of needing serious renovation at the end. Mithen would have been able to use the same evidence, indeed, the same metaphors, but with progressive construction instead of building then repairing. Knocking down mental walls is not a satisfactory technique to build intellect. Instead, Mithen should have kept the theatre metaphor, which he restricts to history, and built up his drama from a soliloquy to a full cast epic. That would have allowed him to enlarge mental capacities through new players, scenery changes, improved interaction among the cast, perhaps with himself taking the final bow. Given the work he's obviously put into this and the wealth of evidence he's considered and offered us, a smattering of applause [after a careful reading of the libretto] is not out of order.